5. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES

      
      This chapter presents the potential environmental consequences of implementing each of the
alternatives described in Chapter 3.  To focus on the most significant issues in the design of the SNF
Program, this chapter summarizes and simplifies the more detailed site-specific analyses of environmental
consequences presented under separate cover as self-contained appendices to Volume 1.  The intent is to
provide a collection of summary information across DOE sites, SNF interim storage alternatives, and issue
areas without recounting the detail of the separate appendices.
      The Centralization alternative generally produces the greatest impacts, with somewhat smaller
impacts associated with the 1992/1993 Planning Basis and Regionalization alternatives.  The No Action
alternative may appear to have the least impact in some of the categories analyzed, such as transportation, but
it also produces larger impacts in others, such as estimated radiation doses as the result of accidents.  In
addition, the increased exposure of workers to radiation and the increased risks of release of radioactive
material to the environment with the continuing degradation of certain types of DOE SNF are potential
impacts that cannot be completely analyzed.
      This chapter is organized into eight sections.  The disciplines (topical areas) studied that result in
potential impacts, are of general public interest, or may help to discriminate among sites for alternatives are
discussed in Section 5.1.  In general, the consequences presented in Section 5.1 relate to socioeconomic
impacts, electricity use, waste generation, and radiological and transportation impacts.  The disciplines that
were studied that showed small impacts or clearly did not discriminate among sites or alternatives are
discussed in Section 5.2.  Sections 5.3 through 5.8 address cumulative impacts, unavoidable adverse
environmental effects, the relationship between short-term use and long-term productivity, irreversible and
irretrievable commitments of resources, potential mitigation measures, and environmental justice,
respectively.
      The period covered in this EIS is the 40 years from 1995 to 2035.  Detailed impact analyses  are
performed for the time period from 1995 to 2005.  Normal operation impacts at the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory are then projected for the remaining 30 years covered by this EIS.  The level of site-
specific detail presented in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 is commensurate with the size of the SNF inventory and the
number and types of sites where SNF would be stored.  Therefore, the analyses of the major DOE and naval
sites are more detailed than the analyses for the other generator/storage locations that would have limited
inventories under the No Action and Decentralization alternatives.  There are five major DOE sites that are or
may be responsible for managing the great majority of SNF:  Hanford Site, Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory, Savannah River Site, Oak Ridge Reservation, and Nevada Test Site.  The DOE did not consider
the Nevada Test Site to be a preferred site for the management of SNF because of the State of Nevada's
current role as the host site for the Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Project and the Nevada Test Site's
lack of SNF management facilities and high-level waste infrastructure.  Minor sites are the university and
government reactor sites and the three facilities that store small quantities of SNF for which DOE has
responsibility:  West Valley Demonstration Project, Babcock & Wilcox Research Center, Lynchburg, and
Fort St. Vrain.
      For more detailed information on analyses of environmental impacts, and for a discussion of the
analyses supporting the consequences reported here, refer to the appropriate site-specific appendix.  These
site-specific appendices, under separate cover, are organized as follows:
Appendix         Focus of Appendix 
_________________________________________________
A          Hanford Site 
B          Idaho National Engineering Laboratory 
C          Savannah River Site 
D          Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program 
E          Other Generator/Storage Locations 
F          Nevada Test Site and Oak Ridge 
           Reservation
_________________________________________________
      Appendix K presents site-specific data compiled from Appendices A through F that were used in
developing the discussion of environmental consequences.  The summary tables in Appendix K allow
comparison of quantitative impacts (for example, increases or decreases in direct employment resulting from
implementation of an alternative) among sites.
      Appendix L presents an evaluation of environmental justice considerations at each of the alternative
sites considered in this EIS.  Environmental consideration and exposure pathways were evaluated within a
80-kilometer (50-mile) radius surrounding each of 10 potential sites of proposed activities.  This 80-
kilometer (50-mile) radius is in keeping with analysis conducted under the National Environmental Policy
Act regarding proposed DOE activities to identify environmental impacts from proposed activities.  This 80-
kilometer (50-mile) radius represents the limit in which any impacts are considered to be of any potential
significance.  Minority and low-income communities surrounding each alternative site were identified through
the use of a Geographical Information System, based on 1990 U.S. Census data.  Demographic maps are
provided for each site under consideration in Appendix L.

5.1 Environmental Consequences of Key Discriminator Disciplines

      This section presents the environmental consequences of the alternatives, focusing on the key
discriminator disciplines-those that may differentiate among sites, have the potential for a more significant
impact, or are of general public interest.  This section is organized in two parts:  a background discussion
providing perspective for each discipline and a presentation of consequences by alternative, discipline, and
site.

5.1.1 Background

      The following discussion provides background and perspective for the environmental consequences
presented in Section 5.1.

5.1.1.1 Socioeconomics.

Socioeconomic impacts are defined in terms of direct and secondary
effects.  Direct effects include changes in site employment and expenditures resulting from SNF-related
construction and operation.  Secondary effects include changes that result from regional purchases,
nonpayroll expenditures, and payroll spending by site employees.  For the major DOE sites, existing
projections (regardless of SNF management decisions) indicate that jobs will be lost during the next few
years for all sites.  Potential SNF management impacts onsite and regional employment were considered in
light of this trend.  
      For the sites considered, only minor increases in site employment over the declining job baseline
would result from SNF management; therefore, secondary effects were considered as a lessening of the rate
of job loss, without substantial impacts on associated regions.  At the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory, the potential for appreciable job losses exists under certain alternatives.  These reductions would
contribute to an overall regional decline.  The reductions are not anticipated to be significant, however,
because they would occur over several years.  For the naval sites, the number of staff required to manage
SNF management facilities would be approximately less than 1 percent of site employment and less than
1/25 of 1 percent of regional employment, so secondary impacts were also considered small in this analysis. 
For other generator/storage locations, job creation was expected to be minimal even under the No Action
alternative where long-term management of SNF would be required should operating reactors be required to
shut down.  The number of staff involved for long-term SNF management would be small in relation to
existing staffing levels at these reactors.
      With employment as an indicator, small changes in population are anticipated, creating minimal
changes in demand on regional supporting infrastructures.  The number of direct jobs that would be created
under each alternative as a result of SNF management activities was estimated for each site.  The
employment graphs shown on Figures 5-1 through 5-9 (presented and discussed fully with the alternatives)
represent the 10-year average of the incremental change in direct employment resulting from SNF
management.  Secondary effects, such as the need for additional housing and improved community services
are discussed if an impact is indicated.  Details on the socioeconomic impact analysis, as well as the baseline
projections from which comparisons were made, are provided in Appendices A through F.  Employment
increases and decreases that are presented in the text are 10-year averages rather than the actual maximum
increase or decrease in any single year as presented in Appendix A through F.  Please see the specific site
appendix for actual annual employment values.

5.1.1.2 Utilities (Electricity).

New facilities (or the restarting of idle facilities) would result in
increased demands on water, power, and sewage.  Water and sewage requirements are considered minimal
and are discussed in Section 5.2.9.  However, power consumption under some of the alternatives would
exceed existing capacity at certain sites and this is discussed in more detail in this section.  Electricity
requirements by site and by alternative vary significantly depending on whether a site is processing or storing
SNF.  For example, at the Hanford Site, the annual increase in power use from SNF management activities
could vary from 0 megawatt-hours per year under the No Action alternative when storing only, to a maximum
of about 130,000 megawatt-hours per year under the Centralization alternative when processing (Appendix
K, Volume 1).  In addition, the operation of an expended core facility consumes approximately 10,000
megawatt-hours per year of electricity.  Therefore, the power requirements would be highest under
alternatives where both processing and operating an expended core facility occur simultaneously.  The graphs
of electricity use in Figures 5-1 through 5-9 show the maximum and minimum incremental change in power
consumption that would result from implementing the alternative.  Current capacities and baseline usage of
utilities and energy from which comparisons are made are discussed in Appendices A through F of Volume 1.

5.1.1.3 Materials and Waste Management.

There are few impacts on materials and waste
management activities except when SNF is processed.  Stabilization of SNF, depending on the technology,
may yield high-level, transuranic, low-level, mixed, and hazardous wastes.  The wastes must usually be
further treated to make them safe for transport, storage, or disposal.  The capacity of sites for additional
storing of high-level and transuranic wastes is generally limited.  Low-level wastes are normally disposed of
onsite at the major DOE facilities.  Hazardous wastes are normally treated in some way and then disposed of
in approved disposal facilities onsite or offsite.  A few categories of mixed waste are being treated, but most
are in storage awaiting development of treatment capabilities.  The graphs of waste generation in Figures 5-1
through 5-9 illustrate the estimated annual average of low-level waste and high-level, transuranic, and mixed
waste that each alternative would generate between 1995 and 2005.  Site-specific details on materials and
waste management and the current status of waste management activities at the sites are discussed in
Appendices A through F.

5.1.1.4 Occupational and Public Health and Safety.

            Radiation Effects-Radiation exposure and its consequences are topics of interest to the
general public near nuclear facilities.  Therefore, this EIS places more emphasis on the consequences of
exposure to radiation than on other topics, even though the effects of radiation exposure under most of the
circumstances evaluated in this EIS are small.  This subsection explains basic concepts used in the evaluation
of radiation effects to provide the background for later discussions of impacts.
      The effects on people of radiation that is emitted during disintegration (decay) of a radioactive
substance depends on the kind of radiation (alpha and beta particles, and gamma and x-rays) and the total
amount of radiation energy absorbed by the body.  The total energy absorbed per unit quantity of tissue is
referred to as absorbed dose.  The absorbed dose, when multiplied by certain quality factors and factors that
take into account different sensitivities of various tissues, is referred to as effective dose equivalent, or where
the context is clear, simply dose.  The common unit of effective dose equivalent is the rem (1 rem equals
l,000 millirem).
      An individual may be exposed to ionizing radiation externally, from a radioactive source outside the
body, and/or internally, from ingesting or inhaling radioactive material.  The external dose is different from
the internal dose.  An external dose is delivered only during the actual time of exposure to the external
radiation source.  An internal dose, however, continues to be delivered as long as the radioactive material
remains in the body, although both radioactive decay and elimination of the radionuclide by ordinary
metabolic processes decrease the dose rate with the passage of time.  The dose from internal exposure is
calculated over 50 years following the initial exposure.
      The maximum annual allowable radiation dose to an individual of the public from DOE-operated
nuclear facilities is 0.1 rem (100 millirem) per year (DOE Order 5400.5) (DOE 1993b).  All DOE and naval
facilities covered by this EIS operate well below this limit (see Chapter 4).  It is estimated that the average
individual in the United States receives a dose of about 0.3 rem (300 millirem) per year from natural sources
of radiation.  For perspective, a modern chest x-ray results in an approximate dose of 0.008 rem (8 millirem),
while a diagnostic hip x-ray results in an approximate dose of 0.083 rem (83 millirem).  A person must
receive an acute (short-term) dose of approximately 600 rem (600,000 millirem) before there is a high
probability of near-term death (NAS/NRC 1990).
      Radiation can also cause a variety of ill-health effects in people.  The most significant ill-health
effect to depict the consequences of environmental and occupational radiation exposures is the induction of
latent cancer fatalities.  This effect is referred to as latent cancer fatalities because the cancer may take many
years to develop and for death to occur.
      The collective (or population) dose to an exposed population is calculated by summing the estimated
doses received by each member of the exposed population.  This total dose received by the exposed
population is measured in person-rem.  For example, if 1,000 people each received a dose of 0.001 rem
(1 millirem), the collective dose is 1,000 persons  0.001 rem (1 millirem) = 1 person-rem.  Alternatively, the
same collective dose (1 person-rem) results from 500 people each of whom received a dose of 0.002 rem
(2 millirem) (500 persons  0.002 rem = 1 person-rem).
      The factor that this EIS uses to relate a dose to its effect is 0.0004 latent cancer fatalities per person-
rem for workers and 0.0005 latent cancer fatalities per person-rem for individuals among the general
population.  The latter factor is slightly higher because of the presence of individuals in the general public
that may be more sensitive to radiation than workers (for example, infants).
      These concepts may be applied to estimate the effects of exposing a population to radiation.  For
example, in a population of 100,000 people exposed only to background radiation [0.3 rem (300 millirem)
per year], 15 latent cancer fatalities per year would be inferred to be caused by the radiation [100,000
persons  0.3 rem (300 millirem) per year  0.0005 latent cancer fatalities per person-rem = 15 latent cancer
fatalities per year].
      Sometimes, calculations of the number of latent cancer fatalities associated with radiation exposure
do not yield whole numbers, and, especially in environmental applications, may yield numbers less than 1.0. 
For example, if a population of 100,000 were exposed as above, but to a total dose per individual of only
0.001 rem (1 millirem), the collective dose would be 100 person-rem, and the corresponding estimated
number of latent cancer fatalities would be 0.05 [100,000 persons  0.001 rem (1 millirem)  0.0005 latent
cancer fatalities/person-rem = 0.05 latent fatal cancers].
      How should one interpret a noninteger number of latent cancer fatalities, such as 0.05?  The answer
is to interpret the result as a statistical estimate.  That is, 0.05 is the average number of deaths that would be
expected if the same exposure situation were applied to many different groups of 100,000 people.  In most
groups, nobody (0 people) would incur a latent cancer fatality from the 0.001 rem (1 millirem) dose each
member would have received.  In a small fraction of the groups, 1 latent fatal cancer would result; in
exceptionally few groups, 2 or more latent fatal cancers would occur.  The average number of deaths over all
the groups would be 0.05 latent fatal cancers (just as the average of 0, 0, 0, and 1 is -, or 0.25).  The most
likely outcome is 0 latent cancer fatalities.
      These same concepts apply to estimating the effects of radiation exposure on a single individual. 
Consider the effects, for example, of exposure to background radiation over a lifetime.  The "number of
latent cancer fatalities" corresponding to a single individual's exposure over a (presumed) 72-year lifetime to
0.3 rem (300 millirem) per year is the following:
      1 person  0.3 rem (300 millirem)/year  72 years  0.0005 latent cancer
       fatalities/person-rem = 0.011 latent cancer fatalities.
       
Again, this should be interpreted in a statistical sense; that is, the estimated effect of background radiation
exposure on the exposed individual would produce a 1.1-percent chance that the individual might incur a
latent fatal cancer caused by the exposure.  Said another way, about 1.1 percent of the population is
estimated to die of cancers induced by the radiation background.
      The dose-to-risk conversion factors presented above and used in this EIS to relate radiation
exposures to latent cancer fatalities are based on the "1990 Recommendations of the International
Commission on Radiation Protection" (ICRP 1991).  These conversion factors are consistent with those used
by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in its rulemaking "Standards for Protection Against Radiation"
(FR 1991).  In developing these conversion factors, the International Commission on Radiological Protection
reviewed many studies, including Health Effects of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR V)
and Sources, Effects and Risks of Ionizing Radiation.  These conversion factors represent the best-available
estimates for relating a dose to its effect; most other conversion factors fall within the range of uncertainty
associated with the conversion factors that are discussed in NAS/NRC (1990).  The conversion factors apply
where the dose to an individual is less than 20 rem (20,000 millirem) and the dose rate is less than 10 rem
(10,000 millirem) per hour.  At doses greater than 20 rem (20,000 millirem), the conversion factors used to
relate radiation doses to latent cancer fatalities are doubled.  At much higher doses, prompt effects, rather
than latent cancer fatalities, may be the primary concern.  Unusual accident situations that may result in high
radiation doses to individuals are considered special cases.
      In addition to latent cancer fatalities, other health effects could result from environmental and
occupational exposures to radiation.  These effects include nonfatal cancers among the exposed population
and genetic effects in subsequent generations.  Table 5-1 shows the dose-to-effect factors for these potential
effects, as well as for latent cancer fatalities.  For clarity and to allow ready comparison with health impacts
from other sources, such as those from chemical carcinogens, this EIS presents estimated effects of radiation
only in terms of latent cancer fatalities.  The nonfatal cancers and genetic effects are less probable
consequences of radiation exposure.  Estimates of the total detriment (fatal cancers, nonfatal cancers, and
genetic effects) due to radiation exposure may be obtained from the estimates of latent cancer fatalities
presented in this EIS by multiplying by 1.4 for workers and by 1.46 for the general public.
 Table 5-1.  Risk of latent cancer fatalities and other health effects from exposure to radiation.  ,b
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________
               Latent cancer                                       
Population(c)    fatality   Nonfatal cancer   Genetic effects   Total detriment 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________
Workers          0.0004         0.00008           0.00008           0.00056 
General public   0.0005         0.0001            0.00013           0.00073 
_______________________________
a.  When applied to an individual, units are lifetime probability of latent cancer fatalities per rem (or 1,000 
millirem) of radiation dose.  When applied to a population of individuals, units are excess number of 
cancers per person-rem of radiation dose.  Genetic effects as used here apply to populations, not 
individuals. 
 
b.  Source:  ICRP (1991). 
 
