3. ALTERNATIVES
Chapter 3 describes a range of programmatic alternatives for managing the DOE SNF currently stored
within the DOE complex and at non-DOE generator sites. These alternatives also address SNF that is
projected to be generated through the year 2035. Figure 1-2, given in Chapter 1, identifies locations within
the United States where DOE SNF is being generated and stored.
The five alternatives
analyzed in Volume 1 of this
EIS are summarized in the
box to the right. These
alternatives, which are
consistent with the
alternatives under
consideration for the DOE
Waste Management
Programmatic EIS, present a
range of programmatic
approaches for managing
existing and projected SNF
inventories. The alternatives
involve varying amounts of
SNF shipments, levels of
fuel stabilization, numbers
and types of storage
facilities, and the scope of
research and development
efforts for SNF management
technologies.
_____________________________________________________________________________
Summary of Alternatives for the Management of
DOE Spent Nuclear Fuel
No Action
Take minimum actions required for safe and secure management of
SNF at or close to the generation site or current storage location.
Decentralization
Store most SNF at or close to the generation site or current storage
location, with limited shipments to DOE facilities.
1992/1993 Planning Basis
Transport and store newly generated SNF at the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory or Savannah River Site. Consolidate some
existing fuels at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory or at the
Savannah River Site.
Regionalization
Distribute existing and projected SNF among DOE sites based primarily
on fuel type (Regionalization 4A) or geographic location
(Regionalization 4B).
Centralization
Manage all existing and projected SNF inventories at one site until
ultimate disposition.
_____________________________________________________________________________
The programmatic action that DOE ultimately selects is not necessarily limited to one of the
alternatives presented. A hybrid alternative could, for example, be developed that would incorporate actions
from one or more of the five alternatives analyzed. Moreover, the programmatic decisions will not identify all
site-specific SNF management options. If appropriate, the decisions would be made after additional site-
specific National Environmental Policy Act evaluations.
In developing the alternatives, the need to comply with applicable regulations, permits, and DOE
orders was assumed. Under some of the alternatives (for example, No Action and Decentralization), DOE
would be required to renegotiate existing commitments to accept SNF from utilities (for example, Fort St.
Vrain), domestic research reactor SNF, and potential agreements to accept foreign research reactor SNF.
Under all alternatives, actions to resolve outstanding SNF management deficiencies identified and prioritized
according to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 94-1 Implementation Plan would
be implemented as appropriate. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board 94-1 Implementation Plan will
be balanced with other factors such as budgetary constraints and public comments. Under all alternatives,
DOE would consider ways to reduce costs for the management of SNF.
Some of the alternatives include references to transition periods. These can be defined as the periods
of time needed to fully implement the alternative, if selected. Transition periods vary from 3 to 20 years
depending on the time required to plan, design, procure, or construct equipment and facilities needed to fully
implement the alternative. Activities taking place during transition periods would be similar to anticipated
activities associated with one or more of the defined alternatives. Therefore, environmental impacts of
transition period activities are bounded by the impacts assessment for the defined alternatives.
The DOE SNF Management Program is intended to (a) provide interim storage and management for
SNF at specified locations until ultimate disposition, (b) stabilize the fuel as required for environmentally
safe storage and protection of human health (for both workers and the public), (c) increase safe storage
capacity, replacing facilities that cannot meet current standards and provide additional capacity for newly
generated SNF, (d) conduct research and development initiatives to support safe storage and safe disposal,
and (e) examine SNF generated by the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program. The possible need to convert SNF
into a form that meets the acceptance criteria of geologic repositories is beyond the scope of this EIS and will
be the subject of future National Environmental Policy Act review.
The planning period for this EIS is 40 years, beginning with the issuance of the Record of Decision
(that is, baseline conditions in June 1995) and extending through the year 2035. The
40-year timeframe may be required to make and implement decisions on the ultimate disposition of SNF.
Detailed impact analyses are performed for the time period from 1995 to 2005. Normal operation impacts
are then projected for the remaining 30 years.
Decisions as a result of this EIS apply to actions taken by DOE and the Navy from the date of the
Record of Decision through the interim storage period. At the present time, intersite shipments of DOE SNF
have been curtailed. However, limited shipments of SNF from Navy shipyards have occurred during the
preparation of the EIS. Shipments from sources such as universities and foreign research reactors needing
urgent relief have also occurred. These shipments are in accordance with existing court orders, Federal
facility compliance agreements, and Council on Environmental Quality regulations. If the No Action
alternative is selected in the Record of Decision, all such shipments would cease after an appropriate
transition period.
