Logan, Yvonne
Page 1 of 1

Thomas Grim, Document Manager
US Dept. of Energy
Nat'l Nuclear Security Adm.
Livermore Site Office
700 East Ave, L-293
Livermore CA 94550-9234

Dear Sir – I worked for the Nat'l Inst. of Health on the Baby Tooth Survey in the 60's measuring Stromtium-90 from the atomic tests. I am very concerned that ST-90, CE-137 and americum-241 are found in
1/24.04 water and plants downwind from the LAB. The ST-90, particularly, showed 34 times higher than the legal standard. Please advise.

Yvonne Logan
36 S. Gore
St. Louis, MO 63119

Lonhart, Julia
Page 1 of 1

Dear Mr. Tom Grim

I am writing to urge you to put
1/04.01 a stop to the Environmental Impact Statement on Livermore Labs. I am in fierce opposition to the planned operations for the next ten years. Our future
2/33.01 should not revolve around plutonium amounts doubling
3/35.01 and restarting biowarfare development at the cost of our environment and the safety of our nation. The airborne radioactivity is currently at horribly dangerous levels and with the Environmental Impact Statement
4/17.04 these levels will increase to the destruction of many. Do what is right and put a stop to such a horrible and destructive plan.

Julia Lonhart

Lonzarich, Adriane
Page 1 of 1

Adriane Lonzarich
1264 Edinburgh St.
San Mateo, CA 94402

RECEIVED MAY 11 2004

May 8, 2004

Mr. Tom Grim
DOE, NNSA, L293
7000 East Ave.
Livermore, CA 94550

Dear Mr. Grim,

I have recently been made aware of Lawrence Livermor Lab's plans to increase it's production and storage of dangerous materials and it's plans to add a facility for Bio-warfare research and development.

1/04.01 Not only am I opposed to such development and disturbed at the danger this poses to the present and future generations. but I'm also puzzled at how some of the most intelligent people of our country as you have at Livermore can believe that you can guarantee that this work is not dangerous in view of being located near two earthquake faults and being a logical target for terrorist attack.

I urge you to reconsider these plans. In pursuit of security we are giving up the very hope of having security and creating an enemy (radioactive leakage, possibility of accidents, pollution from weapons prōduction etc.) in our own backyards.

Sincerely,

Adriane Lonzarich

Ludwig-Goeman, Karen
Page 1 of 1

-----Original Message-----
From: karen.ludwig@philips.com [mailto:karen.ludwig@philips.com]
Sent: Monday, April 26, 2004 6:20 AM
To: tom.grim@oak.doe.gov
Subject: Livermore lab changes

Mr. Grim,

1/04.01 I will not be able to attend the Tuesday public hearing in Livermore but wanted to voice my opinion that I am adamantly opposed to the proposed changes to double the plutonium limit, manufacture prototype plutonium bomb cores, use plutonium in NIF experiements, manufacture radioactive tritium targets at NIF and import live anthrax, plague and other pathogens by collocating a biowarfare agent research facitlity with nuclear weapons.

Best Regards,
Karen Ludwig-Goeman
769 Via Del Sol
Livermore CA 94550

Lytle, Jackie
Page 1 of 1

Dear Mr. Grim,

1/04.01 I am writing to urge you to oppose the Environmental Impact Statement on Livermore Lab's planned operations for the next ten years.

2/33.01 I oppose doubling plutonium limits, and I oppose increasing the amount of

3/17.04 airborne radioactivity. Because the proposed plan will do the above, I very strongly oppose the plan.

4/35.01 Designing and supporting the start of biowarfare development is immoral. Please consider this letter

thank you very much
Jackie Lytle

MacDougall, John
Page 1 of 1

Dear Mr Grim:

1/33.01 I am shocked at plans to increase nuclear-weapons activities and double the amount of plutonium at Livermore National Laboratory. I urge you to cancel those plans, and the following are some critical reasons for this.