c.  The difference between the worker risk and the general public risk is attributable to the fact that the 
general population includes more individuals in sensitive age groups (that is, less than 18 years of age and 
over 65 years of age).  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________
      During SNF handling and transportation, the principal radiation hazard is the direct radiation
emitting from the SNF.  In comparison, the hazard from release of radioactive fission products (gases and
particulates) from within the solid SNF is small.  Without adequate shielding, the radiation levels at the
surface of the SNF are often high enough to induce a prompt fatality.  Fortunately, this radiation is easily
attenuated or stopped with the insertion of shielding materials such as lead, steel, or water between the SNF
and the worker.  Because radiation intensity decreases with distance, maintaining a distance of a few hundred
meters also offers adequate protection from the radiation from unshielded SNF.  For example, 10 CFR 71
requires sufficient shielding on shipping casks to reduce radiation levels at 2 meters (7 feet) from the cask to
0.01 rem (10 millirem) per hour or less.  At 100 meters (328 feet), the distance effect would reduce this 0.01
rem (10 millirem) per hour by a factor of about 2,500, which would not be detectable. 
      During SNF interim storage, trace quantities of radioactive isotopes (principally gases and
particulate fission products) may also be released to the environment from severely corroded SNF.  These
releases would result in small doses to the workers in the immediate vicinity of the SNF and, through
atmospheric dispersion and groundwater pathways, would ultimately result in very small doses to members
of the nearby general population.
      Accidents involving SNF can also result in radiation releases and exposures.  For most accidents, a
very small fraction of the radioactive material within the SNF is released.  This is because the SNF is in a
solid form and the radioactive elements are intermingled within the solid SNF.  Significant quantities of these
radioactive elements can be released only when the accident generates enough energy to break up or cause
particles of SNF to be released to the atmosphere.  For most accidents, the energy is not high enough to cause
much damage to the SNF and a small fraction of the radioactive material is released.
      One type of accident, an accidental nuclear criticality (uncontrolled chain reaction), can release large
quantities of direct radiation, as well as fission products and heat.  Within a few tens of meters of the
incidents, doses from direct radiation can be fatal.  Further away, doses are principally from the released
fission product gases and particulates.  This type of accident is well understood and is easily prevented when
handling solid materials such as SNF.
            Risk-Another concept important to the presentation of results in this EIS is the concept of
risk.  Risk is most important when presenting accident analysis results.  The chance that an accident might
occur during the conduct of an operation is called the probability of occurrence.  An event that is certain to
occur has a probability of 1 (as in 100 percent certainty).  The probability of occurrence of an accident is less
than one because accidents, by definition, are not certain to occur.  If an accident is expected to happen once
every 5 years, the frequency (and probability) of occurrence is 0.2 per year (1 occurrence  5 years =
0.2 occurrences per year).
      Once the frequency (occurrences per year) and the consequences (for radiation effects, measured in
terms of the number of latent cancer fatalities caused by the radiation exposure) of an accident are known, the
risk can be determined.  The risk per year is the product of the annual frequency of occurrence times the
number of latent cancer fatalities.  This annual risk expresses the expected number of latent cancer fatalities
per year, taking account of both the annual chance that an accident might occur and the estimated
consequences if it does occur.
      For example, if the frequency of an accident were 0.2 occurrences per year and the number of latent
cancer fatalities resulting from the accident were 0.05, the risk would be 0.01 latent cancer fatalities per year
(0.2 occurrences per year  0.05 latent cancer fatalities per occurrence = 0.01 latent cancer fatalities per
year).  Another way to express this risk (0.01 latent cancer fatalities per year) is to note that if the operation
subject to the accident continued for 100 years, one latent cancer fatality would be likely to occur because of
accidents during that period.  This is equivalent to 1 chance in 100 that a single latent cancer fatality would
be caused by the accident source for each year of operation.
      A frame of reference for the risks from accidents associated with SNF manage-
ment alternatives can
be developed in the same way.  For an average resident in the vicinity of the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory, the risk of a latent cancer fatality caused by the water draining from the Expended Core Facility
after a large earthquake would be approximately 1.7  10-7 per year (see Chapter 5 of Appendix D).  This
risk can be compared with the lifetime risks of death from other accidental causes to gain a perspective.  For
example, the risk of dying from a motor vehicle accident is about 1 in 80.  Similarly, the risk of death for the
average American from fires is approximately 1 in 500, and for death from accidental poisoning, the risk is
about 1 in 1,000 (NNPP 1993).  These comparisons are not meant to imply that risks of a latent cancer
fatality caused by DOE operations are trivial, only to show how they compare with other, more common
risks.  Radiological risks to the general public from DOE operations are considered to be involuntary risks, as
opposed to voluntary risks such as operating a motor vehicle.
            Radiological Accidents-Activities associated with transporting, receiving, handling,
processing, and storing SNF involve substantial quantities of radioactive materials and limited quantities of
toxic chemicals.  Either routine SNF operations or accidents involving either radioactive materials or toxic
chemicals can result in exposure to workers or members of the public, or contamination of the surrounding
environment.
      A number of existing accident analyses were evaluated to find a small group with relatively severe
consequences or risks.  These accidents included events such as small fires; severe accidents that a facility is
designed to withstand; and beyond-design-basis events, which a facility is not designed to withstand.  These
accidents included those initiated by internal events, such as operational errors; those initiated by natural
external phenomena, such as floods, tornados, and earthquakes; and those initiated by human-influenced
external events, such as aircraft crashes and nearby explosions or toxic material releases.  The accidents
evaluated included those with an estimated probability ranging from 1 chance in 1,000,000 to 1 chance in
10,000,000 per year.
      Appendices A through F summarize the possible accidents involving SNF operations at each of the
sites and evaluate the potential consequences of the accidents that present the highest risk, in terms of
estimated frequency of occurrence multiplied by consequences, to the workers and the general public.  As
might be expected, the highest consequences, though frequently not the highest risk, were often found to be
associated with the accidents with the lowest probabilities.  
      The accidents selected, the amount of radioactive and toxic materials released under the accident
conditions, and the estimated probabilities were based on existing safety analyses for the SNF-related
operations at each site, or for comparable operations at other sites.  The accident evaluations also considered
the 40 to 50 years of operational experience with SNF at the sites.
      Accident consequences were analyzed utilizing radioactive and toxic material release estimates for
each accident.  The downwind concentrations of materials released in accidents were then calculated for a
range of potential receptor locations and potential doses to individuals or people at those locations evaluated. 
Doses were evaluated for (a) an individual 100 meters (328 feet) downwind of the facility location where the
release occurs, (b) a hypothetical resident at the site boundary nearest to the facility where the release occurs
(called the maximally exposed offsite individual), and (c) the general population within 80 kilometers (50
miles) of the release location.  The potential impacts to workers in the immediate vicinity of the accident were
analyzed qualitatively.
      Dispersion in air from the release site was estimated with both typical (50th percentile) and unlikely
(95th percentile) meteorological conditions.  The unlikely weather conditions represent those that would
result in high air concentrations of the material released, elevating the exposure of affected individuals. 
Concentrations and human exposures are lower than these values 95 percent of the time.  Dispersion was
calculated using the GENII computer code (Napier et al. 1988) for all sites except Savannah River Site, for
which the site-specific AXAIR89Q code was used (including 95 percent meteorologic conditions).  Although
the modeling for the Savannah River Site was performed using a different code, that code has been validated
and shown to be consistent with the GENII code and conservative in its model results.  The dispersion of
nonradioactive materials was modeled using EPIcode (Homann 1988).
            Nonradiological Accidents-Accidents with nonradiological effects include industrial
hazards from construction and normal operation.  Accidents that may affect occupational or public health
were evaluated for each of the alternatives at each of the potentially affected sites and facility locations.  The
maximum reasonably foreseeable accidents include chemical spills, fires, and worker accidents.  The
accidents estimated to exceed the most widely accepted accident exposure (toxicological) guidelines, such as
the Emergency Response Planning Guideline-3 and the Threshold Limit Value of the American Conference
of Governmental Industrial Hygienists, are summarized in Section 5.1, Volume 1.  Exceeding these
concentrations would result in an unacceptable likelihood that the worker or public would experience or
develop life-threatening or very serious toxicological effects.  The analysis methodologies and the accident
descriptions are discussed in Appendices A through F.
      Industrial accidents that do not involve the release of chemicals could occur at each of the existing or
proposed storage and generation locations during the transition/construction phase at approximately current
rates.  Construction accidents would primarily occur during the construction period (estimated to be
approximately 8 years under the Centralization alternative).  Construction fatalities are estimated to be
approximately one per year at the centralized site for the Centralization alternative only.  After the SNF is
transported to the centralized facility, normal operations would not be expected to be fatal accident-free, but
fatal accident frequency is estimated to be less than one accident per year.  The sites that are not selected for
the centralized facilities would be expected to have less than one fatal accident per year throughout the SNF
interim management period.

5.1.1.5 Transportation.

In this EIS, one of the ways that may be used to discriminate between
alternatives is through the transportation impacts associated with each alternative.  Some alternatives, such as
the No Action alternative, would involve limited transportation of SNF and have few transportation impacts;
while other alternatives, such as the Centralization options, would involve extensive transportation of SNF
and have greater transportation impacts.
      SNF is transported in large, heavy containers called shipping casks.  Shipping casks must meet
stringent Federal standards and are designed and constructed to contain the radioactivity in SNF during
severe transportation accidents.  There are also standards that describe the routing requirements for SNF
shipments.  Because of the stringent standards for SNF shipping casks, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission has estimated that shipping casks will withstand 99.4 percent of truck and rail accidents without
sustaining damage sufficient to breach the shipping cask.  Only in the worst physically conceivable
conditions, which are clearly of low probability, can the shipping cask be so damaged that there is a
significant release of radioactivity to the environment.
      Transportation impacts may be divided into two parts:  (1) the impacts due to incident-free
transportation and (2) the impacts due to transportation accidents.  For incident-free transportation and
transportation accidents, impacts may be further divided into two parts:  (1) nonradiological impacts and (2)
radiological impacts.  The nonradiological impacts are composed of the vehicular impacts of transportation,
such as vehicular emissions and traffic accidents, and are not related to the radioactivity present in the
shipments.
      In contrast to the nonradiological impacts, the radiological impacts are due to the radioactivity
present in SNF shipments.  In the case of incident-free transportation, the radiological impacts result from the
radiation field that surrounds the SNF shipping cask.  These impacts are estimated for workers and the
general population along the transportation route.  In the case of transportation accidents, the radiological
impacts would result from the radioactivity released from the SNF shipping cask during an accident.  These
impacts are also estimated for the general population along the transportation route.
      This EIS evaluated a full range of transportation accidents, up to and including accidents with very
low probability, estimated to be on the order of one in 1 million years.  In addition, the consequences of
severe transportation accidents were evaluated.  The probability of these severe accidents was estimated to be
on the order of one in 10 million years.
      For both incident-free transportation and transportation accidents, methodology developed by the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission was used to estimate impacts.  These impacts were quantified in terms
of the estimated number of radiation-related cancer fatalities and the estimated number of nonradiological
fatalities from vehicular emissions and traffic accidents associated with each alternative.  Appendices A, B,
C, D, F, and I contain more details on the methodology, data, and assumptions used to develop these
estimates.

5.1.1.6 Uncertainties and Conservatism.

The calculations in this EIS have generally been
performed in such a way that the estimates of risk provided are unlikely to be exceeded during either normal
operations or in the event of an accident.  For routine operations, the results of monitoring actual operations
provide realistic estimates of source terms, which when combined with conservative estimates of the effects
of radiation, produce estimates of risk that are very unlikely to be exceeded.  The effects for all alternatives
have been calculated using the same source terms and other factors, so this EIS provides an appropriate
means of comparing potential impacts on human health and the environment.
      The analyses of hypothetical accidents are based on the calculations that in turn must be based on
sequences of events and models of effects that have not occurred.  The models have attempted to provide
estimates of the probabilities, source terms, pathways for dispersion and exposure, and the effects on human
health and the environment that are as realistic as possible.  In many cases, the probability of the accidents
postulated is very low and little experience is available; thus, the consequences are uncertain.  This has
required the use of models or values for input that produce estimates of consequences and risks that are
higher than would actually occur because of the desire to provide results that will not be exceeded.
      All the alternatives have been evaluated using the same methods and data, allowing a fair
comparison of all the alternatives on the same basis.  It should be observed that, even using these
conservative analytical methods, the risks associated with implementing any of the alternatives are small.

5.1.2 No Action Alternative

      Under the No Action alternative, minimal actions would be taken for safe and secure management of
SNF.  SNF would not be transported to or from DOE facilities after a transition period, and facility upgrades
or replacements and onsite fuel movements at DOE sites would be limited.  Existing research and
development activities at DOE sites would continue, but no new projects would be initiated.  Naval SNF
would be stored at naval sites at or near the point of refueling or defueling without examination at the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory.  SNF from smaller DOE sites and university and other Government
reactors would be stored at those reactors, and the special-case commercial fuels would remain at their
current location.  No foreign research reactor fuels would be accepted.
      If this alternative were implemented, the Expended Core Facility at the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory would be shut down, the naval sites would store SNF in transport casks at naval sites, and the
smaller DOE and university and other Government reactor sites would store the SNF they generate onsite. 
After a period of time, some smaller reactors would shut down to avoid the expense of building storage
facilities, and the spent fuel would be stored in the reactor vessel.
      In reviewing the impacts of the No Action alternative, it should be recognized that the consequences
summarized in Figure 5-1 only approximately represent the consequences of this alternative.  These
consequences fall within four categories that may apply to one or more sites:  increasing the potential for
higher radiation exposures because of degrading fuels, increasing the potential for higher radiation exposures
because of the location of SNF in or near major population centers, causing a potential loss of employment
because research reactors would be shut down, and postponing the generation of wastes associated with
research and converting SNF to a form acceptable for disposition.  These issues are discussed in the
following paragraphs.
      Because there would be minimal actions taken to stabilize fuel under the No Action alternative, the
frequency of an SNF-related radiation accident could increase as the stored fuels deteriorate with time.  The
lack of structural integrity of the fuel in some instances could result in an increase in handling-related
accidents.  In addition, releases from stored fuels could increase, increasing population doses, as the number
of cladding failures increase.  While the DOE is committed under the No Action alternative to ensure safe
and secure management of SNF, future deterioration of fuels and facilities may increase accident risks over
current risk estimates.  
      Under this alternative, DOE-managed SNF would be stored in over 50 locations around the country,
many of which are in areas of relatively high population density.  While the risk of exposure would be small
for this alternative as with other alternatives, and the worst consequence accident is expected to be associated
with one of the major DOE sites, the potential consequence of accidents could be greater because of the
proximity of a larger population at many of the potential storage sites. 
Figure 5-1.  Summary of impacts for the No Action alternative.  (The maximum incremental change frombaseline is illustrated in graphs.  Input data are summarized in Appendix K.)
      The employment associated with SNF management at other generator/storage locations would be
higher under this alternative than others because economies of scale would not be achievable with storage
facilities being distributed among more than 50 sites.  At the same time, however, non-SNF-related
employment would decrease because of SNF management-related concerns.  Several hundred reactor
operations and research jobs could be lost if research reactors were forced to close because of the inability to
store SNF onsite.  This job loss is not represented in the SNF management employment consequences
presented in Section 5.1.2.1.
      Under the No Action alternative, no new research would be initiated on appropriate technologies for
converting fuels to an acceptable form for ultimate disposition and no new facilities would be built over the
next 40 years for that purpose.  Because this research was not initiated, potential adverse environmental
impacts associated with research activities were not assessed under the No Action alternative.  The lack of
adverse environmental impacts makes the No Action alternative appear to be more environmentally
acceptable than the other alternatives, when in fact the adverse impacts cannot be assessed until the research
projects are planned.
      The sites that would be affected by the No Action alternative are the Hanford Site, Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory, Savannah River Site, naval sites, and other generator/storage locations.  The
environmental consequences at these sites are described below.

5.1.2.1 Socioeconomics.

As shown in Figure 5-1, the graph of the maximum incremental
change in employment from SNF management activities for the major DOE sites, except the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory, indicates there would be little socioeconomic impact associated with the No Action
alternative between 1995 and 2005.  Implementation of the No Action alternative would result in the
shutdown of the Expended Core Facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, resulting in the loss
of approximately 500 permanent jobs from a region with a relatively low population and few jobs.  Closure
of the Expended Core Facility would initially result in an increase in direct employment at the facility by 50
jobs over 3 years to handle the transport of containers, but then the 500-person work force would decrease to
a caretaker work force of 10 (see Appendix D, Volume 1).  This results in the loss of an average of
approximately 240 jobs over the 10-year period or 3 percent of the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory's
work force, as shown in Figure 5-1.  At the Hanford and Savannah River Sites, there would either be no
change or less than a 1 percent increase in direct employment, respectively, from implementing the No Action
alternative.  The peak employment would be 50 additional workers at the Savannah River Site,
approximately 0.3 percent of the 1995 baseline.
      Naval sites would require very few additional workers to secure the naval SNF in storage and
monitor its condition.  The incremental labor required for SNF management at the naval sites would be
drawn from the existing work force and would be insignificant with respect to current employment levels at
those sites.  At the university and other Government reactors, there would be a need for security and
maintenance personnel for reactors that would shut down.  While this would not be an increase in
employment at those sites because the staff required to run the reactors would no longer be required, it would
be an increase in the staff that would be involved directly in SNF management.  Across all sites, there would
be a decrease in employment of less than 0.1 percent of the total workforce.  Therefore, implementation of
the No Action alternative would have no socioeconomic effect on a nationwide scale.

5.1.2.2 Utilities (Electricity).

Figure 5-1 illustrates the maximum incremental power use with
the No Action alternative in terms of percentage increase or decrease over baseline site use.  For each of the
sites, this change is very small and easily accommodated.  Ongoing SNF operations are included in the
baseline electric power usage, and the proposed actions under the No Action alternative are not power-
intensive.  At the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, the shutdown of the Expended Core Facility would
result in about a 5 percent reduction in electric power consumption below existing site usage.  At naval and
other generator/storage locations, there would be no discernable increase in power consumption over baseline
use.

5.1.2.3 Materials and Waste Management.

Figure 5-1 illustrates the annual average volume
of high-level, transuranic, and mixed wastes and low-level waste that would be generated from SNF
management over the next 10 years under the No Action alternative.  Day-to-day SNF management and
storage activities would annually generate approximately 20 cubic meters per year (26 cubic yards per year)
of transuranic wastes and approximately 400 cubic meters per year (520 cubic yards per year) of low-level
waste at the Savannah River Site.  These volumes would be generated by activities required to safely store
SNF, including the onsite consolidation of existing fuels and refurbishment of existing SNF storage pools. 
No high-level waste would be generated at any of the sites under the No Action alternative, and very small
levels of all wastes would be generated by the Hanford Site and the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.
      At the naval sites, implementation of the No Action alternative would result in the production of
limited amounts of solid municipal wastes and low-level radioactive waste.  Wastes produced from the
storage of naval SNF would be controlled and managed in accordance with existing site management
programs.  These small amounts of waste are shown as zero in Figure 5-1.