After considering a number of elements, DOE has identified Regionalization 4A (management by fuel
type) as the preferred alternative. DOE arrived at its preferred alternative through a formal decision
management process, which included developing screening and performance criteria. Screening criteria are
requirements that an alternative must satisfy to be further evaluated; performance criteria are desirable
attributes or characteristics that help distinguish the relative merit of each alternative that satisfies the
screening criteria. After applying the screening criteria, additional management considerations (technical and
nontechnical), discussed below, were used to arrive at the final preferred alternative.
The screening and performance criteria were developed considering the following factors:
(a) environmental impact, (b) environmental regulatory compliance, (c) DOE and SNF programmatic
missions, (d) public comments, (e) national security mission, (f) cost, and (g) DOE policy.
Each alternative was first evaluated based on the following screening criteria:
Resolving vulnerabilities consistent with DOE's Plan of Action to Resolve Spent Nuclear Fuel
Vulnerabilities (DOE 1994a, b, c)
Complying with all applicable Federal and state environmental laws and regulations, consent
orders, and Federal facility agreements
Maintaining backup capabilities for SNF management to limit interruptions of vital SNF
program activities
Providing the capability for 100 percent examination of naval SNF
Providing technology development for SNF treatment, storage, and ultimate disposition.
Those alternatives that did not satisfy all of the screening criteria were not considered further, and
these were No Action, Decentralization A and B, and Centralization. The remaining alternatives, 1992-93
Planning Basis, Decentralization C, and Regionalization 4A and 4B, met all of the screening criteria. These
alternatives were then evaluated based on optimizing overall performance relative to the following
performance criteria:
Minimizing transport of SNF
Minimizing environmental impact
Assuring lowest cost consistent with mission accomplishment
Maximizing support for DOE's National SNF Program to achieve safe storage and preparation
for final disposition
Maximizing DOE's ability to honor new and historical commitments and contracts.
Applying these performance criteria, two of the four remaining alternatives, 1992-93 Planning Basis
and Regionalization 4A, rated the highest, so they were determined to be candidates for the preferred
alternative. These candidate alternatives were then evaluated against a number of technical and nontechnical
considerations, including environmental impact perception, indicated stakeholder preferences, implementation
factors, regulatory risk, SNF processing potential, environmental justice, and fairness. This final evaluation
resulted in Regionalization 4A being identified as the preferred alternative, because Regionalization 4A better
supports a path forward for ultimate disposition of the SNF. Additional information on this alternative can
be found in Section 3.1.4.
While the Nevada Test Site is analyzed in this EIS as an alternative site for SNF management
activities, DOE did not consider it to be a preferred site for the management of SNF because of the State of
Nevada's current role as the host site for the Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Project and the Nevada
Test Site's lack of SNF management facilities and high-level waste infrastructure.
The DOE's preferred alternative is consistent with the Navy's preferred alternative to continue to
conduct refueling and defueling of nuclear-powered vessels and prototypes, and to transport SNF to the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory for full examination and interim storage, using the same practices as in the
past. Details and analyses supporting the Navy's preferred alternative can be found in Appendix D of
Volume 1.
The remainder of this chapter is comprised of three sections. Section 3.1 summarizes the alternatives
and the implications for each site. Section 3.2 discusses the alternatives eliminated from further evaluation.
Section 3.3 provides a brief comparison of the potential environmental impacts associated with each
alternative.
3.1 Overview of Alternatives Considered
Section 3.1 and Tables 3-1 through 3-5 discuss the potential actions at each site as a result of
implementing each of the alternatives.
Table 3-1. Summary of the No Action alternativeTable 3-2. Summary of the Decentralization alternative.Table 3-3. Summary of the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternativeTable 3-4. Summary of the Regionalization alternative.Table 3-4. Summary of the Regionalization alternative (cont.).Table 3-5. Summary of the Centralization alternative.Table 3-5. Summary of the Centralization alterantive (cont.).____________________________________________________________________________
No Action Alternative
Take minimum actions required for safe and secure management of SNF
at or close to the generation site or current storage location.
After an approximate 3-year transition period, no transport of SNF
to or from DOE facilities would occur.