2/27.02 1. One of these plans was cancelled over ten years ago, on the grounds of being dangerous and unnecessary. This is the Plutonium Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation. This would require a 3-fold increase in the amount of plutonium used in a single room-which would pose grave dangers to public health, and cause serious risks of nuclear nonproliferation in the event some plutonium was stolen.

3/37.01 2. Another plan involves testing new technologies to manufacture plutonium pits for nuclear weapons. This-jointly with the Modern Pit Facility--would make possible the production of 150-450 bomb cores annually, which is about the double the combined nuclear arsenals of France and China. This program would gravely destabilize and already-hazardous world.

4/26.01, 26.03 3. As a result of these plans, plutonium, highly-enriched uranium and litium hydride would be added to experiments in the National Ignition Facility (NIF) when the latter is completed at Livermore. That will in turn increase the possibility of using the NIF to develop nuclear weapons, and create additional public-health risks for workers at Livermore.

5/26.04 4. Under the plans, the amount of tritium in test targets will rise tenfold. Here again there is a serious radiation danger for Livermore workers-particularly given that Livermore has a history of tritium spills, releases and accidents.

6/39.01 5. The plans call for Livermore to develop diagnostics to "enhance" the readiness of the US to conduct full-scale underground nuclear tests. This will lead the world back to the dangerous days of unrestrained nuclear testing..

7/35.01 6. The plans provide for an advanced bio-warfare agent facility located at the same area at Livermore as the nuclear-weapons work. This could weaken the international treaty against biological weapons. In addition, at a time of public concern about bioterrorism, the plan could cause the equivalent of a bioterror attack in the event that harmful organisms got out of Livermore. Such an event would threaten not only Livermore workers and residents but millions of people in the nearby Bay Area.

In short, the new plans for Livermore cause very serious problems for public health. Further, they make our country LESS safe by aggravating the risk of nuclear proliferation, and by contributing to the development, testing and deployment of highly-provocative weapons.

Sincerely yours,

John MacDougall, Professor
Department of Regional Economic & Social Development
University of Massachusetts Lowell
61 Wilder St.
Lowell MA 01854
Tel. 978-934-4303, fax 978-934-4028

MacKinnon, Fr Donald, CSsR
Page 1 of 1

I am Fr Donald MacKinnon. I am 70 years old. One of my fondest memories is to have been in New York when Pope Paul VI visited the UN. You remember that he finished his remarks there with the quote from Isaiah, "War never again. No more war."

Clearly, as has become brutally obvious in Iraq, modern war is of another species entirely than the conflicts waged in centuries past. There is no way that non-combatants will not be killed, maimed, even their unborn generations subject to crippling because of nuclear-tipped weapons.

1/07.01 The Rad Lab here at Livermore has a potential for developing peaceful technology. Disastrously, currently it is receiving most of its funding for making unbelievably terrible weapons of war.

As an old American, I beg you to reconsider the uses to which the dedicated personnel at Livermore can spend their creative energies. Help them build the peace. Turn the swords into plowshares.

War never again. War no more.

Thank you.

Fr Donald MacKinnon CSsR
2215 Rose St
Berkeley CA 94709-1430

510.981.9005

Makhijani, Ph.D., Arjun
Page 1 of 2

Comments of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research on the Draft Supplemental Site-Wide Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic EIS, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, DOE/EIS-0348, February 2004

by
Arjun Makhijani, Ph.D.
Washington, D.C. April 30, 2004

These comments on the Livermore Draft Site-Wide Programmatic EIS on stockpile stewardship (abbreviated here as SWPEIS) are restricted to the issues of the environmental and health impacts of plutonium processing covered in the SWPEIS. IEER may submit further comments at a later time.