5.1.2.4 Radiological Impacts.

For the No Action alternative, the radiological impacts from
normal operations and accident risks are expected to be small at each of the major DOE and naval sites that
handle and store SNF.  Radiological impacts from normal operations and accidents are discussed by site
below.
            Radiological Impacts From Normal Operations-The airborne releases from the
SNF interim storage pools at the Hanford Site, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, and Savannah River
Site were estimated to result in low-level exposures to the population in the vicinity of the site with no
additional latent cancers within that population expected.  For naval sites, there would be no airborne
releases; direct radiation is the only mechanism of exposure associated with the dry SNF interim storage
technologies that would be used under this alternative.  The estimated annual latent cancer fatalities for the
general population are illustrated in Figure 5-1.
            Radiological Impacts From Accidents-
            Hanford Site.  Under the No Action alternative, a wide range of accident scenarios was
considered, including accidents initiated by operational events, external hazards such as aircraft crashes, and
natural phenomena such as earthquakes.  The highest risk SNF-related accidents identified in Section 5.15 of
Appendix A are a liquid metal (sodium) fire in the Fast Flux Test Facility fuel storage area (highest to
general population) and a spent fuel cask drop at the 105-K Basin (highest to workers).  Major seismically
induced accidents were also identified in buildings containing SNF (324 Building and 325 Building). 
Releases from these buildings were associated with materials other than SNF and therefore are not discussed
here.  Aircraft-crash initiated accidents were not considered to be reasonably foreseeable because of their
very low frequency.
      For both of the SNF-related accidents identified, the probabilities of occurrence are estimated to be
less than one chance in 10,000 per year of operation.  The estimated population doses, using very
conservative meteorology and assuming no protective action, for the Fast Flux Test Facility sodium fire
accident corresponds to an estimated 37 latent cancer fatalities in the general population within 80 kilometers
(50 miles).  The estimated risk per year, taking into account the probability of occurrence of this accident, is
less than 3.7  10-3 potential latent cancer fatalities in the general population.  
      The potential dose to the maximally exposed offsite individual corresponds to an estimated
probability of a latent cancer fatality of 2.5  10-4 for the Fast Flux Test Facility sodium fire.  Emergency
actions would likely reduce the actual exposures to any offsite individuals.
      An onsite worker at the maximum exposure location downwind of the spent fuel cask drop is
estimated to receive doses that correspond to an estimated probability of a latent cancer fatality of 1.4  10-3. 
The estimated risk for a worker is 1.4  10-7 latent cancer fatalities per year.
      Workers (up to 12) in the immediate vicinity of the cask drop accident could receive doses on the
order of 70 to 140 rem (70,000 to 140,000 millirem).  Acute doses of this magnitude are in the lower end of
the range of doses that might produce symptoms of acute radiation syndrome in humans.  For that accident,
workers could be near the cask when it drops and receive direct radiation and inhale airborne fission
products.  
      Potential secondary impacts identified for the Fast Flux Test Facility liquid metal fire (Table 5.15-2
of Appendix A) include temporary closure of the Hanford Reach of the Columbia River to boat traffic,
temporary restriction of water use locally, possible loss of crops, environmental contamination in the vicinity
of the facility and near offsite environs, potential restriction on land use for agriculture, temporary restriction
on fishing access, and cleanup costs.  The secondary impacts associated with the K Basin cask drop would be
somewhat lower but similar in nature.
            Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.  Under the No Action alternative, a wide range
of accident scenarios were also considered, including accidents initiated by operational events, external
hazards such as aircraft crashes, and natural phenomena such as earthquakes.  A number of SNF-related
accidents are identified in Section 5.15 of Appendix B. 
      The highest risk to the general population is associated with the melting of a small number of
assemblies as a result of a major earthquake and hot cell breach at the Hot Fuel Examination Facility.  The
estimated probability of this accident is about 1 chance in 100,000 per year of operation.  General population
consequences are estimated to be approximately 7 latent cancer fatalities, with an estimated risk of a latent
cancer fatality of 7.0 10-5 latent cancer fatalities per year.
      The highest risk to workers is an inadvertent nuclear criticality in the Idaho Chemical Processing
Plant CPP-603 Underwater Fuel Storage Facility, which has an estimated probability of 1 chance in 1,000
per year of operation.  The estimated probability of a latent cancer fatality in a worker approximately
100 meters (about 330 feet) downwind of the accident would be 3.9  10-5.  The estimated risk for a worker
is 4.0  10-8 latent cancer fatalities per year.
      If workers were in the immediate vicinity, doses under some circumstances could be very high but
are not likely to be fatal immediately.  In the criticality accident, the criticality would occur under
approximately 6.1 meters (20 feet) of water.  Shielding by the water would be sufficient to prevent exposure
of nearby workers.  Expulsion of a cone of water above the criticality might lead to significant exposure to
any workers who were directly above the location of the criticality.
      Fuel-handling accidents have the highest estimated frequency of occurrence at 1.0 x 10-2 per year,
but because of their lower consequences, fuel-handling accidents do not represent the highest risk accidents
under the No Action alternative.  The frequency of fuel-handling accidents is directly related to the amount of
fuel handled and the annual number of SNF shipments projected under the alternative.
      Potential secondary impacts identified (Table 5.15-8 of Appendix B) for the criticality accident at
the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant are limited adverse effects to vegetation or wildlife and local
contamination requiring cleanup around the accident site.  More extensive contamination and impacts are
expected should a cell breach occur at the Hot Fuels Examination Facility.  Additional secondary impacts
identified include the potential for a 1-year restriction in agricultural use of up to 10,000 acres on and off the
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory site, the potential interdiction of affected agricultural products on
nearby lands, and the potential for temporary restricted access to affected public land (less than 10,000
acres).
      The Expended Core Facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory would be shut down after
a transition period of approximately 3 years.  Potential accidents during this period are presented in
Attachment F of Appendix D under the subheading of the Decentralization alternative.  
            Savannah River Site.  Under the No Action alternative, a wide range of accident types and
accident initiators were considered for the existing SNF wet storage activities, including accidents initiated by
operational events, external hazards such as aircraft crashes, and natural phenomena such as earthquakes. 
Five types of SNF-related accidents are identified in Section 5.15 and Attachment A of Appendix C.  These
include (a) a fuel assembly breach because of dropping, objects falling onto the assembly, or accidental
cutting into the fuel part of an assembly, (b) an inadvertent nuclear criticality in an SNF interim storage pool,
(c) a fire and explosion in an adjacent facility, and (d) spills of contaminated storage pool water either within
the storage facility or to the ground outside of the facility.  The initiators for these accidents include both
operational events and natural phenomena such as earthquakes.  Aircraft-crash-initiated accidents were not
considered to be reasonably foreseeable because of their very low frequency.
      The highest risk accident, both to the general population and workers, was identified as the fuel
assembly breach accident with an estimated frequency of 0.16 per year.  The estimated population dose for
this accident corresponds to 8.5  10-3 latent cancer fatalities in the general population within 80 kilometers
(50 miles).  The estimated risk, taking into account the probability of occurrence of this accident, is 1.4  10-3
latent cancer fatalities per year.  The estimated dose to the maximally exposed offsite individual corresponds
to an estimated probability of a latent cancer fatality of 1.6  10-7 per year.
      A co-located worker downwind of the accident is estimated to receive a dose that corresponds to an
estimated probability of 4.8  10-6 latent cancer fatalities.  The estimated risk for a worker is 7.7  10-7 latent
cancer fatalities per year.
      Based on past experience at the Savannah River Site (two fuel cutting/breach accidents have
occurred in the Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuels), no fatalities nor high exposures to facility workers are
expected for this type of accident.  This type of accident would likely occur with the assembly under 0.3 to
6 meters (1 to 20 feet) of water and result in small amounts of fuel and fission products being released to the
pool water.  The shielding effects of the pool water would attenuate most of the radiation released, but the
noble gases released would rise to the surface of the water and enter the room atmosphere, causing a direct
radiation exposure to workers in the area.  Upon releases into the room's atmosphere, radiation alarms would
sound requiring evacuation of nearby workers.  Timely evacuation would likely prevent substantial radiation
exposure.    
      Potential secondary impacts identified for the SNF-related accidents (Table 5-25 of Appendix C) are
land contamination around the site of the accident, with minor contamination outside of the immediate
facility area.  This would not likely require cleanup of more than 4 hectares (10 acres).
            Naval Facilities.  Under the No Action alternative, newly generated SNF would be stored at
naval sites, which differs from the historical practice of SNF management at the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory.  The naval sites are generally located in densely populated areas.  As a result, the consequences
of an accident involving naval SNF at a naval site would be higher than the same accident at the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory.  
      After a limited transition period, naval SNF would be stored dry in shipping containers at Puget
Sound, Pearl Harbor, Norfolk, and Portsmouth Naval Shipyards and the Kesselring Site.  A review of a wide
range of potential accidents (see Attachment F of Appendix D) indicated the limiting hypothetical accident
scenario with the potential to release radioactive material from the storage containers was an airplane crash
into the dry storage area.  This accident is the highest risk accident for the general population and workers
among all of the sites.  
      The highest risk to the general population occurs at Pearl Harbor.  The probability of an aircraft
crash at the Pearl Harbor facility is estimated to be 1 chance in 100,000 per year of operation.  The estimated
population consequences, using very conservative meteorology, is estimated to be 26 latent cancer fatalities
in the general population within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the site.  The estimated risk to the general
population, taking into account the probability of occurrence of this accident, is 2.6  10-4 latent cancer
fatalities per year.  The probability of a latent cancer fatality in the maximally exposed offsite individual is
estimated to be 9.5  10-3. 
      The highest risk to workers occurs at Norfolk.  The probability of an airplane crash at Norfolk is
estimated to be 1 chance in 1,000,000 per year of operation.  An onsite worker approximately 100 meters
(about 330 feet) downwind of the accident is estimated to receive a dose that corresponds to a probability of
a latent cancer fatality of 7.4  10-2.  The estimated risk for a worker is 7.4  10-8 latent cancer fatalities per
year.
      It is not likely that any fatalities would occur in workers in the vicinity because workers are normally
near the containers for only brief periods when a container is being placed in the dry storage array.  At most,
two or three nearby workers might receive significant radiation exposure from inhalation of airborne
radioactivity if the container seal were breached.  The low probability of the airplane crash itself, coupled
with the probability that workers would be close enough to be affected, coupled with the probability that the
wind would be blowing in the direction of the workers, makes it very unlikely that any worker would receive
substantial radiation exposure.
      Secondary impacts are principally land contamination around the site of the accident and 
temporary contamination of naval vessels at the shipyard.  A total of approximately 43 hectares (106 acres)
might require cleanup.  The contamination could extend about 0.6 kilometers (0.4 miles) beyond the closest
site boundary.
            Other Generator/Storage Locations.  Accident analyses were evaluated for these
facilities.  These accidents included (a) handling accidents that resulted in fuel drops with potential for fuel
cladding breaches that could release portions of the more volatile fission products, such as noble gases and
iodine, (b) accidental nuclear criticalities, (c) building collapse due to natural phenomena or external events
such as major earthquakes or aircraft crashes, and (d) release of contaminated storage pool water.  The
analysis of these accidents indicated that they were similar in kind and consequence to those described for the
major DOE sites and, therefore, these problems are not presented for each of the 57 other generator/storage
locations.  For the No Action alternative, no accidents related to SNF management were identified for the
Nevada Test Site because no SNF is currently managed at the site.  Two accidents were evaluated for the No
Action alternative at the Oak Ridge Reservation.  The first involved a dropped dam during refueling at the
High Flux Isotope Reactor fuel pool.  This accident resulted in an estimated 9.2  10-6 latent cancer fatalities
to the worker and 1.7 latent cancer fatalities to the general population with a risk to the worker of 9.2  10-10
and to the general population of 1.7  10-4.  A beyond design basis accident at the High Flux Isotope Reactor
could result from a roof collapse triggered by a tornado.  This accident could result in an estimated 2.0  10-2
latent cancer fatalities to the worker and 2.3 latent cancer fatalities to the general population with a risk to the
worker of 3.8  10-9 and to the general population of
4.4  10-6.

5.1.2.5 Nonradiological Impacts.

A series of the maximum reasonably foreseeable accidents
was evaluated at each of the SNF management sites that would potentially release hazardous or toxic
chemicals to the workplace or the environment.  The specific accident was defined and effects were estimated
based on the characteristics of the specific facility, potentially affected public adjacent to the facility, and
local residents (at the site boundary).
      The maximum reasonably foreseeable chemical accident at SNF management facilities at the
Hanford Site could result in the release of polychlorinated biphenyls and sulfuric acid at the 105-KE and 105-
KW Basins.  Should these releases occur, workers and the general public travelling adjacent to the accident
could be subjected to chemical concentrations that might cause fatalities or serious health effects.  The
general public at the reservation boundary would be subjected to approximately 20 percent or less of the
guideline value.
      A maximum reasonably foreseeable chemical accident at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant would
be expected to release chlorine and nitric acid.  Should such an event occur, workers would be subjected to
chemical concentrations that might cause fatalities or serious health effects.  The general public at the site
boundary would be subjected to approximately 7 percent or less of the guideline value (Emergency Response
Planning Guideline-3).  The expected concentration on public access adjacent to the spill would be
approximately 30 percent of the guideline value.  Because these accidents would occur in each of the
alternatives evaluated and do not discriminate among alternatives, they are not discussed further.
      The release of nitrogen dioxide vapor from the interaction of target cleaning solution and sodium
nitrite at the Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuel is the maximum reasonably foreseeable chemical accident at
the Savannah River Site.  Should this accident occur, the estimated concentration would be approximately
1 percent of the concentration that would be expected to cause fatalities or serious health effects for the
worker and 0.1 percent for the maximally impacted offsite individual.
      A diesel spill and fire was identified as the maximum reasonably foreseeable accident at each of the
naval sites.  Such an accident would be expected to produce toxic gas concentrations.  Such an incident,
should it occur, would be expected to cause fatalities or serious health effects from three chemicals (sulfur
dioxide, oxides of nitrogen, and nitric acid) that are produced during the fire.  Workers and the public on the
nearest public access point at each of the five naval sites would be affected.  The releases might also be
expected to adversely affect the public immediately outside the facility boundary at the Norfolk Naval
Shipyard site.

5.1.2.6 Transportation.

            Shipments-Under the No Action alternative, the only offsite transportation of SNF
involves shipments of naval SNF from the Newport News Shipyard to the Norfolk Naval Shipyard and
shipments of irradiated test specimens from the Expended Core Facility at the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory to offsite locations.  Onsite transportation of SNF would occur at the Hanford Site, Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory, and Savannah River Site.
            Incident-Free Transportation-For the No Action alternative, the incident-free
transportation of SNF was estimated to result in a total of 0.0089 fatalities over the 40-year period 1995
through 2035.  These fatalities were the sum of the estimated number of radiation-related latent cancer
fatalities and the estimated number of nonradiological fatalities from vehicular emissions.  The estimated
number of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities for transportation workers was 0.0026, the estimated
number of radiation-related cancer fatalities for the general population was 0.00032, and the estimated
number of nonradiological fatalities from vehicular emissions was 0.0059.
      Onsite shipments of SNF were estimated to result in 0.0022 fatalities.  Offsite shipments of SNF
were estimated to result in 0.0067 fatalities.  These fatalities represent the sum of the estimated number of
radiation-related latent cancer fatalities and the estimated number of nonradiological fatalities from vehicular
emissions.
            Transportation Accidents-The cumulative transportation accident risks over the
40-year operational period were estimated to be 4.1  10-6 latent cancer fatalities and 0.047 traffic fatalities. 
If an accident occurred, it would be unlikely to result in the release of any radioactivity.  The maximum
reasonably foreseeable accident has a chance of occurrence between 1  10-6 and  1  10-7 per year.  If it
occurred in an urban or suburban population zone, the likelihood of a single latent cancer fatality within the
exposed population was estimated to be about 1 in 100.  In a rural population zone, the likelihood of a single
latent cancer fatality was estimated to be about 1 in 500.
      Onsite transportation of SNF would occur under the No Action alternative at the Hanford Site, Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory, and Savannah River Site.  The maximum reasonably foreseeable accident
for this alternative would occur at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, with a latent cancer fatality
risk of about 7.5  10-7 for a rural population zone and about 1.1  10-5 for a suburban population zone.  In
the extremely unlikely event that this accident occurred under stable (worst-case) weather conditions, it could
result in 6 latent cancer fatalities in a rural population, such as around the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory, within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the accident, or 85 latent cancer fatalities in a suburban
population zone.  For comparison, the rural population zone would be expected to experience 350 cancer
fatalities and the suburban population zone would experience 42,000 cancer fatalities from other causes.

5.1.3 Decentralization Alternative

      Under the Decentralization alternative, SNF currently stored or generated at DOE sites would remain
at those sites, and SNF generated by university, other Government reactors, and foreign research reactors
would be transported to either the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory or the Savannah River Site. 
Special-case commercial SNF would be transported to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.  Storage
facilities would be upgraded or replaced at DOE sites to improve the safe and secure storage of SNF. 
Existing research and development of technologies improving the safe and secure storage of SNF at DOE
sites would continue, and new projects would commence.  The Navy would store SNF at or near the point of
refueling or defueling (Option A), transport about 10 percent of its SNF to the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard
for limited examinations and storage with the remainder stored at or near the point of fueling or defueling
(Option B), or transport all naval SNF to the Expended Core Facility at the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory for examination and then transport it back to naval sites for storage (Option C).
      The implications of this alternative would be the closure of the Expended Core Facility at the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory under Options A and B and the modification of an existing facility at Puget
Sound Naval Shipyard to provide limited examination under Option B.  Major DOE sites might build new
storage facilities to replace existing facilities or to accept newly generated SNF from other sites.  Degraded
fuels at the major DOE sites might be stabilized to improve safe storage.
      The sites affected by the Decentralization alternative include the Hanford Site, Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory, Savannah River Site, and naval sites.  The environmental consequences at these
sites are described below.

5.1.3.1 Socioeconomics.

For the Decentralization A and B options, one socioeconomic
consequence would be similar to that described for the No Action alternative-closing the Expended Core
Facility would result in the loss of an average of approximately 240 direct jobs over 10 years at the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory (Figure 5-2), with an ultimate loss of about 500 jobs.  This represents a
decrease in employment at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory of approximately 6 percent.  Under the
Decentralization C option, the Expended Core Facility would continue to operate at the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory with no socioeconomic consequences.  At the Hanford and Savannah River Sites,
this alternative would result in significant new construction, employing an additional 80 to 640 workers at the
Hanford Site and 200 to 220 workers at the Savannah River Site over a 10-year period depending on the
options chosen for SNF management at those sites.  The higher value reflects an increase above baseline site
employment of approximately 3 percent at the Hanford Site and approximately 1 percent at the Savannah
River Site.  The peak in employment would be an additional 1,100 workers at the Hanford Site,
approximately 6 percent of the 1995 baseline.  
Figure 5-2.  Summary of impacts for the Decentralization alternative.  (The maximum incremental changefrom baseline is illustrated in all graphs.  Input data are summarized in Appendix K).
      Increases in construction activity over the short-term at the Hanford Site could strain the housing
market and put additional demands on school capacity.  Operations after the construction period would have
very small consequences through the overall project timeframe.  No secondary effects on the local community
are expected at the Savannah River Site.
      At the naval sites, the Decentralization alternative would require construction workers and laborers
to construct fuel storage areas and to staff these areas, but it is expected that these workers would come from
the sites or the local area, and there would not be a significant socioeconomic impact on the surrounding
communities.  Nevertheless, staff required would be approximately
1 percent increase over existing naval site staffing.

5.1.3.2 Utilities (Electricity).

Figure 5-2 illustrates the minimum and maximum incremental
change in power use with respect to existing site usage from implementing the Decentralization alternative. 
As previously discussed in Section 5.1.1.2, the variation in power use by site shown on this graph reflects
whether processing occurs or not.  As an example, if the Hanford Site were to choose a storage option over a
processing option, the power required for the storage option would be less than 1 percent of the overall site
use; however, if a processing option were selected, then power use could increase to 37 percent above
existing site use (see Appendix K).  At each of the sites, the increase in electricity consumption could be
accommodated with the existing site electric power infrastructure.  At Hanford, if a processing option were
selected, an extension of existing utilities in the 200 Area to the project area would be necessary.  The
maximum potential electricity usage shown at the Savannah River Site would be associated with the
processing option that requires the operation of the F- and H-Canyons.  These have operated for many years,
and onsite and offsite utilities are adequate for their operation.  At the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory, the principal differences among options are due to the operation or shutdown of the Expended
Core Facility as was discussed in Section 5.1.2.2.

5.1.3.3 Materials and Waste Management.

The minimum and maximum volumes of high-
level, transuranic, mixed, and low-level wastes that would be generated by SNF management activities over
the next 10 years relative to the baseline are shown in Figure 5-2.  The combined volume of high-level,
transuranic, and mixed waste generated annually, if processing options were implemented, is estimated to
average from approximately 18 to 44 cubic meters per year at the Savannah River Site and Hanford Site,
respectively.  In contrast, if wet storage options for N-Reactor fuel were selected at the Hanford Site then no
high-level, transuranic, or mixed waste would be expected to be generated.  Figure 5-2 also illustrates the
volume of low-level waste that would be generated from implementation of the Decentralization options.  It
should be noted that the volume of low-level waste would increase if a processing option were selected at
either the Hanford Site or the Savannah River Site.  Additional volumes of low-level waste would be
generated at the Savannah River Site from the limited receipt of SNF shipments from offsite and by the
addition of a new canning facility.  Low-level waste would only be generated at the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory under the Decentralization alternative, where the Expended Core Facility would
continue to operate.  Operation of an Expended Core Facility could result in the annual production of
approximately 430 cubic meters (526 cubic yards) of low-level waste (Appendix D).
      At the naval sites, the implementation of the Decentralization alternative would have the same
impact as that described in Section 5.1.2.3 for the No Action alternative because interim storage would be at
the naval sites under both alternatives.

5.1.3.4 Radiological Impacts.

Radiological exposures to both workers and the public from
normal operations for the Decentralization alternative were estimated to be small, similar to the No Action
alternative, with the principal differences associated with possible implementation of the processing options
at the Hanford and Savannah River Sites because of higher radionuclide releases to the atmosphere.  This
increases the offsite population doses and potential for latent cancer fatalities.  Figure 5-2 illustrates the
estimated latent cancer fatalities associated with SNF operations at the major sites.  The estimated latent
cancer fatalities from 40 years of SNF operation would be less than one for each site.
            Hanford Site-The Decentralization alternative considers several options for construction
of new facilities at the Hanford Site, including a new wet storage facility for N-Reactor SNF and a new dry
storage facility for fuels currently stored at other onsite locations.  A second option for implementation of the
Decentralization alternative at the Hanford Site is processing of the N-Reactor SNF followed by dry storage.
      Under this alternative, one of the highest risk SNF-related accidents identified for the No Action
alternative remains-the spent fuel cask drop at a wet storage facility.  Because of the locations of the new
storage facility, the offsite consequences and risks associated with this accident could be reduced to
25 percent of those described under the No Action alternative.  The other highest risk accident, the sodium
fire in the Fast Flux Test Facility fuel storage area, is no longer applicable because the Fast Flux Test Facility
SNF would be moved to a new dry storage facility.
      Potential accidents at the proposed new facilities include a severe cask impact followed by a fire at a
new dry storage facility and a uranium metal fire at a new facility for processing N-Reactor SNF. 
Appendix A indicates that the cask impact and fire accident scenario presents the highest estimated risk to
both the onsite workers and the general public of the accident scenarios identified for this alternative at
Hanford.
      For the severe cask impact accident, the estimated probability is 6 in 1,000,000 per year of
operation.  The estimated population dose, using very conservative meteorology, corresponds to 81 latent
cancer fatalities in the general population within 80 kilometers (50 miles).  The estimated risk per year,
taking into account the chance of occurrence of this accident, would be 4.9  10-4 latent cancer fatalities per
year in the general population.  The potential dose to the maximally exposed offsite individual, assuming no
protective action, corresponds to an estimated probability of a latent cancer fatality of 2.5  10-4.
      An onsite individual approximately 100 meters (about 330 feet) downwind of the accident who
remains within the plume while the fire burns could receive a dose of 120 rem (120,000 millirem).  Acute
doses of this magnitude are in the lower end of the range of doses that might produce symptoms of acute
radiation syndrome in humans.  Because a fire is also involved, the close-in dose is highly dependent on the
meteorological conditions at the time, the amount of plume rise that is generated by the heat from the fire, the
exact location of the accident relative to buildings, etc.  An individual 100 meters (about 330 feet) downwind
is estimated to receive a dose that is sufficient to cause immediate health impacts, but probably would not be
lethal.  This dose corresponds to an estimated worker probability of a latent cancer fatality of 9.4  10-2.  The
estimated risk for a worker is 5.6  10-7 latent cancer fatalities per year.
      Workers in the immediate vicinity of this accident could receive very high doses that could be lethal
unless they immediately evacuated the area of the accident.  There are likely to be two time scales for releases
associated with this accident:  immediately following the accident and while the fire burns.  Nearby workers
may not be able to avoid the immediate radiological impacts but could likely evacuate the area and avoid
most of the fire-related radiological releases unless incapacitated by the accident.
      Potential secondary impacts identified for the severe cask impact with fire accident (Table 5.15-2 of
Appendix A) include possible restriction of use of the Hanford Reach of the Columbia River for recreation,
potential loss of crops, moderate environmental contamination in the vicinity of the facility and near offsite
environs, temporary restriction on land use for agriculture, possible short-term restriction on fishing access,
and cleanup costs.
            Idaho National Engineering Laboratory-Under the Decentralization alternative at
the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory the highest consequence and highest risk SNF-related accidents
are associated with SNF storage and are the same as described under the No Action alternative.  Under the
Decentralization alternative, there are more SNF shipments, and consequently more handling of SNF
compared to the No Action alternative.  As a result, the potential frequency of fuel-handling accidents could
be about 20 percent higher than under the No Action alternative, but because of lower consequences, fuel-
handling accidents would not represent the highest risk accidents under the Decentralization alternative (see
DOE-ID 1994).
 