Stabilization activities would be limited to the minimum actions
required to safely store SNF.
Naval reactor SNF would be stored at naval sites.
Facility upgrade/replacement and onsite fuel transfers would be
limited to those necessary for safe interim storage.
Existing research and development activities would continue.
____________________________________________________________________________
3.1.1 No Action
The No Action
alternative is an alternative
required under the Council on
Environmental Quality
regulations for implementing
the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969. Under the
No Action alternative, DOE
would limit actions to the
minimum necessary for safe
and secure management of
SNF at the generation site or
current storage location.
Under this alternative, small
and large DOE sites, naval
sites, university and other non-
DOE domestic reactors, and foreign research reactors would all independently manage their SNF onsite.
Generally, after an appropriate transition period SNF shipments between sites for management purposes
would be discontinued, including those SNF shipments currently allowed by court orders and Federal facility
compliance agreements. Figure 3-1 indicates SNF inventories. The technology development activities related
to SNF management, limited to activities already approved, would continue within DOE. Figure 3-1 also
shows the distribution of fuel from 1995 through 2035.
The following subsections highlight actions associated with the No Action alternative at the sites
being considered for SNF management.
3.1.1.1 Hanford Site.
Under the No Action alternative at the Hanford Site, only those actions
deemed necessary for the continued safe and secure management of the SNF would be carried out. Thus, the
existing SNF would be maintained close to its current storage locations and there would be minimal facility
upgrades. Activities required to safely store SNF would continue.
Specific actions proposed for the near term include proceeding with the characterization of defense
production reactor fuel to establish safe interim storage limits, containerizing the fuel in the 105-KE reactor
basin by 1998, procuring the first 10 dry storage casks for the Fast Flux Test Facility, transferring SNF to dry
cask storage if required for safety reasons (with emphasis on Fast Flux Test Facility fuel now stored in liquid
sodium), and possibly consolidating SNF from defense production at the 105-KW reactor basin.
Figure 3-1. Spent nuclear fuel distribution, location, and inventory for the No Action alternative. No new facilities are planned under the No Action alternative.
3.1.1.2 Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.
For the No Action alternative, DOE would
maintain SNF close to defueling or current storage locations with minimal facility upgrades or replacements.
The Idaho National Engineering Laboratory would neither receive nor transport SNF except for naval SNF
during a transition period of about 3 years (see Section 3.1.1.6). After the transition period, naval SNF would
not be transferred to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, and the Expended Core Facility at the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory would be shut down. DOE would continue to transfer onsite SNF to the
Idaho Chemical Processing Plant until the existing storage capacity is used.
DOE would continue operating existing SNF-related facilities at the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory. Because of the deteriorated condition of some of the fuel stored underwater in the CPP-603
Underwater Fuel Storage Facility, additional characterization and canning capabilities would be necessary to
stabilize the fuel for safe transport and subsequent storage. DOE has scheduled the installation and operation
of new fuel characterization and canning equipment in the Irradiated Fuel Storage Facility by late 1995 to
provide these capabilities. DOE would perform other required stabilization of SNF at the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory in either the Remote Analytical Laboratory or the Fluorinel Dissolution Process Hot
Cell. DOE would not start any new projects to increase SNF interim storage capacity.
SNF research and development would be limited. Existing SNF management research and
development projects would continue, but the development of technology for the ultimate disposition of SNF
would cease. Existing facilities, such as the Process Improvement Facility, the Remote Analytical
Laboratory, and the Pilot Plant Facility, would support continuing research and development work.
3.1.1.3 Savannah River Site.
For the No Action alternative, DOE would use the existing
Savannah River Site facilities for extended wet storage of its current SNF inventories. The Savannah River
Site would not transport any SNF offsite and would not receive any SNF. Only onsite consolidation and
rearrangement would take place. DOE would temporarily move fuel currently on the Savannah River Site
among facilities to accommodate facility upgrades.
Six Savannah River Site facilities are used for the storage of SNF: the Receiving Basin for Offsite
Fuel, K-Reactor Disassembly Basin, L-Reactor Disassembly Basin, P-Reactor Disassembly Basin, F-Canyon,
and H-Canyon. Most of the fuel is located in the Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuel, the L-Reactor
Disassembly Basin, and the F-Canyon. DOE would accomplish onsite transfers as required to ensure the
safety of aluminum-clad fuel. The Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuels and an upgraded reactor basin would be
utilized for continued storage of this fuel. Additionally, DOE would place the aluminum-clad fuel, which is
degrading because of corrosion, in containers to minimize the spread of radioactive material in the pools in
case the cladding is breached. DOE would continue existing SNF-related research and development.