1/33.01 The proposal to vastly expand plutonium storage and processing in the preferred alternative would convert Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory into a major industrial-scale plutonium processing site. This is a risky idea anywhere, but especially in a urban/suburban community, where there are homes very close to the boundary of the site and about a quarter of a mile from the processing buildings. Even Rocky Flats, located as it was in the Denver-Boulder metropolitan corridor did not have such close proximity of processing buildings to homes. The

2/25.06 SWPEIS does not address this problem with any detail or technical depth. Specifically, it is essential that data relating to failure frequencies of equipment, past accident frequencies, accident records from comparable processing facilities at Rocky Flats, be incorporated into the risk analysis in Appendix D and Appendix N. The failure probabilities and source terms will lack scientific foundation and credibility until that is done.

3/27.01, 05.01 The preferred alternative would process 100 kilograms of plutonium every year, mostly in oxide form and reduced it to metal (Appendix N). This is a large-scale operation for processing enough plutonium metal for 20 to 30 nuclear bombs (depending on the design). It would be 25 times the amount processed under the No-Action Alternative" discussed in the EIS. Such a scale-up needs to be justified in the context of existing available plutonium processing facilities at Los Alamos National Laboratory, and the expansion of that capacity that has been proposed, including the upgrade of the CMR building at LANL. This alternative does not appear to have been considered at all. No processing at LLNL should be considered as the "no-action" alternative.

Makhijani, Ph.D., Arjun
Page 2 of 2

2/25.06 cont. The SWPEIS states that "some changes in equipment and procedure" would be needed, mostly to reduce worker radiation doses. But a detailed analysis of these changes is not presented. Without such an analysis it is impossible to evaluate the postulated accident frequencies and source terms in Appendix D, or the routine radiation doses from plutonium processing. The SWPEIS proposes to use direct reduction of plutonium oxide with calcium. This is an exothermic reaction. The risks of accidents and process upsets, derived from prior experience, need to be presented in detail, based on experience with this specific process.

4/27.03 THE SWPEIS assumes that Livermore will receive feed materials from which americium has been "completely removed" (p N-16); shipments would be from Hanford and SRS. What is the basis for assuming this? For instance, there are no operating processing facilities at Hanford that would allow for completely americium-free material to be received. This assumption appears to be quite unrealistic and needs to be justified in detail or changed. Given the importance of americium for both radiation doses as well as for waste management, it is essential that the SWPEIS have a more realistic assumption about americium contamination of the feed material. As it is even with the assumption of receipt of clean material and only 2 years of storage, a waste stream of up to about 10 kilograms of americium/plutonium metal per year is expected to be generated (p. N-16)

The SWPEIS indicates that the americium/plutonium metal buttons would either be sent to LANL or to WIPP. The State of New Mexico has stated that it will not allow waste material in WIPP that was not included in the 1995 TRU Waste Baseline Inventory Report (DOE/CAO-95-1121).[1] Pure TRU metal from Livermore or any other site is not included in that inventory. The SWPEIS is silent on this issue. It also does not specify the eventual disposition of the waste that would remain in case the plutonium/americium buttons are sent to LANL and some of the plutonium is recovered. Neither does it justify why these operations should not be done at LANL, so that unnecessary transport is avoided.

5/25.05 The production of large amounts of plutonium metal and its processing and evaporation so as to enable the isotopes to be separated by atomic vapor laser separation may entail significant risks that must be evaluated in the context of the urban/suburban location of LLNL.

6/31.04 IEER will present further comments in writing before the end of the comment period. But even a preliminary review of the plutonium processing aspects of the SWPEIS has revealed profound and fundamental deficiencies in this draft document. These deficiencies are so serious that the DOE should re-do the document and re-issue it as a draft so that a more thorough public discourse and public comment on this is possible.

[1] I would like to thank Don Hancock of the Southwest Research and Information Center for the information relating to the WIPP permit.

Manley, James
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2619 Benvenue Ave. Apt. G
Berkeley, CA 94704
April 29, 2004

Tom Grim, Document Manager
NNSA Livermore Site Office, L-293
7000 East Avenue, Livermore, CA 94550-9234
tom.grim@oak.doe.gov

Mr. Grim,

Thank you very much for your presentation this Tuesday in Livermore. It must be difficult to go up in front of such an obviously hostile crowd and present details about the proposed increase in plutonium and biological agents in the neighborhoods of those present. If no one does it, though, the people won't know: thanks for your contribution.