            Savannah River Site-The Decentralization alternative considers several options for
SNF management at the Savannah River Site, including wet storage (Option 2b), new facilities for dry
storage (Option 2a), and processing the SNF followed by dry storage (Option 2c), which were not considered
under the No Action alternative.
      The highest risk accident for both the general population and workers, however, would be the fuel
assembly breach accident that was discussed under the No Action alternative.
      The accident frequency is expected to be about 0.35 fuel assembly breaches per year of operation
with implementation of this alternative.  The risks to the general public, the maximally  exposed offsite
individual, and co-located workers were estimated to be 3  10-3, 3.5  10-7, and 1.7  10-6 latent cancer
fatalities per year of operation, respectively.
            Naval Facilities-The accident risks for the three subalternatives were evaluated for the
naval facilities under the Decentralization alternative:  (a) decentralization with SNF retained at the shipyards
and the Kesselring Site without examination of the SNF, (b) decentralization with limited examination at
Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, and (c) decentralization with performance assessment examination at the
Expended Core Facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory followed by storage at naval sites. 
Attachment F of Appendix D presents a full discussion of the accident risks at each of the naval sites.  
      The accident risks associated with this alternative would be the same as with the No Action
alternative, with the highest risk accident being an aircraft crash into a dry storage container.  The
consequences and risks of this maximum risk accident would be the same as those described under the No
Action alternative.
            Other Generator/Storage Locations-For the Decentralization alternatives, the
accident risks at the Oak Ridge Reservation and other SNF interim storage sites that do not transport their
SNF elsewhere would be expected to be similar to and bounded by the accident risks under the No Action
alternative.

5.1.3.5 Nonradiological Accidents.

The maximum reasonably foreseeable chemical accident
at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Savannah River Site, naval sites, and other generator/storage
locations would be similar to those described under the No Action alternative.  An accident at the wet storage
facility on the Hanford Site could release sulfuric acid vapor and subject workers to up to 130 percent of the
chemical concentrations that are associated with fatalities or serious health effects.

5.1.3.6 Transportation.

            Shipments-Under the Decentralization alternative, university, foreign, and non-DOE
research reactors would transport SNF to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory and the Savannah River
Site.  In addition, naval SNF shipments would be equal to or greater than those under the No Action
alternative, depending on the choice of subalternative with respect to fuel examination options.  Onsite
shipments at major DOE sites would occur to relocate SNF from one facility to another for stabilization or
storage.
            Incident-Free Transportation-For the Decentralization alternative, the incident-free
transportation of SNF was estimated to result in total fatalities that ranged from 0.12 to 0.38 over the 40-
year period 1995 through 2035.  These fatalities represent the sum of the estimated number of
radiation-related latent cancer fatalities and the estimated number of nonradiological fatalities from vehicular
emissions.
      The reason for a range of fatalities was because of three factors:  (a) different examination options
for naval SNF (see Appendix D), (b) the option of using truck or rail transport for DOE SNF (see Appendix
I), and (c) different SNF management options at the Savannah River Site (see Appendix C).  Navy shipments
would be made using a combination of truck and rail; DOE shipments were assumed to be made using 100
percent truck or 100 percent rail.
      The estimated number of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities for transportation workers ranged
from 0.026 to 0.090, the estimated number of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities for the general
population ranged from 0.041 to 0.24, and the estimated number of nonradiological fatalities from vehicular
emissions ranged from 0.047 to 0.050 for this alternative.
      Onsite shipments of SNF were estimated to result in 0.0025 to 0.0036 fatalities.  Offsite shipments
of SNF were estimated to result in 0.12 to 0.37 fatalities.  These fatalities also represent the sum of the
estimated number of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities and the estimated number of nonradiological
fatalities from vehicular emissions.
            Transportation Accidents-The cumulative transportation accident risks over the 40-
year operational period were estimated to be in the range of 0.00085 to 0.0009 latent cancer fatalities, and
0.20 to 1.01 traffic fatalities, if all SNF were transported by truck.  If all SNF were transported by rail, the
corresponding risks were estimated to be in the range of 0.00029 to 0.00034 latent cancer fatalities, and 0.26
to 1.07 traffic fatalities.  The range of fatality estimates reflects the different fuel examination options for
naval SNF (see Appendix D).
      The maximum reasonably foreseeable offsite transportation accident under the Decentralization
alternative involves transport of naval SNF by rail in a suburban area.  The consequences of such an accident
were estimated to be 1.7 latent cancer fatalities.  The probability of occurrence of such an accident would be
slightly greater than 1.0  10-7 per year.  This probability accounts for the accident rate per mile traveled, the
number of miles traveled, the percentage of the total distance that occurs in a suburban area, the
meteorological conditions, and the severity of the accident.  Based on DOE guidance (DOE 1993b), accidents
with a probability of occurrence less than 1.0  10-7 per year are not reasonably foreseeable and are not
evaluated in this EIS.  Consistent with this guidance, an accident of similar severity to that above for the
suburban area, but occurring in an urban area, would not be reasonably foreseeable.  This is because the total
miles traveled in an urban area would be only a few percent of the total transportation route, resulting in a
probability of occurrence of less than 1.0  10-7 per year.  Thus, the maximum reasonably foreseeable offsite
transportation accident in an urban area would be less severe than postulated to occur in a suburban area and
is estimated to result in 0.065 latent cancer fatalities.  (A more complete discussion of this apparent anomaly
is presented in Section A.5.2 of Volume 1, Appendix D, Part B, Attachment A.)
      Onsite transportation of SNF would occur under the Decentralization alternative at the Hanford Site,
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, and Savannah River Site.  The maximum reasonably foreseeable
accident for this alternative occurs at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, and the potential impacts
would be the same as those described under the No Action alternative.

5.1.4 1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative

      Under the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative, SNF currently stored at major DOE sites would
remain at those sites, and newly generated SNF from DOE, university, and other Government reactors would
be transported to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory or the Savannah River Site for storage.  Special-
case commercial SNF and naval SNF would be transported to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory for
storage.  Existing research and development of technologies improving the safe and secure storage of SNF at
DOE sites would continue, and new projects would commence.  Examination of naval fuels would be
conducted at the Expended Core Facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.
      The implications of this alternative for major DOE sites would be similar to those described for the
Decentralization alternative.  New storage facilities would be built at the major DOE sites to replace existing
facilities or to accept newly generated SNF from other sites.  Degraded fuels at the Savannah River Site and
the Hanford Site might be stabilized to improve safe storage.
      The sites that would be affected by the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative are the Hanford Site,
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, and Savannah River Site.  The environmental consequences at these
sites are described below.

5.1.4.1 Socioeconomics.

Implementation of the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative would
not have a significant socioeconomic impact at any of the major DOE or naval sites (Figure 5-3).  The
impacts at the Hanford and Savannah River Sites would be similar to those described for the Decentralization
alternative in Section 5.1.3.1 and shown on Figure 5-2.  Proposed new construction and maintenance
activities at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory would result in the addition of approximately 130
workers over 10 years, less than a 2 percent increase above baseline site employment.  The peak employment
at Hanford would be the same as that described for the Decentralization alternative, a maximum of about
1,100 additional workers at the Hanford Site, an increase of approximately 6 percent above the 1995
baseline.  Secondary socioeconomic impacts at the Hanford Site would be similar to those described under
the Decentralization alternative.
      There would be no socioeconomic impact at the naval sites because current practices would not be
altered.  Storage facilities would not need to be constructed at the individual naval sites, and no employment
would be generated at naval sites.

5.1.4.2 Utilities (Electricity).

The minimum and maximum change in power use from
implementing the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative with respect to the site baseline is shown in Figure
5-3.  The impact on power consumption at the sites would be the same as that described for the
Decentralization alternative in Section 5.1.3.2 (compare with Figure 5-2) except at the Idaho 
Figure 5-3.  Summary of impacts for the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative.  (The maximum incrementalchange from baseline is illustrated in all graphs.  Input data are summarized in Appendix K).
National Engineering Laboratory.  The variation in power use over site baseline use at the Savannah River
and Hanford Sites reflects whether a storage or processing option is selected for SNF management.  The
increase in power use at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory would be because of the
Electrometallurgical Process Demonstration Project.  If processing options were implemented at the Hanford
Site, an extension of existing utilities to the project area would be necessary.

5.1.4.3 Materials and Waste Management.

Figure 5-3 illustrates the combined average
annual volumes of high-level, transuranic, and mixed wastes and of low-level wastes that would be generated
over the next 10 years as a result of SNF management activities with the implementation of the 1992/1993
Planning Basis alternative.  The volume of low-level waste and the combined volume of high-level,
transuranic, and mixed waste would be similar to the volumes generated under the Decentralization
alternative for the Hanford and Savannah River Sites (see Figures 5-2 and 5-3).  The minimum and
maximum values shown for these sites reflect whether a storage option or a processing option would be
implemented, respectively.
      At the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, implementation of the 1992/1993 Planning Basis
alternative would result in the generation of high-level, transuranic, and mixed wastes.  These wastes would
be generated by the Electrometallurgical Process Demonstration Project.  The volume of low-level waste
generated at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory would be from the construction and operation of new
storage and characterization facilities at the site.  Adequate storage capacity exists at the site for these wastes
until 2005, when additional capacity would be expected to be required for managing low-level waste
(Appendix B).

5.1.4.4 Radiological Impacts.

Radiological exposures to both workers and the public from
normal SNF management operations and onsite accidents for the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative
would be essentially the same as estimated for the Decentralization option.  Figure 5-3 illustrates the
estimated latent cancer fatalities associated with SNF operations at the major sites.
            SNF Facility Accidents-
            Hanford Site.  The implementation of the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative at the
Hanford Site would not result in accident risks significantly different from those identified for the
Decentralization alternative (Section 5.15 of Appendix A).
            Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.  Under the 1992/1993 Planning Basis
alternative at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, the consequences and risks of accidents associated
with SNF storage would be the same as described under the No Action alternative (Section 5.15 of Appendix
B).  The consequences of fuel-handling accidents would be the same as described under the No Action
alternative, but increased SNF shipments, and consequently more handling of SNF, could result in a
frequency of fuel-handling accidents about three times higher than for the No Action alternative
(Slaughterbeck et al. 1995).  Because of the increased frequency of fuel-handling accidents, risk to the public
from fuel-handling accidents may exceed the risk from SNF storage accidents.
            Savannah River Site.  The implementation of the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative at
the Savannah River Site would not result in accident consequence estimates 
that differ from those identified under the Decentralization alternative (Section 5.15 and Attachment A of
Appendix C).  Because of increases in amount of SNF handled, the accident frequencies would be expected
to increase.
      The accident frequency for the highest risk accident, the fuel assembly breach, would be expected to
be about 0.40 fuel assembly breaches per year of operation with implementation of this alternative.  This
results in estimated risk to the general public, maximally exposed offsite individual, and co-located worker of
3.4  10-3, 4.0  10-7, and 1.9  10-6 latent cancer fatalities per year of operation, respectively.
            Naval Facilities.  With implementation of the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative for
naval facilities, all storage and examination activities occur at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. 
The maximum risk accident at this facility was not the maximum risk accident at the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory, so it is not discussed further in this volume.  See Attachment F of Appendix D for
details.
            Other Generator/Storage Locations.  For the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative, the
accident risks at the Oak Ridge Reservation and other SNF interim storage sites that do not transport their
SNF elsewhere would be similar to the accident risks under the No Action alternative.

5.1.4.5 Nonradiological Accidents.

The maximum reasonably foreseeable chemical accident
at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Savannah River Site, and other generator/storage locations
would be similar to those described under the No Action alternative.  The Hanford Site accidents would be
similar to those in the Decentralization alternative.
      Two independent accidents were evaluated to describe the maximum reasonably foreseeable
chemical hazards during the operation of the Expended Core Facility at the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory.  Such a release could subject workers to chemical concentrations that could cause fatalities or
serious health effects but would not subject the public to such concentrations.

5.1.4.6 Transportation.

            Shipments-Under the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative, university, foreign, and
non-DOE research reactors would transport SNF to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory and the
Savannah River Site.  Commercial SNF stored at the West Valley Demonstration Project and graphite SNF
stored at the Fort St. Vrain site would be transported to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.  DOE
research reactor SNF stored at various DOE sites would be transported to the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory and the Savannah River Site.  Naval SNF would be transported from naval shipyards to the
Expended Core Facility and irradiated test specimens would be transported between the Expended Core
Facility and offsite locations.  Onsite transportation would relocate SNF from one facility to another for
stabilization or storage.
            Incident-Free Transportation-For the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative, the
incident-free transportation of SNF was estimated to result in total fatalities that ranged from 0.14 to 0.45
over the 40-year period 1995 through 2035.  These fatalities were the sum of the estimated number of
radiation-related latent cancer fatalities and the estimated number of nonradiological fatalities from vehicular
emissions.
      The reason for a range of fatalities was due to two factors:  (a) the option of using truck or rail
transport for DOE SNF (see Appendix I) and (b) different SNF management options at the Savannah River
Site (see Appendix C).  Navy shipments would be made using a combination of truck or rail; DOE shipments
were assumed to be made using 100 percent truck or 100 percent rail.
      The estimated number of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities for transportation workers ranged
from 0.029 to 0.11, the estimated number of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities for the general
population ranged from 0.044 to 0.30, and the estimated number of nonradiological fatalities from vehicular
emissions ranged from 0.045 to 0.071.
      Onsite shipments of SNF were estimated to result in 0.0028 to 0.0036 fatality.  Offsite shipments of
SNF were estimated to result in 0.14 to 0.45 fatality.  These fatalities were also the sum of the estimated
number of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities and the estimated number of nonradiological fatalities
from vehicular emissions.
            Transportation Accidents-The cumulative transportation accident risks over the 40-
year operational period were estimated to be 0.0010 latent cancer fatality and 0.70 traffic fatality if all SNF
were transported by truck.  If all SNF were transported by rail, the corresponding risks were estimated to be
0.00035 latent cancer fatality and 0.73 traffic fatality.
      The maximum reasonably foreseeable offsite transportation accident involves a rail shipment of
special-case commercial SNF in a suburban population zone under neutral (average) weather conditions.  The
accident has a probability of occurrence of about 2.0  10-7 per year and would result in an estimated 7 latent
cancer fatalities in the exposed population.  For comparison, the same population would be expected to
experience about 100,000 cancer fatalities from other causes.  The probability of this accident occurring in an
urban population zone would be less than 1  10-7 per year.  In a rural population zone, the accident
consequences would be estimated to be about 0.2 latent cancer fatalities.
      Onsite transportation of SNF would occur under the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative at the
Hanford Site, the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, and the Savannah River Site.  The maximum
reasonably foreseeable accident for this alternative occurs at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, and
the potential impacts would be the same as those described under the No Action alternative.

5.1.5 Regionalization Alternative

      There are two alternatives under Regionalization:  Regionalization 4A would relocate SNF according
to fuel type; Regionalization 4B would relocate SNF according to location.
      Under Regionalization 4A, certain types of SNF from other DOE sites, and SNF from university and
other Government reactors, special-case commercial SNF, and foreign research reactor SNF would be
transported to either the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory or Savannah River Site for storage.  Existing
research and development of technologies improving the safe and secure storage of SNF at DOE sites would
continue, and new projects would commence.  Naval SNF would be examined at the Expended Core Facility
at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, then stored at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant.
      The implications of Regionalization 4A are essentially the same as those of the 1992/1993 Planning
Basis alternative because there would be minor differences in the amounts of fuel transported to each
destination under these alternatives (see Figure 5-4).
      Under Regionalization 4B, however, two regional sites would be selected, and SNF would be moved
to one site or the other.  In the west, either the Hanford Site, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, or
Nevada Test Site would be the regional site; in the east, either the Savannah River Site or Oak Ridge
Reservation would be designated.  SNF stored or generated west of the Mississippi River would be
transported to the Western Regional Site, and SNF stored or generated east of the Mississippi River would be
transported to the Eastern Regional Site.  An expended core facility would be built at either the Eastern or
Western Regional Site (unless the Western Regional Site were the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, in
which case no new facility would be required).  Research and development would be conducted at the
regional sites.
      Regionalization 4B affects more sites than Regionalization 4A.  Only one site would have SNF
management responsibility in the east and in the west; thus, SNF management activities would be phased out
at those sites not selected as regional sites.  If the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory were not selected as
the Western Regional Site, the Expended Core Facility in Idaho would be closed, and a new facility would be
built at either the Eastern or Western Regional Site.  If the Oak Ridge Reservation were chosen as the Eastern
Regional Site, SNF now at Savannah River would be transported to the Oak Ridge Reservation.  This would
require the development of new storage facilities at the Reservation.  Some fuels might need to be stabilized
before transport.  If the Savannah River Site were selected as the Eastern Regional Site, there would be few
differences between Regionalization 4B and Regionalization 4A except that an expended core facility might
be built at the site.  In the west, transport of Hanford SNF to another site would require stabilization of the
N-Reactor fuels, the great majority of the SNF now stored there.  Some Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory fuels would also require stabilization if they were transported to another site.  New SNF
management facilities would be required at any Western Regional Site selected because of the large volumes
of SNF that would be received.
Figure 5-4.  Summary of impacts for Regionalization 4A (by fuel type).  (The maximum incremental changefrom baseline is illustrated in all graphs.  Input data are summarized in Appendix K.)
      This alternative would affect only the five major DOE sites.  The environmental consequences at
these sites are described below.

5.1.5.1 Socioeconomics.

Under Regionalization 4A, the socioeconomic impacts at the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory would be the same as those described for the 1992/1993 Planning Basis
alternative described in Section 5.1.4.1.  The peak employment under Regionalization 4A would be an
additional 470 workers at the Hanford Site, approximately 3 percent above the 1995 baseline. 
Implementation of Regionalization 4A would have no socioeconomic consequences at either the Oak Ridge
Reservation or the Nevada Test Site because this would result in no changes to existing operations at either
site.
      Impacts of Regionalization 4A on the naval sites would be the same as that described for the
1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative because naval SNF would be transported to the Expended Core
Facility in Idaho for examination and storage at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.
      If either the Hanford Site, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, or Savannah River Site were not
selected as a regional site under Regionalization 4B, there would be an eventual reduction in employment
equal to existing employment for SNF management at these sites.  This would add to the currently predicted
loss of jobs at each of these sites.  In the short term, additional jobs would be required to prepare SNF for
transport offsite (see Figure 5-5).  The closure of the Expended Core Facility at the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory, however, would lead to a short-term loss of jobs as well, increasing the rate of job
loss at that site.
      Sites that were selected as regional sites would have generally increased employment over baseline
levels (see Figure 5-6).  Site employment levels would also increase at whatever site an expended core facility
were constructed (Figure 5-7).  Employment at the Oak Ridge Reservation and Nevada Test Site would
increase if these sites were chosen as the Eastern and Western Regional Sites.  Operation of storage facilities
at both the Oak Ridge Reservation and Nevada Test Site could ultimately result in the creation of
approximately 500 jobs per year at both sites, a 3-percent increase above current site employment at Oak
Ridge Reservation and a 6-percent increase above current site employment at the Nevada Test Site without
the expended core facility or a 7- and 13-percent increase with an expended core facility, respectively
(Figure 5-6).  The peak annual employment from implementation of Regionalization 4B would be an
additional 1,100 workers at the Nevada Test Site.  The secondary impacts of increased employment at either
the Oak Ridge Reservation or the Nevada Test Site could result in an increased housing demand.  At the
Nevada Test Site, overall socioeconomic impacts could be absorbed within the projected expansion of the
local economy, infrastructure, public service, and real estate development.  At the Oak Ridge Reservation,
increased employment could result in increases in capital expenditures to meet the increased demand of
housing, transportation, and educational facilities.
Figure 5-5.  Summary of impacts for Regionalization 4B (by geography) if the site were not selected as theregional site.  (The maximum incremental change from baseline is illustrated in all graphs.  Input data
summarized in Appendix K.)
Figure 5-6.  Summary of impacts for Regionalization 4B (by geography) if sites were selected as a regionalsite and do not have the expended core facility.  (The maximum incremental change from baseline is
illustrated in all graphs.  Input data are summarized in Appendix K.)
Figure 5-7.  Summary of impacts for Regionalization 4B (by geography) if sites were selected as a regionalsite and have the expended core facility.  (The maximum incremental change from baseline is illustrated in
graphs.  Input data are summarized in Appendix K.)
      For the naval sites, implementing Regionalization 4B would have no socioeconomic consequences.

5.1.5.2 Utilities (Electricity).

As shown in Figure 5-4, implementing Regionalization 4A would
have a similar impact on power consumption as the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative (compare Figures
5-3 and 5-4).  There would be no effect on power consumption at the Oak Ridge Reservation, Nevada Test
Site, or naval sites from the implementation of Regionalization 4A.
      Figures 5-5, 5-6, and 5-7 illustrate the minimum and maximum change from baseline site power use
from implementing Regionalization 4B with and without an expended core facility and if the site were not
selected as the regional site.  Regionalization at the Hanford Site or the Nevada Test Site could produce an
impact on power consumption at these sites.
      Figure 5-5 illustrates the impact on power consumption if a site were not selected as a regional site. 
The increase in electricity consumption at the Hanford Site and the Savannah River Site reflects the power
required to prepare or process the SNF for transport as required.  The decrease in power consumption at the
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory would be from shutdown of the Expended Core Facility.
      Figure 5-6 shows the minimum and maximum percent change, without an expended core facility,
over baseline site power consumption if a site were selected as a regional center.  At the Hanford Site and
Savannah River Site, the power consumption increases slightly with the transport of naval fuel to the site. 
Regionalization at the Oak Ridge Reservation would result in a small (less than 3 percent) increase in electric
power demand.  The site electricity supply at each of these sites would be more than adequate.  However,
regionalization at the Nevada Test Site would increase power consumption about 13 percent above existing
site usage and may require additional transmission lines or another substation at the site (see Appendices F
and K).
      Regionalization 4B with an expended core facility onsite is illustrated in Figure 5-7.  The electricity
requirements at each of the major DOE sites would increase with the addition of an expended core facility for
examination of naval SNF.  Power consumption at the Nevada Test Site would increase approximately 18
percent above baseline and about 40 percent at Hanford if the processing (figure maximum) option were
selected.  The storage only options (figure minimum) at the Hanford site would result in only a 3-percent
increase in electricity consumption.  The Nevada Test Site would require additional transmission lines or
another substation to handle additional loads.  The increased load could be handled at the Savannah River
Site, and relatively minor increases could occur at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.