3.1.1.4 Oak Ridge Reservation.
Under the No Action alternative, the Oak Ridge National
Laboratory, which is on the Oak Ridge Reservation, would generate and store SNF as a result of reactor
research activities. No SNF would be transported to the Oak Ridge Reservation, and no SNF would be
transported offsite. SNF would be stabilized, as necessary, to ensure safe storage. Oak Ridge Reservation
research and development activities would continue as planned except that the alternative could lead to the
shutdown of the High Flux Isotope Reactor as a result of filling the existing SNF storage capacity.
Additional SNF management planning is not expected to be required for the Bulk Shielding Reactor or the
Oak Ridge Research Reactor through the year 2035. It is antici-
pated that the fuel now stored in the Tower
Shielding Reactor No. II core would be moved to the Y-12 area at the Oak Ridge Reservation for interim
storage. If this is not possible, additional storage space or cessation of reactor opera-
tions may be required
after 2005. If the Advanced Neutron Source becomes opera-
tional in 2005, additional SNF interim storage
space may be required.
3.1.1.5 Nevada Test Site.
The Nevada Test Site does not generate or store any SNF and would
not receive any SNF under the No Action alternative. Therefore, this alternative does not affect the Nevada
Test Site.
3.1.1.6 Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program.
Under the No Action alternative, naval reactors
would continue to be defueled and refueled as planned. In accordance with normal practices, the spent fuel
would be removed from the ships (or prototypes) and placed into shipping containers. No action would be
needed to prepare the naval SNF for storage because of its corrosion resistance, high integrity, and strength.
The SNF would be stored in this condition at a location near the defueling site. Naval SNF from ships
defueled or refueled at Newport News Shipbuilding, a private shipyard located in Newport News, Virginia,
would be transported to the Norfolk Naval Shipyard, in Portsmouth, Virginia, which is the nearest naval site.
Under this alternative, examination of naval SNF would ultimately cease. A transition period of
approximately 3 years would be required to procure sufficient shipping containers to store naval SNF being
removed by ongoing defueling or refueling. During this period, naval SNF would continue to be transported
to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory for detailed examination and storage. After the transition
period, naval SNF would no longer be transported to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory for
examination and subsequent storage; the SNF removed from naval reactors would remain for storage at the
naval sites. In addition, the Expended Core Facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory would be
shut down.
3.1.1.7 Other Generator/Storage Locations.
Under the No Action alternative, the SNF
generated and/or stored at DOE research and non-DOE research reactors and other locations would not be
transported offsite. For the purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that SNF from foreign research reactors
would not be transported to the United States under this alternative. DOE research reactors with adequate
storage capacity could continue operating as planned. If the onsite storage capacity is inadequate or cannot
be expanded, new plans would have to be considered, including potential cessation of reactor operations after
storage capacity limits are reached.
The No Action alternative would also affect the management of SNF from nuclear power plants that
DOE is obligated to store. For this alternative, the SNF would remain at these sites. Stabilization would be
performed, as necessary, to ensure safe storage. Loss of access to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
for storage of its SNF has already resulted in the construction of new onsite SNF storage at Fort St. Vrain.
Therefore, implementation of the No Action alternative would have no additional impact on the management
of SNF at Fort St. Vrain.
3.1.2 Decentralization
_____________________________________________________________________________
Decentralization Alternative
Store most SNF at or close to the generation site or current storage
location, with limited shipments to DOE facilities.
DOE SNF shipments would be limited to the following:
- SNF stored or generated at universities and non-DOE facilities
- Potential foreign research reactor fuel.
SNF processing might need to be conducted. Other forms of
stabilization might occur to provide for safe storage and/or
transport.
Some facilities would be upgraded/replaced and additional storage
capacity required by the alternative would be constructed.
Onsite fuel transfers would occur for improved safe storage.
Research and development activities would be undertaken for SNF
management, including stabilization technology.
Three options for naval fuel
- No inspection fuel remains close to refueling/defueling site
- Limited inspection at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard
- Full inspection at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
followed by storage close to refueling/defueling site.