I have several questions and reservations about the draft EIS that I would like to see addressed. My comments are based on the summary, so I apologize if by skipping the longer version I missed some key details. If this is the case, please provide a thorough explanation of the relevant issues in your response, and consider making the summary more comprehensive.

1/22.01 First is the issue of the WIPP. A "mobile" contractor is to package and ship more than 1,000 drums of highly radioactive waste to the WIPP, but I can find no mention of exactly what or where this facility is: please clarify. In S.5.1.9 it says that the DOE has determined the WIPP Mobile Vendor facility to be categorically excluded from NEPA review, but it is far from obvious why the loading point for shipments containing potentially fissile materials should be considered so free of potential damage to the environment as to be glossed over. While on-site, materials may be more likely to be stable (barring seismic events or terrorism) but transportation seems likely to increase the probability of accidental releases or worse. Please complete the EIS to compensate for this omission and resubmit it.

2/38.01 Next I want to question the exclusion of the Container Security Testing Facility. If container security is being tested, the potential for container breach must exist. Given the possibility of breach, one cannot exclude the possibility of accidental emissions, and accompanying damage to the environment and/ or people in the environs. Please consider this issue and submit another draft EIS.

3/35.01 The BSL-3 facility also raises questions. The DOE has apparently already deemed the facility to be harmless, but I would like an evaluation of the possibility of accidental emission or exposure to biological agents via access and egress points. How will the agents be brought to Livermore? How will they be disposed of?

4/33.01 Section S.5.1.4 says that "Superblock operations would have to be modified or curtailed if a disposition pathway is not established for plutonium." Given that no disposition pathway is available (two lines previous) it seems clear that operations have to be curtailed! The language of this document makes imperative a cessation of activity, not an expansion: the Proposed

Manley, James
Page 2 of 3

4/33.01 cont. Alternative is clearly infeasible by the DOE's own standards, as is the mislabeled "No Action Alternative." At the very least this language needs to be clarified: what is the timetable within which a disposition pathway must be found before curtailment begins? Why has it not begun already, when this document argues that it must?

5/30.01 Again with respect to the Superblock, section S.5.2.2 says that evaluation of terrorist acts and Superblock security is provided in classified or official use only documents. Mr. Grim's presentation on Tuesday, April 27 contended that no portions of the document remained classified (Power Point presentation, slide 5). Particularly given the more recent DOE statement on the need to reconsider having multiple stockpiles of radioactive material, it is important that this material be made public. Further, the present document obviously was not written in light of the more recent DOE admission of the importance of potentially centralizing stores of plutonium and other fissile materials. The EIS must be performed again in light of the obviously powerful ramifications of the new information and analyses.

6/25.01, 25.08 Next, the accident analysis is woefully inadequate. The contention in S. 5.2.4 that an aircraft crash into a pit manufacturing facility under the Proposed Action Alternative would result in nothing more than 0.168 latent cancer fatalities per year is simply ludicrous. The impact from an airplane (why is it only a single-piston airplane?) crash would obviously breach any safety features, and sixty kilograms of fuel-grade equivalent plutonium's being exposed to extremely high temperatures from a fuel explosion seem likely to do more than release a few stray gamma rays. Even under the No Action Alternative it seems likely that 20kg of such plutonium in a pit manufacturing facility might reach criticality with horrific consequences.

7/25.06 The accident scenario in general is poorly designed. The rareness of the considered incident- less than once every million years- illustrates the lack of consideration in selecting the scenario more than anything else. It is tautologically designed: something rare, the DOE tells us, is rare. Why is there no consideration of purposive attack? Why is the seismic appendix withheld from the summary, and why did Mr. Grim fail to present any relevant information in his presentation? The draft EIS does not attempt to consider more than this one poorly designed case, and obviously more than one type of accident or event is possible, so again we find a need for the generation of a more comprehensive report listing, ironically, more common types of accidents and potential damage caused by each.