5.1.5.3 Materials and Waste Management.

Figures 5-4 through 5-7 illustrate the effects of
implementing the different Regionalization alternatives:  Regionalization 4A, Regionalization 4B with SNF
transported offsite, Regionalization 4B without an expended core facility located at the selected site, and
Regionalization 4B with an expended core facility located at the selected site.  The annual average waste
volumes generated from SNF management activities at a nonselected site would decrease over the next 10
years, but at the selected sites the annual generation rate of waste from SNF management activities would
increase with implementation of the Regionalization alternative.  The construction of an expended core
facility at any site would also increase the annual volume of low-level waste generated.
      The annual waste volumes generated from SNF management activities associated with
Regionalization 4A are illustrated in Figure 5-4.  The effects of Regionalization 4A would be similar to those
described for the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative in Section 5.1.4.3 (see Figures 5-3 and 5-4).
      Figure 5-5 illustrates the effect of not being selected as a regional center.  In comparison to the
Decentralization and 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternatives, the annual generation rate of high-level,
transuranic, mixed, and low-level wastes would ultimately decrease at the affected site because the SNF
inventory would be transported offsite.  However, characterization and stabilization activities prior to
transport would generate transient increases in waste volumes.
      The effect of being selected as a regional center without a replacement expended core facility is
illustrated in Figure 5-6.  Implementation of this Regionalization 4B alternative would have similar effects at
the Hanford Site and Savannah River Site as the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative.  The Oak Ridge
Reservation and Nevada Test Site would generate waste from SNF management activities under the
alternative.  Regionalization at either of these two sites would be expected to generate approximately 16
cubic meters (21 cubic yards) of transuranic waste and approximately 200 cubic meters (260 cubic yards) of
low-level waste annually from operating an SNF management complex.
      Figure 5-7 illustrates the effect on annual waste volume generation of being selected as a regional
center with the addition of an expended core facility to examine naval SNF.  The addition of the expended
core facility would have no effect on the annual volume of high-level, transuranic, or mixed waste generated,
but would increase the volume of low-level waste that would have to be managed at any site.
      The effects from implementing either of the Regionalization alternatives at the naval sites would be
the same as that described for the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternatives in Section 5.1.4.3.

5.1.5.4 Radiological Impacts.

Radiological exposures to both workers and the public for
Regionalization 4A would to be similar to the 1992/
1993 Planning Basis alternative.  These are not
discussed further in this section.  Figure 5-4 illustrates the potential latent cancer fatalities to the population
within 80 kilometers (50 miles) from SNF operations at the major sites for Regionalization 4A.
      Radiological exposures to both workers and the public for Regionalization 4B would to be similar to
the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative if the Savannah River Site, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory,
or Hanford Site were selected as regional sites.  Figures 5-5, 5-6, and 5-7 illustrate the potential latent cancer
fatalities to the population within 80 kilometers (50 miles) from SNF operations for Regionalization 4B if
SNF is transported offsite, or if the site is selected as the regional site without and with the expended core
facility, respectively.
      For any of the Regionalization alternatives, the maximum estimated latent cancer fatalities in the
general population from normal operations are estimated to be 7.6  10-3 per year.
            SNF Facility Accidents-
            Hanford Site.  Accident risks under Regionalization 4A are the same as those for the
Decentralization alternative.  The selection of the Hanford Site as the regional site would not result in
accident risks significantly different from those identified for the Decentralization alternative (Section 5.15 of
Appendix A), although higher activity under this alternative would increase the annual frequency of
accidents.  The probability of the cask impact and fire accident scenario was estimated to be 7 in 1,000,000 if
the Hanford Site were selected as a regional site. 
      Selecting a different site as the regional site would reduce the estimated accident risks from those
identified for the Decentralization alternative because the existing wet storage facilities would be shut down
and the amount of SNF handled at the dry storage facility would change slightly.  The accident probability for
the dry storage cask impact and fire was estimated to be 5 in 1,000,000 such that the estimated risk from this,
the highest risk accident, would be 4.1  10-4 latent cancer fatalities in the general population per year of
operation.
            Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.  While the consequences of potential SNF
storage and handling accidents would be similar for all alternatives, the estimated frequency of handling
accidents depends on the amount of SNF handled under the alternatives.  For alternatives where all stored
SNF is transported to another site, SNF storage and handling risks would be reduced to those associated with
SNF generated at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory research reactors.  Under Regionalization 4A,
the consequences and risks of accidents associated with SNF storage would be the same as described under
the No Action alternative (Section 5.15, Appendix B).  The consequences of fuel-handling accidents would
be the same as described under the No Action alternative, but increased transporting and handling of SNF
would result in a frequency of fuel-handling accidents about five times higher than for the No Action
alternative (Slaughterbeck et al. 1995).  Because of the increased frequency of fuel-handling accidents, risk to
the public from fuel-handling accidents may exceed the risk from SNF storage accidents.
      If the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory were selected as a regional site under Regionalization
4B, the highest consequences to the offsite population result from accidents involving stored SNF and would
be the same as described under the No Action alternative (Section 5.15 of
Appendix B).  With the resumption of processing at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant, the postulated
accident with the highest consequence and risk to workers would be an inadvertent nuclear criticality during
processing that has an estimated probability of 1 chance in 1,000 per year of operation.  The estimated
probability of a latent cancer fatality in a worker approximately 100 meters (330 feet) downwind of the
accident would be 3.6 x 10-3, corresponding to an estimated risk to a worker of 3.6 x 10-6 latent cancer
fatalities per year of operation.  The consequences of fuel-handling accidents would be the same as described
under the No Action alternative, but increased transporting and handling of SNF results in a frequency of
fuel-handling accidents about 20 times higher than for the No Action alternative (Slaughterbeck et al. 1995). 
Because of the increased frequency of fuel-handling accidents, risk to the public from fuel-handling accidents
may exceed the risk from SNF storage and processing accidents.
      If the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory were not selected as a regional site under
Regionalization 4B, the consequences and risks of accidents associated with SNF storage would be the same
as described under the No Action alternative (Section 5.15 of Appendix B).  The consequences of fuel-
handling accidents would be the same as described under the No Action alternative, but increased
transporting and handling of SNF would result in a frequency of fuel-handling accidents about nine times
higher than for the No Action alternative (Slaughterbeck et al. 1995).  Because of the increased frequency of
fuel-handling accidents, risk to the public from fuel-handling accidents may exceed the risk from SNF
storage accidents.
            Savannah River Site.  Accident risks under Regionalization 4A would be essentially the
same as those for the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative.  The accident frequency for the highest risk
accident, a fuel assembly breach, would be expected to be about 0.44 fuel assembly breaches per year of
operation with implementation of this alternative.  The estimated risk of latent cancer fatalities to the general
public, maximally exposed offsite individual, and co-located worker would be 3.7  10-3, 4.4  10-7, and 2.1
 10-6 per year of operation, respectively.
      The implementation of Regionalization 4B at the Savannah River Site, including the three options of
dry storage, wet storage, and processing followed by dry storage, would not result in accidents significantly
different from those identified for the same options under the Decentralization alternative (Section 5.15 and
Attachment A of Appendix C).  Because of an increase in the amount of SNF handled, however, the accident
frequency for some accidents would increase.
      Under Regionalization 4B, the accident frequency for the highest risk accident, a fuel assembly
breach, would be expected to be about 0.41 fuel assembly breaches per year of operation with
implementation of this alternative.  This results in a proportional increase in risk to the general public and the
workers.  The estimated risk of latent cancer fatalities to the general public, maximally exposed offsite
individual, and co-located worker would be 3.5  10-3, 4.1  10-7, and 2.0  10-6 per year of operation,
respectively.  With regionalization elsewhere, the highest risk accident would still be the fuel assembly
breach with an estimated risk approximately the same as with the No Action alternative.
            Naval Facilities.  The accident risks associated with the implementation of the
Regionalization alternative at sites other than the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory are presented in
detail in Attachment F of Appendix D.  That evaluation considered the accidents associated with operation of
an expended core facility and wet and dry storage facilities at the Hanford Site, Savannah River Site, Oak
Ridge Reservation, and Nevada Test Site.  Accidents evaluated were the same set of accidents identified for
the Decentralization alternative.  The maximum risk accidents, for either the general population and workers
at sites where an expended core facility might be located if they are associated with an expended core facility,
are discussed under the affected sites. 
            Oak Ridge Reservation.  The Oak Ridge Reservation would not be affected by
Regionalization 4A.  The implementation of Regionalization 4B at the Oak Ridge Reservation would be
expected to be similar to implementation of the Centralization alternative, except that less storage
requirements would be needed.  Section 5.15 (Part 3) of Appendix F indicates that the accident consequences
would be similar for both alternatives and that it is reasonable to assume that the accident consequences and
risks described for the Centralization alternative would envelop the Regionalization alternative.
      A wide range of accident scenarios were considered, including accidents initiated by operational
events, external hazards such as aircraft crashes, and natural phenomena such as earthquakes.  The highest
risk SNF-related accidents identified were (a) a fuel assembly breach as a result of dropping the assembly,
objects falling on the assembly, or cutting into the fuel portion of the assembly, (b) a dropped fuel cask, (c) a
severe impact that results in breach of a transport cask and fire, (d) an aircraft crash into the SNF dry storage
facility, (e) an aircraft crash into the SNF dry cell facility, (f) a wind-driven missile impact into storage casks,
and (g) and aircraft crash into a water storage pool.
      The highest risk to the general population would be a fuel assembly breach, with an estimated
frequency of 0.16 per year.  General population consequences were estimated to be approximately
2.1  10-2 latent cancer fatalities per year.  The estimated risk to the general population, taking into account
the probability of occurrence of this accident, would be 3.4  10-3 latent cancer fatalities per year.  The
estimated probability of maximum latent cancer fatalities to the maximally exposed individual would be
6.0  10-6.
      The dropped fuel cask accident has the maximum risk to workers with an estimated frequency of less
than 1 in 10,000 per year.  A worker downwind of the accident was estimated to receive a dose that
corresponds to an estimated probability of 1.9  10-3 latent cancer fatalities.  The estimated risk for a worker
would be 1.9  10-7 latent cancer fatalities per year.
      Workers in the immediate vicinity of the cask drop accident could receive very high doses; however,
the doses would not result in a fatality.  For that accident, workers could be expected to be very near the cask
when it drops and receive both direct radiation as well as inhale airborne fission products.  Workers would be
expected to quickly evacuate the area and thus reduce their potential radiation exposure.
            Nevada Test Site.  The implementation of Regionalization 4B at the Nevada Test Site
would also be expected to be similar to implementation of the Centralization alternative, except that storage
requirements would be less.  Section 5.15 (Part 2) of Appendix F indicates that the accident consequences
would be similar for both alternatives and that it is reasonable to assume that the accident consequences and
risks described for the Centralization alternative would envelop the Regionalization alternative.
      A wide range of accident scenarios were considered for the Centralization alternative, which also
apply to Regionalization 4B, including accidents initiated by operational events, external hazards such as
aircraft crashes, and natural phenomena such as earthquakes.  The highest risk SNF-related accidents
identified for the Nevada Test Site were a fuel assembly breach (highest risk to the general public) and a
dropped fuel cask (highest risk to workers).
      The fuel assembly breach is the highest risk to the general population with an estimated frequency of
0.16 per year and an estimated offsite population dose corresponding to 6.6  10-4 latent cancer fatalities. 
The estimated risk to the general population, taking into account the probability of occurrence of this
accident, would be 1.1  10-4 latent cancer fatalities per year.  The potential dose to the maximally exposed
offsite individual would correspond to a probability of a latent cancer fatality of 1.6  10-7.
      The dropped fuel cask accident was the highest risk accident to workers with an estimated frequency
of less than 1 in 10,000 per year.  A worker approximately 100 meters (330 feet) downwind of the accident
would have a probability of a latent cancer fatality of 1.9  10-3.  The estimated risk to a worker would be 1.9
 10-7 latent cancer fatalities per year of operation. 
      Workers in the immediate vicinity of the cask drop accident could receive very high doses; however,
the doses would not result in a fatality.  For that accident, workers could be expected to be very near the cask
when it drops and receive both direct neutron and gamma radiation as well as inhale airborne fission
products.  Workers would be expected to quickly evacuate the area and thus reduce their potential radiation
exposure.
            Other Generator/Storage Locations.  For Regionalization 4A and 4B, the accident risks
would be expected to be similar to the accident risks under the No Action alternative.

5.1.5.5 Nonradiological Accidents.

The maximum reasonably foreseeable chemical accident
at the Idaho Engineering National Laboratory, Savannah River Site, and other generator/storage locations
would be similar to those described under the No Action alternative.  An accident during the operation of a
wet storage facility at the Hanford Site could release sulfuric acid and subject workers to fatalities or serious
health effects.
      Two independent accidents have been evaluated to describe the maximum reasonably foreseeable
chemical accident during the operation of the expended core facility at each of its potential locations.  Such a
release could subject workers to chemical concentrations that could cause fatalities or serious health effects
but would not subject the public to such concentrations except at potential locations on the Oak Ridge
Reservation and adjacent to the Savannah River Site.

5.1.5.6 Transportation.

            Regionalization 4A (by fuel type)-
            Shipments.  Under Regionalization 4A, the same SNF types would be transported as under
the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative with differences occurring in the destinations of some SNF based
on fuel type.  Onsite shipments would relocate SNF for continued safe storage or stabilization.
            Incident-Free Transportation.  For Regionalization 4A, the incident-free transportation of
SNF was estimated to result in total fatalities that ranged from 0.17 to 0.61 over the 40-year period 1995
through 2035.  These fatalities represent the sum of the estimated number of radiation-related latent cancer
fatalities and the estimated number of nonradiological fatalities from vehicular emissions.
      The reason for a range of fatalities was due to two factors:  (a) the option of using truck or rail
transport for DOE SNF (see Appendix I), and (b) different SNF management options at the Savannah River
Site (see Appendix C).  Navy shipments would be made using a combination of truck and rail; DOE
shipments were assumed to be made using 100 percent truck or 100 percent rail.
      The estimated number of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities for transportation workers ranged
from 0.031 to 0.15, the estimated number of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities for the general
population ranged from 0.054 to 0.41, and the estimated number of nonradiological fatalities from vehicular
emissions ranged from 0.052 to 0.084.
      Onsite shipments of SNF were estimated to result in 0.0025 to 0.0034 fatalities.  Offsite shipments
of SNF were estimated to result in 0.17 to 0.61 fatalities.  These fatalities also represent the sum of the
estimated number of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities and the estimated number of nonradiological
fatalities from vehicular emissions.
            Transportation Accidents.  The cumulative transportation accident risks over the 40-year
operational period were estimated to be 0.0011 latent cancer fatality and 0.77 traffic fatality if all SNF were
transported by truck.  If all SNF were transported by rail, the corresponding risks were estimated to be
0.00037 latent cancer fatality and 0.76 traffic fatality.
      As in the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative, the maximum reasonably foreseeable offsite
transportation accident involves a rail shipment of special-case commercial SNF in a suburban population
zone under neutral (average) weather conditions.  The accident has a probability of occurrence of about 2.8 
10-7 per year, and the consequences are the same as those described under the 1992/1993 Planning Basis
alternative.
      Onsite transportation of SNF would occur under Regionalization 4A at the Hanford Site, Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory, and Savannah River Site.  The maximum reasonably foreseeable accident
for this alternative would occur at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, and the potential impacts
would be the same as those described under the No Action alternative.
            Regionalization 4B (by geography)-
            Shipments.  Under Regionalization 4B, the same SNF types would be transported as under
the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative with differences occurring in the destinations of the SNF based on
geographical considerations.  Non-naval SNF originating from western United States locations or points of
entry would be transported to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Hanford Site, or Nevada Test Site. 
Non-naval SNF originating from eastern United States locations or points of entry would be transported to
the Savannah River Site or Oak Ridge Reservation.  Naval SNF would not be split on an east-west basis
because the Navy would operate a facility for examining naval SNF at one of the DOE sites.  Onsite
shipments at major DOE sites may relocate SNF from one facility or another for continued safe storage or
stabilization, if applicable.
            Incident-Free Transportation.  For the six Regionalization 4B alternatives, the incident-
free transportation of SNF was estimated to result in total fatalities that ranged from 0.14 (Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory and Oak Ridge Reservation alternative) to 0.90 (Nevada Test Site and Oak Ridge
Reservation alternative).  The other four alternatives would result in fatalities between these two alternatives. 
These fatalities were over the 40-year period 1995 through 2035 and represent the sum of the estimated
number of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities and the estimated number of nonradiological fatalities
from vehicular emissions.
      The reason for a range of fatalities was due to two factors:  (1) the option of using truck or rail
transport for DOE SNF (see Appendix I), and (2) the six regionalization alternatives.  Navy shipments would
be made using a combination of truck or rail; DOE shipments were assumed to be made using 100 percent
truck or 100 percent rail.
      For regionalization at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory and Oak Ridge Reservation, the
estimated number of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities for transportation workers was 0.033, the
estimated number of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities for the general population was 0.043, and the
estimated number of nonradiological fatalities from vehicular emissions was 0.059.
      For regionalization at the Nevada Test Site and Oak Ridge Reservation, the estimated number of
radiation-related latent cancer fatalities for transportation workers was 0.21, the estimated number of
radiation-related latent cancer fatalities for the general population was 0.60, and the estimated number of
nonradiological fatalities from vehicular emissions was 0.091.
      For regionalization at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory and Oak Ridge Reservation, onsite
shipments of SNF were estimated to result in 0.0025 fatalities.  Offsite shipments of SNF were estimated to
result in 0.13 fatalities.  These fatalities also represent the sum of the estimated number of radiation-related
latent cancer fatalities and the estimated number of nonradiological fatalities from vehicular emissions.
      For regionalization at the Nevada Test Site and Oak Ridge Reservation, onsite SNF shipments were
estimated to result in 0.0023 fatalities.  Offsite shipments of SNF were estimated to result in 0.90 fatalities. 
These fatalities also represent the sum of the estimated number of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities
and the estimated number of nonradiological fatalities from vehicular emissions.
            Transportation Accidents.  Cumulative accident risks for transportation by truck would
range from 0.00090 latent cancer fatalities and 0.72 traffic fatalities for regionalization at the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory and Savannah River Site, to 0.0012 latent cancer fatalities and 1.0 traffic fatalities
for regionalization at the Nevada Test Site and Oak Ridge Reservation.  Cumulative accident risks for
transportation by rail would range from 0.00024 latent cancer fatalities and 0.72 traffic fatalities for
regionalization at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory and Oak Ridge Reservation, to 0.00035 latent
cancer fatalities and 0.91 traffic fatalities for regionalization at the Nevada Test Site and Oak Ridge
Reservation.
      As in the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative, the maximum reasonably foreseeable offsite
transportation accident would involve a rail shipment of special-case commercial SNF in a suburban
population zone under neutral (average) weather conditions.  The accident has a probability of occurrence
that ranges from about 2.7  10-7 per year for regionalization at the Hanford Site and Savannah River Site, to
about 3.7  10-7 per year for regionalization at the Nevada Test Site and Savannah River Site.  Accident
consequences would be the same for each alternative and would be the same as those described under the
1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative.
      Onsite transportation of SNF would occur under Regionalization 4B at the Hanford Site,  Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory, and Savannah River Site.  The maximum reasonably foreseeable accident
for this alternative would occur at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, and the potential impacts
would be the same as those described under the No Action alternative.

5.1.6 Centralization Alternative

      Under this alternative, all stored and newly generated SNF would be transported to and stored at one
of five sites:  the Hanford Site, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Savannah River Site, Oak Ridge
Reservation, or Nevada Test Site.  SNF management activities at unselected sites would cease.  All SNF-
related research and development activities would be conducted at the selected site, and the expended core
facility would also be located there.
      The implications of this alternative would be similar to those of Regionalization 4B alternative for
western sites, but if an eastern site were selected, considerably greater volumes of SNF would be stored there
than under any other alternative because the site would receive fuels from the Hanford Site and the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory.  Therefore, substantially larger storage facilities would be needed under
this alternative than under any other.  New facilities with the largest capacity for SNF would be built at the
Oak Ridge Reservation and Nevada Test Site because they do not now have the capacity to accept additional
fuels and do not currently store significant volumes of SNF.  The potential environmental consequences at
these sites are described below.