____________________________________________________________________________
Under the
Decentralization alternative,
DOE would (a) maintain
existing SNF in storage at
current locations, and (b) store
new SNF at or near the site of
generation, thereby reducing
the amount of fuel transported
before a decision on ultimate
disposition. This alternative
differs from the No Action
alternative by slightly
increasing shipments to DOE
sites and developing or
upgrading facilities. Table 3-2
summarizes the basic actions
at each site under this
alternative. Actions that
would improve management
of SNF would be undertaken.
SNF processing and research
and development would be performed. Fuel may be transported for safety or research and development
purposes. Figure 3-2 identifies the movement of fuel from 1995 through 2035 under this alternative. SNF
from non-DOE locations would be transported to one of the major existing sites for management. SNF
managed by DOE would remain at its current location until a decision on final disposition is made. The Navy
has evaluated three options for SNF management under this alternative, based on the amount of examination
that would be performed on the SNF. In general, naval SNF would be stored at the defueling site. SNF from
Newport News Shipbuilding would be transferred to the Norfolk Naval Shipyard.
3.1.2.1 Hanford Site.
Under the Decentralization alternative, the near-term activities at the
Hanford Site include those activities identified under the No Action alternative, as well as substantial facility
development and upgrades, and SNF processing research and development. In addition to the three principal
activities identified for the No Action alternative (that is, fuel characterization, fuel canning, and cask
procurement for Fast Flux Test Facility fuel), the following general activities would also occur: evaluating
wet and dry storage methods for defense production N-Reactor and Single-Pass Reactor fuel; evaluating dry
storage methods for other fuels (Shippingport Core II, Fast Flux Test Facility, miscellaneous); conducting
extensive research and development on defense
Figure 3-2. Spent nuclear fuel distribution, location, and inventory for the Decentralization alternative.production SNF stabilization techniques; and constructing and using wet and/or dry storage facilities and
possibly a stabilization facility. In response to public comment, this alternative also includes the option to
process defense production SNF at an overseas facility. A discussion of this option is provided in Volume 1,
Appendix A, Attachment B.
The Hanford Site would not transport SNF to or receive SNF from offsite locations, unless the option
to process defense production SNF at an overseas facility is selected. Local transport of fuel would occur to
support safety requirements, improved SNF management, and research and development activities.
Combinations of wet and dry storage would be considered. Either a new wet storage facility or dry
casks or vault-type dry storage would be needed to replace existing facilities. Dry storage of defense
production SNF would require a new stabilization facility. Because of substantial chemical and physical
differences between defense production fuels and the nondefense fuels, it is possible that separate storage
facilities would be built. Additional National Environmental Policy Act documentation would be prepared
before selecting this option.
3.1.2.2 Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.
Under the Decentralization alternative, the
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory would accept limited shipments of SNF for storage, including SNF
from some domestic research reactors and some foreign research reactors. Some onsite transfers would also
be conducted. DOE would manage the existing SNF at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, such as
the naval SNF at the Naval Reactors Facility and the SNF in underwater pools, to accomplish safe and secure
interim storage until ultimate disposition.
DOE would use the characterization and canning equipment described for the No Action alternative to
stabilize SNF removed from the CPP-603 Underwater Fuel Storage Facility for interim SNF storage. DOE
would transfer the SNF in the CPP-603 Underwater Fuel Storage Facility to the Fuel Storage Area by the year
2000. DOE would continue to use the Underground Storage Facility and the Irradiated Fuel Storage Facility
for existing SNF inventory and transfers of other SNF based on safety analyses. DOE would upgrade or
increase fuel storage capacity at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, as required.
The Idaho National Engineering Laboratory would conduct various research and development
activities, including laboratory and pilot-plant testing, continued repository performance assessments and
acceptance criteria development, and the characterization of SNF.
The Idaho National Engineering Laboratory would examine different amounts of naval SNF,
depending on the option selected for the Navy Nuclear Propulsion Program (see Section 3.1.2.6). Under two
of the three options, the Expended Core Facility would ultimately be shut down. As with the No Action
alternative, each of the options for naval fuel would require a transition period. During this transition period,
SNF would be transported in shipping containers to the Expended Core Facility for examination and then to
the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant for storage.