8/20.01 In particular, the failure to consider accidents during transportation is egregious. What is the possibility of an automobile accident on any given stretch of road? Consider the number of shipments *to* the facility, traveling thousand of miles from South Carolina and from Washington to Livermore. Consider also the number of shipments *from* the facility to the WIPP. Consider the number of people on the route and the possibility of accidental exposure. In Mr. Grim's presentation, he described the additional ambient radiation that population will be exposed to as the vehicles simply move through the cities along the way, but no mention was made of the possibility of collision or other accident. This needs to be corrected: please provide detailed information on the exact corridors and anticipated amounts of materials of all types to be transported along them. Corridors and anticipated transit should consider both access to and egress from the LLNL. Further, no mention is made of the potential exposure by truck drivers or other transportation workers. Please perform such analysis and resubmit this document.

Manley, James
Page 3 of 3

9/26.04 Another apparent oversight is the possibility of accidental breach of a tritium firing chamber. Certainly human error could lead to the venting of some tritium.

10/35.01 Further, no mention is made of the risks involved in transporting the biological agents: the Proposed Action Alternative involves increased experimentation with these agents, and so the risk of accidental release must be considered, both from the LLNL and while in transit. The

11/25.04 accident scenario alleges that the plane accident would have the same effect on the potential release of biological agents regardless of which alternative is chosen, but earlier the draft indicates that the Proposed Action involves increased work with biologicals, implying that greater quantities could be involved. This too must be corrected.

12/36.01 More transit issues arrive with the planned shipment of transuranic waste from the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. No analysis of the environmental or human risks involved in loading, transport, unloading, and storage is provided.

13/23.03 Human damage is calculated only in terms of latent cancer fatalities, but other morbidity consequences seem to be ignored. Please consider and report all types of morbidity effects of the facility both now and under all alternatives.

14/21.01 Since energy generation has clearly established environmental consequences, why is the issue of energy consumption not considered in this EIS? Regardless of how the existing millions of kilowatt-hours per year are used, the fact that they are used in itself implies significant environmental damage. This also needs to be considered.

15/07.01 Finally, I call upon the DOE to include several more options for future action, as requested by others in previous letters. There should be a "conversion to civilian research" option. There should also be a "conversion to a facility researching plutonium disposal" option. There should

16/05.01 be a true No Action Alternative rather than one that actually increases energy use above the Proposed Action Alternative. And finally, per the more recent DOE admission, there should be a

17/08.02 "Move all radioactive and weapons material to a more secure facility which is more distant from all population centers" option.

I look forward to your resubmission of this draft EIS and the next round of public comment. I also look forward to the day when our society no longer attempts to find excuses to justify the construction and repeated testing of nuclear weapons. This is the highest perversion of human intellectual power ever committed- please call it off!

Sincerely,

James Manley
University of California, Berkeley
Ph.D. student

Manley, James
Page 1 of 2

-----Original Message-----
From: James Manley [mailto:isahavajoe@yahoo.com]
Sent: Saturday, May 08, 2004 8:51 PM
To: tom.grim@oak.doe.gov
Cc: marylia@earthlink.net; schultz@fst.gtulink.edu
Subject: comments on draft EIS

Hello! I already sent in some comments on the draft EIS, but I realized that there was one issue which I neglected.