5.1.6.1 Socioeconomics.

The Centralization alternative would result in the largest
socioeconomic impact in terms of the number of direct jobs created (or lost) on a local basis by SNF
management activities (see Figure 5-7).  The change in site employment would range from a decrease of less
than 3 percent of total site employment at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory to a maximum increase
of about 13 percent above existing site employment at the Nevada Test Site when an expended core facility
were constructed at the site.  The intensity of this impact at the major DOE sites would depend on (a)
whether the SNF management programs used existing personnel or required workers to move into the region,
and (b) future actions at each site competing for the available labor pool.  Under Centralization if the site
were selected, the peak in employment would occur at the Savannah River Site where an additional 1,700
workers would be required for the proposed SNF management activities, an increase of approximately 11
percent above the projected 1995 baseline.  If  the site were not selected, the peak in employment would be an
additional 580 workers at the Hanford Site or approximately 3 percent above the projected 1995 baseline.  If
either the Hanford Site, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, or Savannah River Site were not selected as
a central site under the Centralization alternative, there would ultimately be a reduction in employment equal
to existing employment for SNF management at these sites.  This would add to the forecast loss of jobs at
each of these sites.  In the short term, additional jobs would be required to prepare SNF for transport offsite
(see Figure 5-5).  The closure of the Expended Core Facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory,
however, would lead to a long-term loss of jobs as well, increasing the rate of job loss at that site.
      Sites selected as central sites would generally have increased employment over baseline levels (see
Figure 5-6).  This increased direct employment would also result in an indirect increase in employment in the
surrounding communities.  At the Oak Ridge Reservation, the associated population growth could result in
increases in capital expenditures to meet the increased demand of housing, utilities, including electricity
generation, wastewater treatment, and water, transportation, and education facilities.  At the Hanford Site,
centralization activities could strain the housing market and add to school-capacity concerns.  For
centralization at the Savannah River Site or the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, DOE expects that
potential impacts on the demand for community resources and services would be minimal.  For centralization
at the Nevada Test Site, there is a potential increase in housing demand.  Overall socioeconomic impacts for
centralization at the Nevada Test Site could be absorbed within the projected expansion of the local economy,
infrastructure, public service, and real estate development.

5.1.6.2 Utilities (Electricity).

The effect on power consumption from implementing the
Centralization alternative would be generally similar to that described for Regionalization 4B where the SNF
is transported offsite or where the SNF is transported to the regional site except at the Savannah River Site. 
Power consumption minimum increase would be about 8 percent over the site baseline usage at the Savannah
River Site from the construction and operation of additional wet storage facilities under the Centralization
alternative.  Figures 5-8 and 5-9 illustrate the Centralization impacts for the two cases:  if a site were selected
or not selected as the central site (compare with Figures 5-5 and 5-7).  The impacts would be the same as
those described in Section 5.1.  Thus, for example, electric power requirements with centralization at the
Nevada Test Site would be similar to Regionalization 4B at the Nevada Test Site with a replacement
expended core facility also located at that site (Figure 5-6).
      Under the Centralization alternative at Hanford, the power consumption would rise by approximately
3 percent if SNF were only stored and could rise as much as 40 percent if processing were required.  While
the increase in power required for processing appears large (as a percent of baseline) when compared to the
Savannah River Site, much of the difference would be the result of a higher Savannah River Site baseline
with power consumption.

5.1.6.3 Materials and Waste Management.

The Centralization alternative would have similar
effects at the major DOE sites to those described in Section 5.1.5.3 for the Regionalization alternative (see
Figures 5-5 and 5-7).  If a site were not selected as the central site, the annual volume of waste generated
from SNF management activities would ultimately decrease; however, transient activities to stabilize and
package the fuel could be substantial.  The site selected as the central site would increase the annual volume
of wastes generated from SNF management activities.  The increase in waste would not necessarily be
proportional to the larger amount of SNF being managed onsite because the originating sites would
characterize and can their fuel before transport so it could be placed directly into storage at the receiving site. 
The waste volumes would be generated from transferring fuel from water pools at some sites, characterizing
and canning small amounts of new fuel, and operating the expended core facility.  Figures 5-8 and 5-9 show
the effects of not being selected as well as being selected as the central site for SNF management activities.
Figure 5-8.  Summary of impacts for the Centralization option if sites were not selected as a central site.(The maximum incremental change from baseline is illustrated in graphs.  Input data are summarized in
Appendix K.)
Figure 5-9.  Summary of impacts for the Centralization option if sites were selected as a central site andhave an expended core facility.  (The maximum incremental change from baseline is illustrated in graphs. 
Input data are summarized in Appendix K.)

5.1.6.4 Radiological Impacts.

For the Centralization alternative, the radiological impacts from
both normal operations and accidents at both the originating site and the central storage site would be
expected to be low and similar in magnitude.  Accident analysis for both existing and proposed SNF interim
storage facilities indicates that the probabilities of accidents with the potential for significant impacts would
be extremely low.  
      Figure 5-7 illustrates the estimated latent cancer fatalities among the population within 80 kilometers
(50 miles) from SNF operations at each of the major sites.  For each major site, this figure includes the
potential impacts associated with site SNF operations with centralization at another site, as well as with
centralization at that site.
      Accident risks from SNF activities would be principally because of handling and storage activities
and, therefore, would be expected to be similar for each of the centralization sites.  The principal differences
would be due to activities at the existing SNF sites necessary to prepare the SNF for transport to the central
site.
            SNF Facility Accidents-
            Hanford Site.  The implementation of the Centralization alternative at the Hanford site
would be expected to result in accident risks for some accidents slightly different from those identified for the
Decentralization alternative (Section 5.15 of Appendix A).  The amount of SNF handled at the dry storage
facility would be greater, resulting in an increase in the accident probability for the dry storage cask impact
and fire to approximately 8 in 1,000,000.  The estimate of risk from this, the highest risk accident to the
general population, would be 6.5  10-4 latent cancer fatalities in the general population per year of operation. 
The corresponding risk to an individual worker would be 7.5  10-7 potential latent cancer fatalities per year
of operation.
      Implementation of the Centralization alternative (or Regionalization 4B) elsewhere reduces the
estimates of accident risks from those identified for the Decentralization alternative because the existing
storage facilities would be shut down and the amount of SNF handled at the site decreases slightly.  The
accident probability for the dry storage cask impact and fire would be expected to decrease slightly, to
approximately 5 in 1,000,000.  This yields an estimated accident risk to the general population of 4.1  10-4
latent cancer fatalities per year of operation.  The corresponding highest risk accident to a worker would be
4.75  10-7 potential latent cancer fatalities per year of operation.
            Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.  The implementation of the Centralization
alternative at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory is estimated in Section 5.15 of Appendix B to result
in additional accident scenarios and accident risks from those identified for the No Action  alternative due to
the assumed resumption of chemical processing of SNF at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant.  The
consequences and risks from SNF-related accidents would be the same as  Regionalization 4B if the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory is selected as a regional site.
      The implementation of the Centralization alternative at a site other than the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory would result in potential accident consequences and risks the same as the
Regionalization 4B when the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory is not selected as a regional site.
            Savannah River Site.  The implementation of the Centralization alternative at the
Savannah River Site, including the three options of dry storage, wet storage, and processing followed by dry
storage, is assessed in Section 5.15 and Attachment A of Appendix C to result in accidents not significantly
different from those identified for the same options under the Decentralization alternative.  Because of an
increase in the amount of SNF handled, however, the accident frequency for some accidents would increase.
      The accident frequency for the highest risk accident, a fuel assembly breach, would be expected to be
about 0.84 fuel assembly breaches per year of operation with implementation of this alternative.  The
estimated risk of latent cancer fatalities to the general public, maximally exposed offsite individual,  and co-
located worker would be 7.2  10-3, 8.4  10-7, and 4  10-6 per year of operation, respectively.  With
centralization elsewhere, the highest risk accident would still be the fuel assembly breach with an estimated
risk approximately the same as with the No Action alternative.
            Oak Ridge Reservation.  The accident risks associated with implementation of the
Centralization alternative at the Oak Ridge Reservation are presented in detail in Section 5.15 (Part 3) of
Appendix F.  These accident risks are summarized under Regionalization 4B.
            Nevada Test Site.  The accident risks associated with implementation of the Centralization
alternative at the Nevada Test Site are presented in detail in Section 5.15 (Part 2) of Appendix F.  These
accident risks are summarized under Regionalization 4B.
            Other Generator/Storage Locations.  The accident risks under the Centralization
alternative would be expected to be the same as the accident risks under the No Action alternative.

5.1.6.5 Nonradiological Accidents.

Abnormal operational events could result in the release of
toxic or hazardous substances from the centralized facility or from SNF management facilities at the other
storage/generator sites prior to the shipment of SNF to the central site.  The events that would be expected to
exceed exposure guidelines would be similar to those described under the 1992/1993 Planning Basis
alternative.
      Two independent accidents have been evaluated to describe the maximum reasonably foreseeable
chemical hazard during the operation of the expended core facility at each of its potential locations.  Such a
release could subject workers to chemical concentrations that would exceed the Emergency Response
Planning Guideline value but would not subject the public to such concentrations except at potential locations
on the Oak Ridge Reservation and adjacent to the Savannah River Site.

5.1.6.6 Transportation.

            Shipments-Under the Centralization alternative, all stored and newly generated SNF
would be transported to one of five sites:  the Hanford Site, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory,
Savannah River Site, Oak Ridge Reservation, or Nevada Test Site.  
            Incident-Free Transportation-For the five Centralization alternative sites, the
incident-free transportation of SNF was estimated to result in total fatalities that ranged from 0.21
(centralization at the Oak Ridge Reservation) to 1.7 (centralization at the Savannah River Site).  These
fatalities were over the 40-year period 1995 through 2035 and represent the sum of the estimated number of
radiation-related latent cancer fatalities and the estimated number of nonradiological fatalities from vehicular
emissions.
      The range of fatalities was due to two factors:  (a) the option of using truck or rail transport for DOE
SNF (see Appendix I) and (b) the five centralization options.  Navy shipments would be made using a
combination of truck and rail; DOE shipments were assumed to be made using 100 percent truck or 100
percent rail.
      For centralization at the Oak Ridge Reservation, the estimated number of radiation-related latent
cancer fatalities for transportation workers was 0.050, the estimated number of radiation-related latent cancer
fatalities for the general population was 0.073, and the estimated number of nonradiological cancer fatalities
from vehicular emissions was 0.083.
      For centralization at the Savannah River Site the estimated number of radiation-related latent cancer
fatalities for transportation workers was 0.43, the estimated number of radiation-related latent cancer
fatalities for the general population was 1.2, and the estimated number of nonradiological fatalities from
vehicular emissions was 0.11.
      For centralization at the Oak Ridge Reservation, onsite shipments of SNF were estimated to result in
0.0023 fatalities.  Offsite shipments of SNF were estimated to result in 0.20 fatalities.  These fatalities were
also the sum of the estimated number of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities and the estimated number of
nonradiological fatalities from vehicular emissions.
      For centralization at the Savannah River Site, onsite shipments of SNF were estimated to result in
0.0035 fatalities.  Offsite shipments of SNF were estimated to result in 1.7 fatalities.  These fatalities were
also the sum of the estimated number of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities and the estimated number of
nonradiological fatalities from vehicular emissions.
            Transportation Accidents-Cumulative accident risks for transportation by truck
would range from 0.0048 latent cancer fatalities and 1.0 traffic fatalities for centralization at the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory, to 0.0020 latent cancer fatalities and 1.44 traffic fatalities for
centralization at the Savannah River Site.  Cumulative accident risks for transportation by rail would range
from 0.0013 latent cancer fatalities and 0.95 traffic fatalities for centralization at the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory, to 0.0014 latent cancer fatalities and 1.19 traffic fatalities for centralization at the
Nevada Test Site.
      For centralization at either the Hanford Site or Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, the
maximum reasonably foreseeable offsite transportation accident would involve a rail shipment of
special-case commercial SNF in a suburban population zone under neutral (average) weather conditions.  The
accident has a probability of occurrence of about 5  10-7 per year and the consequences would be the same
as those described under the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative.
      For centralization at the Oak Ridge Reservation or the Nevada Test Site, the maximum reasonably
foreseeable offsite transportation accident involves a rail shipment of special case commercial SNF in an
urban population zone under neutral (average) weather conditions.  The accident has a probability of
occurrence of about 1  10-7 per year and could result in an estimated 36 latent cancer fatalities in the
exposed population for Oak Ridge Reservation; for the Nevada Test Site, the accident would result in
approximately 36 latent cancer fatalities.  For comparison, the same population would be expected to
experience about 540,000 cancer fatalities from other causes.  The probability of this accident occurring
under stable (worst-case) weather conditions is less than 1  10-7 per year for urban and suburban zones; the
probability of occurrence is 5.7  10-7 per year if the accident occurred in a rural population zone and could
result in an estimated 2 latent cancer fatalities.
      For centralization at the Savannah River Site, the bounding offsite transportation accident would
involve a rail shipment of commercial SNF in a suburban population zone under stable (worst-case) weather
conditions.  The accident has a probability of occurrence of about 1.2  10-7 per year and could result in an
estimated 55 latent cancer fatalities in the exposed population.  For comparison, the same population would
be expected to experience about 42,000 cancer fatalities from other causes.  The probability of this accident
occurring in an urban population zone is less than 1  10-7 per year.  In a rural population zone, the accident
consequences would be approximately 3 percent of the suburban zone consequences.
      Onsite transportation of SNF would occur under the Centralization alternative at the Hanford Site,
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, and Savannah River Site.  The bounding accident among the three
sites occurs at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, and the potential impacts would be the same as
those described under the No Action alternative.
      Table 5-2 summarizes the comparison of incident-free transportation fatalities for each of the SNF
management alternatives.  Table 5-3 provides the comparison of transportation accident risks for each of the
SNF management alternatives.
Table 5-2.  Comparison of incident-free transportation total fatalities for alternatives over the 40-year
period.
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
                                                  Minimum(a,b)            Maximum(b,c)
                                                    total                   total 
                                                  fatalities              fatalities 
No Action                                           0.0089                  0.0089 
                                                                                 
Decentralization                                    0.12 to 0.15          0.35 to 0.38 
                                                                                  
1992/1993 Planning Basis                            0.14                  0.45 
Regionalization 4A (fuel type)                      0.17                  0.61 
Regionalization 4B (geography)                                             
   Idaho National Engineering Laboratory and        0.15 to 0.17          0.51 to 0.53 
   Savannah Site
   Idaho National Laboratory and Oak Ridge          0.14 to 0.15          0.53 to 0.54 
   Reservation
   Hanford Site and Savannah River Site             0.17                  0.55 to 0.56 
   Hanford Site and Oak Ridge Reservation           0.15                  0.57 
   Nevada Test Site and Savannah River Site         0.19                  0.88 
   Nevada Test Site and Oak Ridge Reservation       0.17                  0.90 
Centralization                                                             
                                                                           
   Hanford Site                                     0.23                  1.3 
   Idaho National Engineering Laboratory            0.21                  1.1 
   Savannah River Site                              0.26                  1.7 
   Oak Ridge Reservation                            0.21                  1.6 
   Nevada Test Site                                 0.26                  1.6 
_______________________________________________ 
a.  The minimum total fatalities would be associated with transport of DOE fuel by rail; naval SNF shipments would be by both 
truck (onsite) and rail (offsite). 
 
b.  Total fatalities were calculated for the 40-year period 1995 through 2035 and were the sum of the estimated number of 
radiation-related latent cancer fatalities for workers and the general population and the estimated number of nonradiological 
fatalities from vehicle emissions. 
 
c.  The maximum total fatalities would be associated with transport of DOE fuel by truck, naval SNF shipments would be by 
both truck (onsite) and rail (offsite).
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Table 5-3.  Comparison of estimated transportation accident risks for alternatives over the 40-year period.
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
                                Truck Accident Risks(a)              Rail Accident Risks(a)
                          _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Alternative
                                Latent cancer                        Latent                  
                                fatalities     Traffic fatalities    cancer fatalities      Traffic fatalities 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
No Action                       4.1 X 10^-6    0.047                 4.1  10-6             0.047 
                                                                                                                
Decentralization(b)             0.00085 to     0.20 to 1.01          0.00029 to             0.26 to 1.07 
                                0.00090                              0.00034 
1992/1993 Planning Basis        0.0010         0.70                  0.00035                0.73 
Regionalization 4A (fuel type)  0.0011         0.77                  0.00037                0.76 
                                                                              
Regionalization 4B (geography)                                                               
                                                                                             
   Idaho National Engineering   0.00090        0.72                  0.00034                0.73 
   Laboratory and Savannah River 
   Site
   Idaho National Engineering   0.00095        0.73                  0.00024                0.72 
   Laboratory and Oak Ridge 
   Reservation
   Hanford Site and Savannah    0.0013         0.84                  0.00075                0.82 
   River Site
   Hanford Site and Oak Ridge   0.0013         0.81                  0.00050                0.78 
   Reservation
   Nevada Test Site and Savannah0.0012         0.99                  0.00045                0.91 
   River Site
   Nevada Test Site and Oak     0.0012         1.00                  0.00035                0.91 
   Ridge Reservation
Centralization                                                                               
                                                                                             
   Hanford Site                 0.0050         1.10                  0.0013                 1.05 
   Idaho National Engineering   0.0048         1.00                  0.0013                 0.95 
   Laboratory
   Savannah River Site          0.0020         1.44                  0.00080                1.09 
   Oak Ridge Reservation        0.0017         1.35                  0.00055                1.00 
   Nevada Test Site             0.0050         1.33                  0.0014                 1.19 
_______________________________ 
a.  Assumes SNF shipments would be 100 percent by truck or 100 percent by rail, except for naval SNF shipments that would be 
by both truck (onsite) and rail (offsite). 
 
b.  Range of values in each column for the Decentralization alternative reflects the different fuel examination options for naval 
SNF.
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

5.2 Issues Not Discussed In Detail

      This section discusses potential impacts for issues that are not discussed in detail because they
are small and do not distinguish among alternatives, but about which the public may have general
interest. The discussion for each discipline generally concentrates on sites and alternatives that have
the largest expected impacts, demonstrating that the environmental consequences for that discipline
are not of sufficient importance to be given strong consideration in the programmatic decisionmaking
process.

5.2.1 Land Use

      The proposed alternatives would not result in major impacts on land use at either the DOE or
the naval sites. The largest amount of land that would be disturbed at any of the DOE sites would be
53 hectares (130 acres) at the Hanford Site. This would occur under the Centralization alternative
and would take less than 0.5 percent of the land at that site. Less than 6.5 hectares (16 acres) of land
would be required at the naval sites for the No Action alternative for the storage of SNF on railcars,
and no additional land outside of the existing sites would be required. At all SNF sites, new facilities
would be located near existing facilities or new facilities would be built on previously disturbed or
industrialized land. Additional land might be required for infrastructure and buffer zones if a new
SNF management facility is required. Because less than 0.5 percent of the land at any of the DOE
sites would be needed and the current land we at the naval sites would not change, land use was
determined not to be a discriminating factor (discriminator) among sites or alternatives and is not
considered further in this volume, Detail on land we impacts is presented in Appendices A
through F. The EIS does not explicitly consider land that is currently used for SNF operations or
land that might or might not be made available for other uses under some alternatives.

5.2.2 Cultural Resources

      Cultural, archaeological, historic, and architectural resources are defined as prehistoric and
historic sites, districts, structures, and evidence of human use that are considered important to a
culture, subculture, or a community for scientific, traditional, religious, or other reasons.
      Most of the major DOE sites and some of the naval sites contain areas of archaeological,
cultural, or historical interest. Direct impacts to archaeological resources would be associated with
ground disturbance activities. Indirect impacts would result from improved visitor access, changes in
land status, or other actions that would limit future scientific investigation. Although the major DOE
sites have not been surveyed completely, the locations for the construction of proposed new facilities
have generally been evaluated for their cultural importance. No known cultural resources would be
affected by construction under any of the proposed alternatives. Specific surveys would be conducted
before beginning any construction to determine the impacts to cultural resources. As described in
Section 5.7.3, if cultural resources (for example, prehistoric or historic artifacts) were encountered
during construction, earth-moving activities would stop and the State Historic preservation officer
would be contacted immediately. If Native American or Native Hawaiian resources were to be
involved, their leaders would also be contacted. Impacts to cultural resources were determined not to
be an important discriminator among sites and alternatives; therefore, they are not considered further
in this chapter. Details on cultural impacts are given in Appendices A through F.