3.1.2.3 Savannah River Site.
The near-term fuel transfer and consolidation activities at the
Savannah River Site for the Decentralization alternative would be similar to those under the No Action
alternative, except that the site would receive limited SNF shipments from other locations. The Savannah
River Site would receive research and test reactor fuel from some domestic and perhaps some foreign
research reactors. This SNF would consist primarily of aluminum-clad fuel elements and some stainless steel
and zircaloy fuel elements.
Fuel would continue to be stored in the Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuels and in an upgraded reactor
basin until it is either canned, placed in wet or dry storage, or is processed. The processing option
represented for evaluation in the EIS consists of processing existing Savannah River Site aluminum-clad fuel
using existing chemical separations facilities (that is, F- and H-Canyons) and storing the current inventory of
stainless-steel-clad and zirconium-clad fuel as well as future receipts of aluminum-clad SNF. This option is
analyzed because DOE has data from past processing that can be used for analyses. The impacts from this
technology are representative of other processing technology options that may be considered in the future.
Other processing options, such as processing all SNF or processing coupled with vitrification, are also
feasible and would be analyzed as part of the site-specific National Environmental Policy Act documentation
needed to implement any option for this alternative.
The Decentralization alternative would require a new fuel characterization facility, a new wet or dry
canning facility, and a new wet or dry storage facility. The Savannah River Site would evaluate wet and dry
storage and processing options because (as in the No Action alternative) interim wet storage of the fuel
elements without canning could cause corrosion and cladding failures. The Savannah River Site would
initiate projects to design characterization, canning, and dry storage facilities for aluminum-clad fuels.
Ongoing SNF research would continue at the site.
3.1.2.4 Oak Ridge Reservation.
Under the Decentralization alternative, the Oak Ridge National
Laboratory would generate and store SNF from reactor research activities. No SNF would be transported to
the Oak Ridge Reservation except for small amounts associated with research and development activities (for
example, from Sandia National Laboratories). No SNF would be transported offsite. SNF would be
stabilized, as necessary, to provide safe storage. Research and development activities at the Oak Ridge
Reservation would continue as planned. Because the interim storage capacity for SNF at the Oak Ridge
Reservation is limited, new interim storage capacity would be added. The amount of SNF in interim storage
would not increase substantially.
3.1.2.5 Nevada Test Site.
Under the Decentralization alternative, the Nevada Test Site would not
generate or store any SNF and would not receive any SNF. Therefore, this alternative is not applicable to the
Nevada Test Site.
3.1.2.6 Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program.
The Decentralization alternative at the naval sites
is similar to the No Action alternative because naval reactors would continue to be defueled and refueled as
planned, and the fuel would generally be stored at or near the defueling site. No action would be needed to
prepare the naval SNF for storage because of its corrosion resistance, high integrity, and strength. A
transition period would be required while the necessary interim storage capabilities could be procured and
developed at the naval sites. During this period, naval SNF would continue to be transported to the Expended
Core Facility for examination and subsequent interim storage at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.
The principal difference from the No Action alternative is that the options for interim storage would be
selected from shipping containers, dry storage casks, and wet storage in water pools. Another important
difference is that examination of naval fuel would be possible.
Under this alternative, the Navy has three options, which vary by the amount of detailed examina-
tion
that could be performed on the naval SNF:
Option A, No Examination-Interim storage of naval SNF at the naval site of origin without
any detailed examination, except during the 3-year transition period when naval SNF would
continue to be transported to the Expended Core Facility at the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory for detailed examination and preparation for storage at the Idaho Chemical
Processing Plant.
Option B, Limited Examination-Transport approximately 10 percent of the naval SNF to the
Puget Sound Naval Shipyard where the existing water pool, designed to support aircraft carrier
refuelings, would be modified to enable limited examination of certain high-priority SNF. Use
of this water pool for examination would preclude the performance of aircraft carrier refueling
work at the shipyard.
Option C, Full Examination-Transport naval SNF to the Expended Core Facility for full
examination and then return the fuel to the naval or DOE facility near the site of origin for
storage.
For Option A, the Expended Core Facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory would be
shut down after the transition period. For Option B, the water pool facility at the Puget Sound Naval
Shipyard would be modified to support SNF examinations and, upon completion, the Expended Core Facility
would be shut down. It would not be possible to perform aircraft carrier refuelings at the Puget Sound Naval
Shipyard if this option were selected. Under Options A and B, examinations of SNF would be either
terminated or severely decreased. Under Option C, the Expended Core Facility would continue to operate,
and planned Expended Core Facility improvements, including construction of the dry cell, would be
completed.