1/31.01 I see no justification in the draft EIS for the timeframe for the proposed action. As UC Berkeley Economist David Zilberman has written, there is a third option often overlooked in project evaluation:
the possibility of delaying the project. In many cases, postponement of a project allows waiting for technology to be developed and allows for further analysis of the manifold ramifications of complex projects. Building on the work of Nobel Prizewinner Ken Arrow (Arrow and Fisher 1974) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994), he and his coauthor Karina Schoengold describe the importance of considering the time of construction.
Their model maximizes discounted expected net benefits when a stochastic element is part of the benefit function, much as your economic analysis must be doing (unless you have somehow been given perfect
knowledge!) They find that the variance of the marginal benefit of project function can be reduced and the overall stream of benefits of a project enhanced if uncertainty is minimized at the time of project initiation, and in particular postponing projects to allow for extra time to enhance learning about how to optimize project parameters can enhance total project value. They say, "In particular, in cases where there is uncertainty about [research] productivity as a result of availability of a new technology or uncertainly about environmental impacts of [program] activities, the option value of waiting may be quite high and there may be significant gain from delay." (p. 36)
Thus, justifying a given action implies justifying the selected timeframe. In the draft EIS, as I noted in my previous letter, you call attention to the lack of an existing means for the disposal of plutonium. It seems extremely likely that investing research in this area right now is likely to improve returns to later program development. In other words, given the current state of technology, this project is not justified at the current time. The EIS must demonstrate the optimality of proceeding with any alternative other than a true no-action alternative over a scenario of delayed construction, which might include a reshuffling of research priorities in the short term, until a satisfactory means for plutonium disposal is found.

Thank you for your consideration, and I look forward to your comprehensive response.

James Manley
2619 Benvenue Ave. Apt. G
Berkeley, CA 94704
(510)843-8434

Manley, James
Page 2 of 2

References:

Arrow, K. and A. Fisher, 1974. "Environmental Preservation, Uncertainty, and Irreversibility,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 88: 312-19.

Dixit, A., and R. Pindyck, 1994. Investment Under Uncertainty. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Schoengold, Karina and David Zilberman, "The Economics of Water, Irrigation, and Development", forthcoming in "Handbook of Agricultural
Economics: Volume 3", editor Robert Evenson.

Markman, Leona
Page 1 of 3

-----Original Message-----
From: Bhasaleona@aol.com [mailto:Bhasaleona@aol.com]
Sent: Monday, May 10, 2004 11:24 AM
To: tom.grim@oak.doe.gov
Subject: opposition to livermore

Mr.Tom Grim
>DOE, NNSA, L-293
>7000 East Avenue
>Livermore, CA 94550
>
>for further information contact Tri-Valley CAREs at (925)
>443-7148 www.trivalleycares.org
>
>
>The letter itself is in blue text. Following the letter is information
>about what DOE & LLL is proposing.
>
>
>Dear Mr. Grim,
>
>Please consider this letter with my comments on the environmental and
>proliferation risks from proposed nuclear weapons development and new
>plutonium and tritium programs at the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE)
>Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL).
>
1/02.01 >I write to you because the DOE has prepared a draft Site Wide
>Environmental Impact Statement (SWEIS) that proposes to ramp up nuclear
>weapons activities at the Livermore Lab in Northern California.
>Livermore Lab is working on the design of a new, high-yield nuclear
>bunker-buster, called the "Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator," and I
>oppose its development. Additionally, I oppose the development of
>so-called "mini-nukes" and other new nuclear weapons concepts being
>researched at Livermore Lab.
>
>Here are my comments on six dangerous new programs being proposed at
>Livermore Lab.
>
2/08.02 >1. Storage of More Nuclear Materials: This plan will more than double
>the storage limit for plutonium at Livermore Lab from 1,540 pounds to
>3,300 pounds. It would increase the radioactive tritium storage limit
>from 30 grams to 35 grams. I join California Peace Action and the
>Livermore-based Tri-Valley CAREs group in calling on DOE to
>de-inventory the plutonium and tritium stocks at Livermore Lab, not increase them.
>
3/27.01, 33.01 >2. Plutonium Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation (AVLIS): This plan

Markman, Leona
Page 2 of 3

3/27.01, 33.01 cont.
>will revive a project that was canceled more than 10 years ago because
>it was dangerous and unnecessary. The project is Plutonium AVLIS. This
>is a scheme to heat and vaporize plutonium and then shoot multiple
>laser beams through the hot vapor to separate out plutonium isotopes.
>To do this, Livermore Lab plans to increase the amount of plutonium
>that can be used at one time in any one room from 44 pounds to 132
>pounds a 3-fold increase. I join California Peace Action and the
>Livermore-based Tri-Valley CAREs in calling for cancellation of this project.
>