5.2.3 Aesthetic and Scenic Resources

      At all DOE sites, any proposed new SNF management facilities would be located far from
areas with public access. Where new facilities would be visible to the public, similar facilities are
already visible. At naval sites, SNF storage locations would be located at existing industrial facilities.
Aesthetic and scenic resources would not be significantly affected by SNF management activities and
are not considered further in this chapter. Discussion of impacts on aesthetic and scenic resources are
contained in Appendices A through F.

5.2.4 Geologic Resources

      None of the sites has known significant geologic resources that would be affected by the
alternatives. Except for the potential existence of gold, tungsten, and molybdenum at the Nevada
Test Site, geologic resources at the candidate sites consist of surficial sand, gravel, or clay deposits
that have low economic value. The alternatives that involve constructing new facilities would result
in disturbing or extracting surface deposits to construct the facilities. New construction would
increase the use of surface deposits (that is, sand and gravel deposits), but because of the large
volume of these materials on the sites, the impact is expected to be small.
      All the major DOE sites have experienced earthquakes; however, they are located in areas
with low to moderate seismic potential with respect to more seismically active areas in the United
States (Algermissen et al. 1982, 1990). Because any new facility would be constructed to meet
current seismic design criteria for a given area, seismic concerns are not a discriminating factor
among sites. Details on site geology are provided in Appendices A through F.

5.2.5 Air Quality

      SNF management activities under some alternatives would result in slightly increased releases
of pollutants to the atmosphere. At the major DOE sites, the projected emissions from SNF
management activities would not contribute to nonattainment of state or Federal standards. There
would be no impact on nonradiological ambient air quality at the naval sites (Appendix D).
Construction activities at several different sites are expected to cause short-term, minor increases in
fugitive dust emissions, but the use of standard dust suppression techniques would be expected to
minimize this problem. These particulate emissions could temporarily affect visibility in localized
areas but would not cause nonattainment of state or Federal standards. Because SNF management
activities would not be expected to cause either radiological or nonradiological air quality impacts to
exceed state or Federal standards at any site for any alternative considered, or to significantly affect
air quality in any other respect, air quality impacts are not discussed further in this chapter. The
potential radiological impacts on health are discussed in Section 5.1. The computer models used for
evaluating air quality impacts, and detailed results are discussed in Appendices A through F.

5.2.6 Water Resources

      The proposed alternatives would have small impacts on water resources at each of the
candidate sites. Compared with existing activities at all proposed SNF sites, additional water
consumption would be minor and would relate primarily to the increased demand of a larger work
force because SNF water pools use recycled water. The maximum increase of water usage over
baseline at any candidate site would be approximately 5 percent. There would be net increases in
employment at the Oak Ridge Reservation, and the Nevada Test Site; however, water resources
would not be expected to be appreciably affected under any alternative. Nevertheless, at the Nevada
Test Site, where available water is limited, a cumulative water supply impact is possible. The effects
of groundwater withdrawal from the Frenchman Flat hydrographic area at the Nevada Test Site to
support a proposed SNF facility on groundwater yields are unknown and require additional study.
The Frenchman Flat hydrographic area is part of the Ash Meadows sub-basin whose perennial yield
has greatly exceeded its annual water withdrawals. Some potential also exists for minor, short-term
impacts of sedimentation during construction at the Oak Ridge Reservation and the Savannah River
Site.
    
      Storing SNF in water pools creates a potential for radiological groundwater contamination
through undetected leaks or accidents that breach containment systems. Releases to groundwater
caused by accidental minor breaches of leak containment systems are very small compared with
accidental minor releases, which are presented in Appendices A through F under Occupational and
Public Health and Safety. Water resources are discussed in detail in Appendices A through F.

5.2.7 Ecological Resources

      The major DOE sites under consideration are located on large reservations that are
predominantly "natural." The naval sites, on the other hand, are generally much smaller with
significant industrial infrastructure. Similarly, the majority of the other generator and storage sites
are in urban or suburban settings, where natural flora and fauna are limited to species that have
developed a tolerance to human activities. Therefore, the largest impacts to ecological resources are
expected to occur at the five major DOE sites where undisturbed or semi-disturbed natural areas could
be converted to industrial activity. Under any of the alternatives involving the construction of new
facilities at DOE sites, individuals or small populations of some wildlife species may be disturbed,
displaced, or destroyed.
      The development of new DOE facilities would affect some natural habitats. The size of the
areas affected would be small in relation to the size of the sites and the size of remaining natural
habitats. The type of habitats affected would vary but would be typical of the regional area in which
the sites are located. The habitat losses would probably not affect any threatened or endangered
species or critical habitats with the possible exception of the proposed facilities at the Nevada Test
Site and the Hanford Site. At the Nevada Test Site, the proposed SNF facilities could be constructed
within the range of the desert tortoise, a federally listed threatened species. At the Hanford Site,
construction related to SNF management could result in a habitat loss up to 28 hectares (70 acres) for
Federal and state-listed candidate species (for example, loggerhead shrike, sage sparrows, burrowing
owls, pygmy rabbits). As described in Section 5.7.7, mitigation plans would be developed in
consultation with the appropriate agencies if any threatened or endangered species were identified on
the project site. Habitat fragmentation is not expected because new facilities would be constructed
adjacent to existing facilities. Because minor impacts to ecological resources would occur at all sites
for all alternatives involving construction, ecology was not considered a significant discriminator
among sites and, therefore, is not discussed further in this chapter. Appendices A through F present
a detailed discussion of ecological impacts.

5.2.8 Noise

      The construction of SNF management facilities at any of the sites would generate noise levels
consistent with light industrial activity. However, at the major DOE sites, noise generated onsite
does not propagate offsite at levels that would affect the general population. Noise at the naval sites
is primarily from truck and car traffic, shiploading, and diesel-powered equipment. Noise impact
analyses at the naval sites indicate that noise from construction or operation of facilities would not
cause the ambient noise levels to exceed U.S. Environmental Protection Agency or state guidelines.
Construction would occur at the naval sites under the No Action and Decentralization alternatives.
Noise impacts would be expected to be comparable at the major DOE sites for all alternatives except
for the No Action alternative, which does not involve construction of new facilities. Because these
new facilities would be located in industrialized areas, however, no impacts are expected. Because
noise impacts would be minor and do not differentiate among the sites or the alternatives, they are not
considered further in this chapter. Details on the noise impact analyses are provided in Appendices A
through F.

5.2.9 Utilities and Energy

      New facilities (or the restarting of idle facilities) would result in increased demands on water,
power, and sewage. The greatest resource requirements would result from the implementation of the
Centralization alternative. Based on available data, the increased water usage would range from less
than 1 percent at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory to a maximum of less than 5 percent
above existing site usage at the Savannah River Site. Electricity requirements are discussed in
Section 5.1. The increase in sewage generation resulting from implementation of the alternatives
would range from less than 1 percent at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory to a maximum of
9 percent at the Savannah River Site. A central sewage treatment system would have to be
constructed for the SNF facilities at the Nevada Test Site under the Regionalization and Centralization
alternatives if the Nevada Test Site were selected as a regional or central site. The existing system
capacities at all sites could manage the estimated changes in utility usage rates for water.
Appendices A through F provide details on utilities and energy consumption.

5.3 Cumulative Impacts

      A cumulative impact on the environment results from the incremental impact of the action
when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable actions. "Other" actions include DOE
projects at the potentially affected sites not related to SNF management, as well as projects proposed
by other Government agencies, private businesses, or individuals. This type of an assessment is
important because significant cumulative impacts can result from several smaller actions that by
themselves do not have significant impacts. The programmatic cumulative impacts from the
implementation of the DOE SNF Management Program are discussed in Section 5.3.1. The
site-specific cumulative impacts are described in Section 5.3.2.

5.3.1 Programmatic Cumulative Impacts

      On a nationwide basis, the implementation of any of the SNF Management Program
alternatives would not be expected to significantly contribute to cumulative impacts. There would be
a small change in regional employment, little use of nonrenewable resources, low radiological
emissions, and a low rate of radioactive waste generation. Under most alternatives, subalternatives,
and options, the activities required for SNF management would be very small in comparison to other
non-SNF-related activities already underway at almost all sites where SNF would be stored. Even in
those alternatives where there would be large changes in nonrenewable resource use at one or more
sites (Regionalization by geography or Centralization), on a national scale, increases at the selected
regional or central site would be compensated for by changes at nonselected sites, so the net change is
very small.
      Reasonably foreseeable projects that could contribute to cumulative impacts are identified for
each of the DOE and naval sites in Appendices A, B, C, D, and F. For the major DOE sites, these
projects are primarily associated with environmental restoration and waste management activities, one
of the priorities being given to site management, and are being covered by the Waste Management
Programmatic EIS and site-specific EISs. It is expected that SNF management activities would have
consistently smaller impacts than the environmental restoration and waste management activities, and
that the overall impact of SNF management would not contribute significantly to cumulative impacts
on either a regional or a nationwide basis.
      The transport of DOE and naval SNF over highways and railways is only one of the sources
of radiological dose to the general public. The potential transport of commercial SNF for disposal in
a repository, assumed to be in Nevada for purposes of analysis, the proposed transport of transuranic
wastes to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico, and the expected transport of radioisotopes
used in medicine and other activities all would contribute to public exposures. Available historical
data and projected future doses are summarized in Appendix I.
      During analysis, the potential for significant cumulative impacts to other resources was
considered; none were found. Cumulative impacts are described qualitatively because programmatic
considerations do not require detailed information that depends on specific facility location or design.
More detailed cumulative effects analysis will be performed for any actions that are proposed in the
course of implementing programmatic SNF management decisions.

5.3.2 Site-Specific Cumulative Impacts

      All of the sites contain facilities unrelated to SNF that may continue to operate throughout the
duration of the SNF interim management program (approximately 40 years). Impacts from both
construction and operation of SNF facilities would be cumulative with the impacts of existing and
planned facilities or actions such as environmental restoration and waste management activities
unrelated to SNF. Cumulative effects involving site-specific projects that are planned to occur
simultaneously with SNF management activities at the major DOE sites are discussed in the site
appendices. Not all planned facilities were factored into the assessment of cumulative impacts
pending funding approval or resolution of DOE policy issues.
      The following sections discuss cumulative impacts to those environmental resources identified
in Appendices A through F. During analysis, the potential for significant cumulative impacts to other
environmental resources (that is, geologic resources, aesthetic and scenic resources, and cultural
resources) was evaluated; none were found.

5.3.2.1 Land Use.

Implementation of any of the SNF alternatives at the major DOE sites
would have a minimal cumulative impact with respect to either the available land onsite or to the
continued mission of the sites. The largest proportion of any site that would be required for all
sitewide activities is less than 1 percent of the total site area.

5.3.2.2 Socioeconomics.

Depending on the economic status and outlook for an area, SNF
activities coupled with other actions have the potential to strain or overburden the socioeconomic
resources of certain areas, particularly if either the Regionalization or Centralization alternatives were
selected with an expended core facility located at the site. For example, these cumulative effects
could contribute to housing shortages, the need for additional schools, and increased demand for
utilities and transportation.
      Each site is anticipating an overall decline in site employment over the next few years;
therefore, the existing work force could be reassigned to SNF management activities. However, it
was assumed that the construction activities associated with the proposed SNF management
alternatives would require the in-migration of construction workers. Although these construction
activities are short-term with a duration of a few years, when addressed cumulatively with other
reasonably foreseeable activities, there could be a socioeconomic impact in the communities
surrounding the Hanford Site, Nevada Test Site, and Oak Ridge Reservation. For example, at the
Hanford Site cumulative employment, housing requirements, and needs for schools would increase up
to 1 percent over those based on present Hanford employment for SNF management activities only.
    
      Impacts to socioeconomic resources associated with the implementation of proposed SNF
actions at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Savannah River Site, naval sites, and other
generator sites are not expected to be sufficient to have a cumulative effect on the regional social
infrastructure within each site's region of influence.

5.3.2.3 Air Quality.

The available data in Appendices A through F indicate that the
cumulative air emissions from the Savannah River Site, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, and
naval sites, including those from the proposed SNF management alternatives, would not exceed the
limits for nonradioactive air pollutants and would not threaten to exceed the limits for nonradioactive
pollutants or the 40 CFR Part 61 limit of 0.01 rem (10 millirem) per year for radioactive emissions.

5.3.2.4 Water Resources.

Based on data available in Appendices A through F, the
implementation of any of the SNF alternatives at the major DOE sites would result in minimal
cumulative impacts to water resources under normal operations. The proposed SNF facilities and
related management operations are designed to generate no liquid releases of wastewater to the
subsurface or water resources containing radiological constituents or hazardous chemicals. The
facilities would be constructed using state-of-the-art technologies, including secondary containment
and leak detection and water balance monitoring equipment. Liquid effluent discharges from SNF
activities will be monitored for the presence of radioactive and chemical constituents and determined
suitable for land disposal as required under Federal and State regulations.
      Water usage from SNF activities would also have a small cumulative effect on overall
quantities of water available at the major DOE sites. The maximum increase over baseline water use
would be approximately 5 percent for any of the proposed locations.

5.3.2.5 Biotic Resources.

Construction of the proposed SNF facilities in addition to other
planned activities could disturb as much as 9 hectares (24 acres) of terrestrial habitat at the Hanford
Site and as much as 13 hectares (31 acres) of previously disturbed land at the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory. No impacts to biotic resources would be expected at the Savannah River
Site or Oak Ridge Reservation. However, construction activities at the Nevada Test Site and Hanford
Site could result in habitat loss for either Federal and state candidate species or federally listed
threatened species. For example, at the Hanford Site the Cumulative impact from planned activities
including construction related to SNF management could result in habitat loss for Federal and state
candidate species (for example, loggerhead shrike, sage sparrows, burrowing owls, pygmy rabbits).
At the Nevada Test Site, the proposed SNF facilities would be constructed within the range of the
desert tortoise, a federally listed threatened species. Therefore, the proposed SNF management
activities in addition to other planned actions could result in a small cumulative loss of habitat for the
desert tortoise.

5.3.2.6 Occupational and Public Heath.

The sources of radiation exposure to
individuals consist of natural background radiation from cosmic, terrestrial, and internal body
sources; medical radiation; and radiation from manmade sources, including consumer and industrial
products, nuclear facilities, and weapons test fallout. At the Savannah River Site, for example,
natural background radiation contributes about 82 percent of the dose received by an average member
of the population within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the site, medical exposure accounts for
15 percent of the annual dose, and the combined doses from weapons test fallout, consumer and
industrial products, and air travel account for approximately 3 percent. DOE nuclear facilities at the
Savannah River Site account for less than 0.1 percent of the total radiation exposure.
      The radiological impacts from SNF management operations are exposures to both workers and
the general public from normal operations and the risk of additional radiation exposures due to
accidents. The major concerns with these exposures are whether the doses are sufficient to cause
immediate harm and bow much they will increase the probabilities, among the exposed population, of
latent cancer fatalities, nonfatal cancers, and genetic effects. Of further concern is that these SNF
management-related exposures are in addition to those exposures and risks affecting the same workers
and members of the general public from other sources. The cumulative impact of both the
SNF-related increment and other possible sources is also a concern.
             Cumulative Impacts to the General Public-The principal regulatory limit
affecting emissions from DOE and naval sites is the Clean Air Act standard (40 CFR Part 61,
Subpart H for DOE; Subpart I for the Navy) for airborne radionuclide emissions from DOE facilities.
This rule limits airborne emissions to those amounts that would not cause any member of the public
to receive in any year an effective dose equivalent of more than 0.01 rem (10 millirem) per year.
Implementation of any of the alternatives at any of the sites is not expected to result in normal
releases exceeding this limit. The naval sites have demonstrated to the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency that, at 0.0001 rem (0.1 millirem) per year, they are at 1 percent of the limit and operation of
SNF management facilities is not expected to change that conclusion. Data available for each of the
sites (see Appendices A through F) indicate that over the 40-year planning period, the cumulative
radioactive emissions from the existing, the potential SNF management activities, and reasonably
foreseeable future site activities at any of the sites would not be expected to result in an additional
latent cancer fatality among the general population surrounding the site, except for the Oak Ridge
Reservation. With centralization at the Oak Ridge Reservation, operation of the proposed SNF
management facilities over their expected 40-year lifetimes is estimated to result in a total population
dose of approximately 2,500 person-rem. This equates to approximately two latent cancer fatalities
over the period.
             Cumulative Impacts on the Site Work Force - The cumulative impact of
selection of either of the alternatives coupled with the existing and reasonably foreseeable actions has
the potential to increase the radiological exposure to workers at the sites transporting and receiving
the SNF. For both the transporting and receiving sites, the routine exposure to the workers is
expected to increase because much of the dose to the workers is associated with SNF handling
operations.
      Because occupational worker exposures are easily monitored and controlled to levels a factor
of 10 or more below the current standards, the overall average exposure per worker is expected to
remain approximately constant at each of the SNF transporting and receiving sites with each of the
alternatives. However, with options that involve more SNF activities, the number of SNF-related
workers is expected to increase, thus increasing the collective radiation dose to the site work force.
As reported in Appendices A through F and summarized in Appendix K, the increases in collective
dose to the work force varies from site to site and with the alternatives. At the Oak Ridge
Reservation, for example, the increases due to SNF-related actions range to 3,200 person-rem over
the 40-year planning period. The maximum SNF-related increase is equivalent to approximately one
additional latent cancer fatality among the workforce.

5.3.2.7 Transportation.

             Radiological Impacts - Table 5-4 summarizes the existing and reasonably
foreseeable actions assessed to determine the cumulative impact for transportation for the SNF
alternatives. The cumulative radiological impacts of incident-free transportation of SNF are presented
in terms of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities. These results are summarized in Table 5-5 and
more details are contained in Appendix I. Over the 93-year period from 1943 through 2035, the total
number of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities was estimated to be 290, or approximately three
latent cancer fatalities per year. General transport of radioactive material accounted for about
90 percent of these radiation-related latent cancer fatalities. The radiation-related latent cancer
fatalities would be indistinguishable from other cancer fatalities and would be 0.001 percent of the
total number of cancer fatalities that would be expected to occur. The radiation-related latent cancer
fatalities associated with the alternatives evaluated in this EIS would be 5 x 10^-6 percent of the total
number of cancer fatalities that would be expected to occur.
             Traffic Accident Impacts - Fatalities involving the transport of radioactive
materials for 1971 through 1993 were surveyed based on data in the Radioactive Material Incident
Report database. This database contains information on radioactive materials transportation incidents
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Table 5-4. Other activities included for assessment of cumulative impacts for transportation.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
                  Activity                                Description
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Existing activities:
   Historical shipments                    Historical shipments of SNF, Hanford Site,
                                           Idaho National Engineering Laboratory,
                                           Savannah River Site, Oak Ridge Reservation,
                                           and Nevada Test Site
   General transportation                  Nationwide transport of radioactive materials
                                           for medical, industrial, fuel cycle, and disposal
                                           purposes
Reasonably foreseeable activities:
   Geologic repository                     Shipments of commercial SNF and defense
                                           high-level waste to the geologic repository at
                                           Yucca Mountain, Nevada
   Waste Isolation Pilot Plant             Shipments of transuranic waste to the Waste
                                           Isolation Pilot Plant at Carlsbad, New Mexico
                                           (including a 5-year Test Phase and 20-year
                                           Disposal Phase)
   Submarine reactor compartments          Shipments of reactor compartments from Puget
                                           Sound Naval Shipyard to Hanford
   Return of isotope capsules              Shipments of cesium-137 isotope capsules to the
                                           Hanford Site
   Uranium billets                         Shipment of low-enriched uranium billets from
                                           the Hanford Site to the United Kingdom
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Table 5-5. Summary of transportation radiological cumulative impacts.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
                                        Occupational latent   General population latent
         Category of shipment(a)         cancer fatalities      cancer fatalities
Projected SNF shipments for all
alternatives
       Truck                              0.00060 to 0.40        0.00017 to 1.2
       Train                              0.00060 to 0.060       0.00017 to 0.085
 Historical SNF(b)                        0.080                  0.055
 General transportation (1943 to 2035)(c) 120                    140
Reasonably foreseeable actions(d)
       Truck                              4.4                    25
       Train                              0.33                   0.85
 Total cancer fatalities(c)               130                    160
----------------------------
 a. See Table 54 and Appendix I for more details.
 b. Shipments to Hanford Site, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Savannah River Site, Oak
 Ridge Reservation, and Nevada Test Site. Includes transport of naval SNF to the Idaho National
 Engineering Laboratory.
 c. Shipments are a combination of truck and train.
 d. Shipments to the geologic repository, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, and shipments of
 submarine reactor compartments, isotope capsules, and uranium billets
 e. Numbers may not sum due to rounding.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
and accidents from the U.S. Department of Transportation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
DOE, state radiation control offices, and media coverage. From 1971 through 1993, 21 traffic
accidents involving 36 fatalities have occurred. These fatalities resulted from traffic accidents and
were not associated with the radioactive nature of the cargo. No radiological fatalities because of
transportation accidents have ever occurred in the United States. During the same time period, over
1,000,000 persons were killed in traffic accidents in the United States.
      For the alternatives evaluated in this EIS, about one traffic accident fatality was estimated to
occur. During the 40-year time period from 1995 through 2035 evaluated in this EIS, approximately
1,600,000 persons would be killed in traffic accidents in the United States.