3.1.2.7 Other Generator/Storage Locations.
The Decentralization alternative for other
generators and storage locations is similar to the No Action alternative because offsite transport of SNF
would be allowed in limited amounts for continued operation. Thus, both DOE and non-DOE research
reactors would be allowed to transport SNF offsite, as necessary. Additional SNF interim storage facilities at
domestic research reactors would not be required. For this alternative, SNF currently stored at the West
Valley Demonstration Project, Babcock & Wilcox Research Center, and the Fort St. Vrain power plant would
remain at these sites. As identified in the No Action alternative, loss of access to the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory for storage of its SNF has already resulted in the construction of new onsite SNF
storage at Fort St. Vrain. Therefore, implementation of the Decentralization alternative would have no
additional impact on the management of SNF at Fort St. Vrain.
3.1.3 1992/1993 Planning Basis
_____________________________________________________________________________
1992/1993 Planning Basis Alternative
Transport to and store newly generated SNF at the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory or Savannah River Site. Consolidate some existing
fuels at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory or the Savannah River
Site.
Fuel would be transported as follows:
- TRIGA fuel from the Hanford Site to the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory; Hanford Site receives limited fuel for
research of storage and dispositioning technologies
- Naval fuel to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory for
examination and storage
- West Valley Demonstration Project and Fort St. Vrain fuel to
the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
- Oak Ridge Reservation fuel to the Savannah River Site
- Domestic research fuel, and foreign research reactor fuel as
may yet be determined, divided between the Savannah River
Site and the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.
Facilities upgrades and replacements that were planned would
proceed, including increased storage capacity.
Research and development for SNF management would be
undertaken, including stabilization technology.
SNF processing might need to be conducted. Other forms of
stabilization might occur to provide for safe storage and/or
transport.
____________________________________________________________________________
The 1992/1993
Planning Basis alternative
represents DOE's 1992/1993
plans for management of its
SNF. Under this alternative,
existing SNF located at major
DOE sites would remain at
those sites. This results in less
intersite transportation of SNF
compared with the other
alternatives, except for the No
Action alternative.
Table 3-3 summarizes the
basic actions at each site under
this alternative.
Under this alternative,
DOE would transport and
store newly generated SNF at
the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory or
Savannah River Site. Some
existing SNF currently at other
sites would be consolidated at
the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory or the Savannah River Site. Specifically, the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
would receive TRIGA fuel from the Hanford Site, SNF from naval sites, some test reactor SNF, SNF from
the West Valley Demonstration Project and Fort St. Vrain, and some SNF from university and perhaps from
foreign research reactors. The Savannah River Site would also receive some test reactor SNF and some SNF
from university and perhaps from foreign research reactors. DOE sites would generally upgrade facilities and
construct new facilities for the management of SNF.
Continued SNF transportation, receipt, processing, and storage are assumed for this alternative. The
construction and operation of any new facilities required to accommodate current and project-specific SNF
interim storage requirements would be implemented. Figure 3-3 identifies the movement of fuel from 1995
through 2035 under this alternative. Activities related to SNF processing would include research and
development and pilot programs to support future decisions on the ultimate disposition of SNF.
Figure 3-3. Spent nuclear fuel distribution, location, and inventory for the 1992/1993 Planning Basisalternative.
Naval SNF would continue to be transported to the Expended Core Facility at the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory for examination. After examination, the SNF would be transferred to the Idaho
Chemical Processing Plant for interim storage, pending ultimate disposition.
3.1.3.1 Hanford Site.
The activities at the Hanford Site for the 1992/1993 Planning Basis
alternative are the same as those identified for the Decentralization alternative, except that 191 TRIGA SNF
elements currently stored in the 308 Building and the 200 Area low-level burial grounds would be transported
to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. No new SNF would be transported to the Hanford Site except
for limited quantities of materials for research in support of interim storage technologies for ultimate
disposition. Thus, the overall inventory at the Hanford Site would decrease slightly.
3.1.3.2 Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.
Under the 1992/1993 Planning Basis
alternative, DOE would continue the maintenance and operation of existing SNF-related facilities in a manner
similar to the No Action alternative; however, some consolidation of Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
facilities could occur. Newly generated SNF would, with minor exceptions, be transported to either the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory or the Savannah River Site.