4/26.01, 26.03
>3. Dangerous New Experiments in the National Ignition Facility
>Mega-Laser: This plan will add plutonium, highly-enriched uranium and
>lithium hydride to experiments in the National Ignition Facility (NIF)
>mega-laser when it is completed at Livermore Lab. Using these materials
>in the NIF will increase its usefulness for nuclear weapons
>development. It will also make the NIF more hazardous to workers and
>the environment. I join California Peace Action and the Livermore-based
>Tri-Valley CAREs in calling for a close out of the NIF project and
>termination of plans to use plutonium and other new materials in it.
>

5/37.01
>4. New Technologies for Producing Plutonium Bomb Cores: This plan
>makes Livermore Lab the place to test new manufacturing technologies
>for producing plutonium pits for nuclear weapons. A pit is the
>softball-sized piece of plutonium that sits inside a modern nuclear
>weapon and triggers its thermonuclear explosion. DOE says these new
>technologies will then be used in a new bomb core factory, called the
>Modern Pit Facility (MPF). The Livermore Lab plutonium pit program will
>enable the MPF and production of 150 - 450 plutonium bomb cores
>annually, with the ability to run double shifts and produce 900 per
>year. This production capability would approximate the combined nuclear arsenals of
France and China each year.
>I join California Peace Action and the Livermore-based Tri-Valley CAREs
>in calling for termination of this technology development project.
>

6/39.01
>5. Enhancing Readiness to Resume Full-Scale Nuclear Tests: This plan
>calls for Livermore Lab to develop diagnostics to "enhance" the
>nation's readiness to conduct full-scale underground nuclear tests at
>the Nevada Test Site. This is a dangerous step back to the days of
>unrestrained nuclear testing and I join with California Peace Action
>and Tri-Valley CAREs to oppose any move to "enhance" U.S. readiness to
>conduct full-scale tests.
>

7/35.01
>6. Mixing Bugs and Bombs: This plan mixes bugs and bombs at Livermore
>Lab. It calls for collocating an advanced bio-warfare agent research
>facility with nuclear weapons activities in a classified area at
>Livermore Lab. The DOE proposes genetic modification and aerosolization
>(spraying) with live anthrax, plague and other deadly pathogens on site

Markman, Leona
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7/35.01 cont.
>at LLNL. This could weaken the international biological weapons treaty
>-- and it poses a risk to workers, the public and the environment here in the California.
>Interestingly, this program is listed as part of LLNL's "no action
>alternative" as though it were an existing program -- even though it is
>not yet constructed, Tri-Valley CAREs has brought litigation against
>it, and a federal Judge has issued a "stay" prohibiting the importation
>of dangerous pathogens into the facility while the lawsuit moves
>forward. I join Tri-Valley CAREs in opposing the operation of a
>bio-warfare agent facility at Livermore Lab.
>

8/04.01
>I believe the DOE plan to introduce new weapons programs into LLNL will
>promote a new arms race and escalate the nuclear danger. Further, the
>DOE proposal to double LLNL's plutonium storage limit to 3,300 pounds
>and triple the amount held "at risk" in any one room increases the
>environmental threat LLNL poses to the people of California. The SWEIS
>propels Livermore Lab in exactly the wrong direction.
>

9/07.01
>Instead of proposing new weapons projects, DOE should enhance the
>peaceful, civilian scientific capabilities and mission at Livermore Lab
>by proposing new, unclassified programs in environmental cleanup,
>non-polluting and renewable energy, earth sciences, astrophysics,
>atmospheric physics and others. The alternative of a "green lab" in
>Livermore should be pursued instead of the dangerous nuclear weapons
>future proposed by the Site Wide Environmental Impact Statement.
>

>Sincerely,
>

leona markman,
509 townsend drive
aptos ca 95003