5.3.2.8 Energy/Utilities.

Under certain SNF management alternatives, energy or utility
requirements for SNF management in combination with other present for future projects, could stress
or exceed the existing capacity at a site. The existing energy and capacity would be adequate for the
SNF management alternatives at all sites with the possible exception of the Hanford Site and the
Nevada Test Site.
      If all SNF were transported to the Hanford Site under the Centralization alternative, then
existing utilities, including water mains, power lines, sewage facilities, and telephone lines, would
need to be extended to the project area. If the Centralization alternative was implemented in addition
to other power-intensive activities (for example, operating a vitrification plant), existing capacity
might be inadequate based on current consumption.
      If the Centralization alternative were implemented at the Nevada Test Site, additional
transmission lines might need to be constructed. In addition, a sewage treatment facility for the SNF 
management facility would have to be constructed at the Nevada Test Site if SNF management          
activities were implemented under the Regionalization and Centralization alternatives. Water supplies
at the Nevada Test Site have been developed from local groundwater sources within the Ash Meadows
Sub-basin. Existing withdrawals of groundwater from this sub-basin may have already exceeded its 
localized perennial yield (Appendix F). SNF management facilities at this site may result in the need
for additional water.

5.3.2.9 Waste Generation.

Waste volumes generated from SNF management activities  
depend on the alternative chosen. In general, the Regionalization and Centralization alternatives at
the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, and the alternatives at the Savannah River Site involving 
processing, would result in the largest cumulative impact on waste generation. Under some options,
the total increase in waste generation could be four times the current facility baseline and require the
construction of additional facilities.
      To evaluate the adequacy of existing storage capacity, waste volumes generated from the SNF
management alternatives were compared with current generation rates at the major DOE sites. At the
Navy sites, the rate of low-level waste generation would be small and not stress existing capacity. No
mixed, transuranic, or high-level waste would be generated from SNF activities at the Navy sites
(Appendix D).
      At the major DOE sites, increased low-level waste generated from SNF management activities   
would range from about 1 percent above baseline generation rates at the Oak Ridge Reservation to   
approximately four times above baseline at the Savannah River Site for centralization and processing 
options, respectively. Adequate storage capacity exists at all sites except at the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory, where beyond the year 2005 low-level waste storage capacity may be
strained (Appendix B).
      The increased volume of transuranic waste that could be generated from SNF management
activities could exceed 100 percent above baseline at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory,
Savannah River Site, Oak Ridge Reservation, and Nevada Test Site based on centralization and
processing options. This percentage is high at both Nevada Test Site and the Oak Ridge Reservation
because neither of these sites is currently generating transuranic waste and because both sites have
projected that future transuranic waste volumes will only be produced by SNF management activities.
However, adequate storage capacity exists at both sites.
      The volume of high-level waste generated from SNF management activities has been estimated
to range from approximately 21 percent to greater than 100 percent above current site baseline
generation rates at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory and the Savannah River Site,
respectively. Again, the percentage is high at the Savannah River Site because essentially no
high-level waste is currently being generated onsite, but with processing approximately 2 cubic meters
per year of high-level waste could be generated. Adequate storage capacity exists at the sites. No
high-level waste would be generated at either the Nevada Test Site or the Oak Ridge Reservation.

5.4 Adverse Effects That Cannot Be Avoided

      Adverse impacts would result, no matter the alternative, from radiation exposure associated
with maintaining facilities that are at or near the end of their design life, until completion of the
construction of new facilities. However, these exposures would be kept within applicable regulatory
requirements and other applicable guidelines and would be controlled to levels that are as low as
reasonably achievable. Implementation of any alternative except the No Action alternative would
increase the volume of radioactive waste, in particular, low-level waste generated at the major DOE
sites. Under the action-based alternatives, where SNF is transported to other sites, there would be a
small increased potential for exposure to the general population when the SNF is in transit.
      Under the No Action alternative, there would be several adverse effects that could not be
avoided. These include the continuation of the environmentally degraded state of the three major
DOE sites because existing facilities would deteriorate further. Naval and research reactor SNF
would be stored near population centers, potentially increasing the consequences of an SNF handling
or management accident. This alternative also presents a greater personnel requirement for managing
SNF interim storage facilities. (Under other alternatives, the apparently higher personnel requirement
would be for additional management activities that would not be done under the No Action
alternative - they are not just related to storage facilities.) In addition, the shutdown of research
reactors that could not store SNF onsite would result in the loss of several hundred reactor operator
and research positions.
      Under Regionalization 4B and Centralization alternatives, one or more major DOE sites
would transport all its SNF to another major DOE site, the facilities at the transport sites would be
shut down, and facilities at the receiving site(s) would be built. This would cause the relocation of
many jobs associated with SNF management and duplicate some existing facilities. While new
facilities are generally required at each DOE site under many alternatives, there are existing facilities
that can be used for storage at major sites that would be shut down prior to the end of their useful
design life.
      The construction and operation of any of the facilities under consideration for storage of SNF
would result in some adverse impacts to the environment. Although location-dependent, changes in
project design and other measures (for example, sound engineering practices during construction)
would eliminate, avoid, or minimize these impacts. In general, most of the adverse impacts would be
of short duration and would result from the construction of proposed facilities. For example, noise,
atmospheric emissions, fugitive dust, sediment runoff, and solid waste would be expected to increase
during construction. Section 5.7 discusses potential mitigation measures that could be used to control
or minimize impacts to the environment. See Appendices A through F for site-specific discussion on
adverse effects that cannot be avoided.

5.5 Relationship Between Short-Term Use of the Environment

           and the Maintenance and Enhancement of Long-Term Productivity
      The implementation of any of the SNF management alternatives would cause some adverse
impacts to the environment and permanently commit certain resources. This section describes the
relationship between short-term influences from the implementation of an SNF management
alternative and the associated long-term effects.
      The proposed alternatives for SNF management would require the short-term use of multiple
resources; for example, energy, materials of construction, and labor to achieve the objective of safely
securing SNF to minimize the risk to workers, to the public, and to the environment. For example, if
no action were taken, degradation of the fuel and SNF facilities would occur with the potential for
releases to the environment. Releases to the environment could contaminate land near the point of
storage, thereby reducing the potential future use. By consolidating and containing the SNF at
specific locations, the potential for impacting the environment would be reduced at the other
locations. After the implementation of a comprehensive SNF management strategy, those areas
currently used for SNF management could be released to allow other productive use, such as for
research or technology development.
      The premature shutdown of research reactors due to a lack of sufficient SNF interim storage
space under the No Action alternative could have an impact upon the national and regional
communities in which they are located. Most of these reactors are the only regional source of
radiopharmaceuticals and often they are important centers of medical and biological research. The
sites where these reactors are located, many of them universities, are unique training facilities for
students in many fields of research and development: materials science, environmental science,
physics, biology, and electronics.
      In the medical arena, research reactors have proven to be vital to cancer therapy, diagnostic
imaging, studies of the biological effects of radiation, and other important medical applications.
Demand for medically important radioisotopes would not decrease merely because the source was shut
off. The continued demand for radioisotopes would be met by placing orders with remaining
reactors, which may be farther away from the place where they are needed. Many medically
important isotopes (for example, iodine-131) have such short half-lives that the amount transported
must include enough to allow for radioactive decay during shipment. Therefore, shutdown of reactors
would result in the need to produce and transport larger quantities of radiopharmaceuticals.
      Shutdown of research reactors could produce an impact on commercial enterprises that are
engaged in the doping of silicon crystals through neutron irradiation. The doped silicon chips are
widely used in electronic components such as the computers used in automobile engines.
      Graduates trained at these facilities contribute to a wide variety of nuclear industries and to
Government agencies involved with (a) monitoring nuclear technology, for example, regulatory
agencies, Federal and international inspections, (b)hardware for inspections, and (c) remote
monitoring.
      Development of new SNF interim management facilities would commit lands to those uses
from the time of construction through cessation of operations. At that time, these facilities could be
converted to other uses or decontaminated, decommissioned, and the site restored to its original land
use. Existing SNF management facilities could also be converted to other uses or the lands restored
following their decommissioning.
      See Appendices A through F for site-specific discussions on the relationship between
short-term use of the environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity.

5.6 Irreversible and Irretrievable Commitment of Resources

      The irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources resulting from the construction and
operation of SNF management facilities would involve materials that could not be recovered or
recycled, or resources that would be consumed or reduced to unrecoverable forms. For example, the
construction and operation of an SNF facility at any of the locations under consideration would
consume irretrievable amounts of electrical energy, fuel, construction materials, and miscellaneous
chemicals. Some construction materials are recyclable and, therefore, should not be considered
irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources. Furthermore, some of the resources would
be irretrievable because of the nature of the commitment or the cost of reclamation. For example,
human resources used for the construction and operation of the proposed SNF facilities would be
irretrievably lost since these resources would be unavailable for use in other work activity areas. On
the whole, however, SNF management is not particularly resource intensive. See Appendices A
through F for site-specific discussions on irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources.

5.7 Potential Mitigation Measures

      This section summarizes measures that D0E(a) could implement to avoid or reduce impacts to
the environment. Possible mitigation measures are generally the same for all alternatives and are
summarized by resource category below. Although the environmental effects described in
Sections 5.1 through 5.3 may not require mitigation, the range of potential mitigation actions is
described below. For all sites, impacts to land use and aesthetic and scenic resources would be small;
therefore, mitigation measures for these attributes would not be required.

5.7.1 Pollution Prevention

      Implementation of the SNF management alternatives would generate waste with the potential
for releases to air and water. To control both the volume and toxicity of waste generated and to
reduce impacts on the environment, pollution prevention practices would be implemented.
      DOE is responding to Executive Order 12856, Federal Compliance with Right to Know Laws
and Pollution Prevention Requirements, and associated DOE orders and guidelines by reducing the
use of toxic chemicals; improving emergency planning, response, and accident notification; and
encouraging the development and use of clean technologies and the testing of innovative pollution
prevention technologies. Pollution prevention programs have been implemented at each site.
Program components include waste minimization, source reduction and recycling, and procurement
practices that preferentially procure products made from recycled materials. Portions of the pollution
prevention program have been implemented at the existing DOE and naval sites for nearly 10 years.
For example, the waste minimization program at the Savannah River Site has decreased the amount of
all waste types generated by material substitutions.
      Implementation of the pollution prevention plans minimizes the amount of waste generated
during SNF management activities.

5.7.2 Socioeconomics

      The SNF management alternatives would require additional workers for construction,
stabilization, monitoring, and maintenance of SNF. This would produce a socioeconomic effect
depending on the available site work force, regional labor pool, and community infrastructure. Minor
socioeconomic impacts would be expected from implementation of the SNF management alternatives;
--------------------------
a. Because this is an EIS issued by the DOE, it contains language concerning compliance with
applicable environmental requirements, taking appropriate mitigative measures to reduce
environmental impacts, and other matters phrased in the context of DOE as the party taking the
actions. As a cooperative agency, and because Navy sites are also evaluated in this EIS, the Navy
will also assure compliance with applicable environmental requirements and take other appropriate
measures for its facilities in a consistent and appropriate fashion.
____________________________________________________________________________________________________
the mitigation measures described below could be used to further minimize the effect on the
community.
      Construction and operation-related impacts resulting from increased labor and capital
requirements could be reduced by coordinating with local communities and county planning agencies.
Effective planning would address changes in community services, housing, infrastructure, utilities,
and transportation. DOE would coordinate, in an appropriate manner, with the local and regional
planning agencies to address impacts on the work force and community infrastructure. This could be
facilitated through the development of citizen advisory boards. The timing of certain activities that
have been proposed to proceed concurrently could also be adjusted to minimize socioeconomic
impacts.

5.7.3 Cultural Resources

      Impacts to cultural resources could occur during construction and earth-moving activities
associated with the SNF management alternatives. Areas of proposed ground disturbance would be
assessed for the potential to contain important archaeological and paleontological resources. Each
DOE operations office is responsible for establishing and maintaining mitigation agreements including
actions to be taken in the event of discovery of archaeological resources or human remains during
construction. These agreements will be negotiated with their potentially affected tribes and state
historic preservation officers. These agreements would be referenced in future site-specific National
Environmental Policy Act documentation when appropriate. An example of a possible mitigation
measure for archaeological resources would be avoidance or data recovery prior to construction.
Other measures would be necessary to mitigate potential impacts to values of Native American or
Native Hawaiian populations, including involvement in the selection of a mitigation strategy for
impacts to archaeological sites, spiritual geographical features, and land use. This could include the
SNF Program's participation in liaison programs to understand Native American or Native Hawaiian
concerns.
      For paleontological resources, assessments could include literature searches, surface surveys,
and consultation with recognized paleontological experts in the region or limited test excavations in
geologically similar disturbed areas. If significant paleontological resources were identified, a
mitigation plan for recovery, stabilization, and caring of the resources would be implemented before
construction.
      For example, at the Hanford Site, certain site activities would have the potential to adversely
affect prehistoric archaeological sites. In this case, the specific activity plans would be reviewed to
determine potential effects before initiation of activities. The activity will then be designed to avoid
these sites. If avoidance of these sites would not be possible, mitigation measures would be
developed in conjunction with the appropriate state agencies and Native American tribes.
      To avoid impacts during operation such as unauthorized artifact collection, workers could be
educated through programs and briefing sessions to inform personnel of applicable laws and
regulations for site protection. These educational programs would stress the importance of cultural
resources and specifics of the laws and regulations for site protection.

5.7.4 Soils

      Soils could be affected from implementation of the SNF management alternatives if there were
leaks or a release to soils as a result of SNF activities. DOE would appropriately remediate any soils
contaminated from SNF management activities.

5.7.5 Air Resources

      Certain actions under the SNF management alternatives would impact air quality. For
example, the construction of new facilities could negatively impact air quality through the emission of
fugitive dusts and from pollutants from diesel- and gasoline-powered equipment. The increase in
offsite ambient levels would be small because of the large distance to the nearest public access, and
use of the mitigation measures described below would further minimize the potential impact.
      DOE would meet applicable regulations regarding the maintenance of air quality from both
radiological and nonradiological emission sources. DOE does not foresee impacts to air quality from
SNF management that would warrant measures beyond those employed consistent with good
construction, engineering, and operations, and management practices.

5.7.6 Water Resources

      The implementation of some of the SNF management alternatives would require larger
volumes of water for the stabilization of SNF. DOE would control water consumption through the
appropriate application of water recycling, water conservation measures and equipment, stormwater
catchment basins, and worker training programs. Constant process monitoring and mass-balance and
design to current standards, including double-wall confinement of all vessels and piping, would be
included in design and operating standards by DOE to limit potential operational releases from a SNF
processing or storage facility to essentially zero.

5.7.7 Ecological Resources

      Implementation of the SNF management alternatives could impact terrestrial resources,
wetlands, aquatic resources, and threatened and endangered species either directly by earth-moving
activities that disturb habitat or indirectly through construction activities that result in increased 
runoff into wetlands or aquatic environments.
      To avoid potential impacts to endangered, candidate, or state-identified sensitive species,
preconstruction surveys would be completed to determine the presence of these species or their
habitat. If protected species or primary habitat for these species are located near or within an area to
be disturbed, DOE would evaluate the project design and other program activities to determine if
modifications would avoid negative impacts. DOE would consult with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service to develop the most appropriate action-specific mitigation measures.
      Wetland habitat would be delineated in accordance with applicable U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers procedures and wetlands located near proposed activities would be avoided. However, if
avoidance were not possible, specific mitigation measures could be developed in consultation with the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. For example, mitigation could include construction of new wetland
acreage equivalent to the acreage of disturbed wetland habitat or enhancement of existing wetland
habitat at another location onsite.

5.7.8 Noise

      Construction and operation from SNF management would result in the generation of noise
consistent with light industrial activity. DOE does not foresee noise impacts from SNF management
that would warrant mitigation measures beyond those employed consistent with good construction
engineering, operational, and management practices.
      Noise impacts to the public and other noise-sensitive receptors could be reduced by providing
noise buffer areas between sources and receptors, constructing noise walls and other attenuation
structures, and limiting the emissions to daytime periods.

5.7.9 Traffic and Transportation

      The number of workers in SNF management activities under some of the alternatives would
add to the current work force and to additional commuting traffic. At sites with increasing traffic
concerns, roads could be widened with the addition of lanes or implementation of traffic demand
management. DOE would also consider using high-occupancy vehicles (such as vans or buses),
implementing car-pooling or ride-sharing programs, or staggering schedules to reduce the potential
for increased traffic congestion. See Section 5.7.12 for discussion of transportation accident
mitigation.

5.7.10 Occupational and Public Health and Safety

      Implementation of the SNF management alternatives would increase the potential for radiation
exposure either through direct exposure or through air emissions. Although these effects are small, as
discussed in Section 5.2, the as low as reasonably achievable principle would be used for controlling
radiation exposure of workers and the public. Pollution prevention practices would be implemented
to avoid or reduce production of potentially harmful substances. Waste minimization would be
practiced to reduce the toxicity and volume of secondary wastes to be managed. Furthermore, sites
would update their current worker training, emergency planning, emergency preparedness, and
emergency response programs as needed to address new SNF management actions for the protection
of both workers and the public.

5.7.11 Site Utilities and Support Services

      The SNF management alternatives would put increased demands on utilities at the sites.
Under certain alternatives, additional transmission lines or substations may need to be added to the
infrastructure and, at the Nevada Test Site, a sewage treatment facility for the SNF management
facility would need to be constructed. However, DOE would reduce the need for certain utilities
(such as water and electricity) through the implementation of resource conservation, pollution
prevention, and energy efficiency measures.

5.7.12 Accidents

      The potential exists for an accident associated with either the handling or transportation of
SNF with the consequence being a significant release of radioactive or other hazardous materials to
the environment. Although the probability is very small, as discussed in Section 5.2, each of the
locations considered for SNF management have emergency action plans and equipment to respond to
accidents and other emergencies to limit the magnitude of potential impacts from any accident. These
plans include training of workers, local emergency response agencies (such as fire departments), and
the public; communication systems and protocols; readiness drills; and mutual aid agreements. The
plans would be updated to cover any new SNF facilities and activities. DOE would coordinate
activities with state and local agencies to establish and implement an appropriate emergency response
training program for potential accidents.

5.8 Environmental Justice

      In February 1994, Executive Order 12898, titled Federal Actions to Address Environmental
Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations (FR 1994), was released to Federal
agencies. This order directs Federal agencies to incorporate environmental justice as part of their
missions. As such, Federal agencies are specifically directed to identify and address, as appropriate,
disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of their programs,
policies, and activities on minority populations and low-income populations. Appendix L of this EIS
provides an assessment of the areas surrounding the 10 sites under consideration for the management
of SNF under all programmatic alternatives considered in this volume. Because DOE is still in the
process of developing guidance, the approach used in this analysis might depart somewhat from the
guidance eventually issued.
      The overall review indicated that the potential impacts calculated for each discipline under 
each of the alternative sites considered for the management of all or some portion of DOE SNF (or  
naval SNF only) present no significant risk and do not constitute a reasonably foreseeable adverse
impact to the surrounding population. This includes both the impacts of facility operations and the  
transport of SNF, and the risk of reasonably foreseeable accident scenarios postulated for both, all of 
which are small. Therefore, the impacts of the programmatic management of DOE SNF under all    
alternatives evaluated in this EIS do not constitute a disproportionately high and adverse impact on 
any particular segment of the population, minorities or low-income communities included.   
      Characterization of the numbers and location of minority and low-income populations is 
dependent on how these populations are defined and what assumptions are used in conducting the
analysis. As discussed in Appendix L, at the time this EIS and the Draft Environmental Impact
Statement on a Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research
Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel (Draft FRR SNF EIS) were prepared, the Federal Interagency Working
Group on environmental justice had not issued final guidance on the definitions of minority and 
low-income populations, or the approach to be used in analyzing environmental justice, as directed by
the Executive Order (FR 1994). Final internal DOE guidance on environmental justice also has not 
been adopted. As a result, both the definitions and assumptions used by and within agencies for 
conducting environmental justice analyses can vary and the resulting demographic results can differ 
on a case-by-case basis. For example, this EIS and the Draft FRR SNF EIS present demographic     
characterizations derived from the same United States Census Bureau database, but these documents 
used different definitions and assumptions. Several of the same candidate interim SNF management 
sites were evaluated in both documents. As discussed in Appendix L, variations in these definitions 
and assumptions led to differences in the characterization of minority and low-income populations  
surrounding these potential interim SNF management sites. Nevertheless, although the
characterizations differ, the impacts resulting from the proposed action under all alternatives present  
no significant risk to the population as a whole. Therefore, no disproportionately high and adverse
effects would be expected for any particular segment of the population, including minority and I
low-income populations, regardless of which set of definitions and assumptions were applied.