DOE would complete a new characterization and canning facility with appropriate inspection,
conditioning, and packaging equipment to stabilize any new receipts of SNF and to prepare fuel currently in
underwater storage for dry storage. DOE would upgrade or increase dry fuel storage capacity at the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory, as required.
SNF research and development, with the construction of a Technology Development Facility, would
continue as planned. The Electrometallurgical Process Demonstration Project would continue at the Argonne
National Laboratory-West Fuel Cycle Facility. The Dry Fuels Storage Facility would be used to demonstrate
technology for the dry storage of selected DOE highly enriched uranium fuels.
Naval SNF would continue to be transported to the Expended Core Facility at the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory for examination. After examination, the SNF would be transferred to the Idaho
Chemical Processing Plant for interim storage, pending ultimate disposition.
3.1.3.3 Savannah River Site.
The implementation of the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative
at the Savannah River Site would involve the same actions and options as the Decentralization alternative,
except that DOE would transfer about half of the newly generated domestic and foreign aluminum-clad
research reactor SNF to the Savannah River Site.
The stabilization activities and options would be the same as those for the Decentralization
alternative. The Savannah River Site would place the nonaluminum fuels and offsite aluminum-clad fuel
receipts in interim storage and either process the aluminum-clad fuels currently at the Savannah River Site or
place them in interim storage. The storage options and new facility requirements would also be the same as
those for the Decentralization alternative. The Savannah River Site would undertake the same types of
research and development programs as those described for the Decentralization alternative. Current ongoing
activities would continue. The Savannah River Site would also conduct research and pilot-scale studies to
determine the best technology for ultimate disposition of the aluminum-clad fuels.
3.1.3.4 Oak Ridge Reservation.
Under the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative, the Oak
Ridge Reservation would transport excess SNF to other DOE locations as necessary to permit continued
operations of Oak Ridge reactors. The option for acquiring dry storage facilities would support continued
High Flux Isotope Reactor operation during the transition period. The amount of SNF stored at the Oak
Ridge Reservation would not increase. Research and development activities would continue, and SNF interim
storage capacity would not increase.
3.1.3.5 Nevada Test Site.
Under the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative, the Nevada Test Site
would not generate or store any SNF and would not receive any SNF. Therefore, this alternative is not
applicable to the Nevada Test Site.
3.1.3.6 Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program.
Under this alternative, naval reactors would
continue to be defueled and refueled as planned. Upon removal from the ship, the SNF would be transported
to the Expended Core Facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory for examination. After
examination, the fuel would be transported to the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant for interim storage,
pending ultimate disposition. No action to prepare the SNF for storage would be necessary because of its
corrosion resistance, high integrity, and strength. Planned improvements for the Expended Core Facility,
including construction of the dry cell facility, would be completed.
3.1.3.7 Other Generator/Storage Locations.
Under this alternative, SNF would continue to be
transported to designated DOE sites. At Brookhaven National Laboratory, implementation of this alternative
could require a transition period of several years and construction of temporary SNF storage facilities or
acquisition of dry storage containers. DOE assumes that no additional SNF interim storage facilities would
be constructed at the other generator/storage sites. For this alternative, SNF currently stored at the West
Valley Demonstration Project, Babcock & Wilcox Research Center, and the Fort St. Vrain power plant would
be transported to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.
3.1.4 Regionalization
The Regionalization alternative comprises Regionalization 4A, which would assign existing and
projected SNF among DOE sites based primarily on fuel type, and Regionalization 4B, which would assign
fuels geographically. This subsection briefly defines each one, provides a boxed summary, and discusses the
implications of both on each site.
Table 3-4 summarizes actions at the sites being consid-
ered for the Regionalization alternative.
___________________________________________________________________________
Regionalization 4A Preferred Alternative
Distribute existing and projected SNF among DOE sites based primarily on
fuel type.
Naval fuel would be transported to, examined, and stored at the
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.
Aluminum-clad fuel would be transported to the Savannah River
Site; TRIGA and nonaluminum fuel would be transported to the
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory; defense production fuel
would be retained at the Hanford Site.
SNF processing might need to be conducted. Other forms of
stabilization might occur to provide for safe storage and/or
transport.
Facilities required to support SNF management would be upgraded
or built as necessary.
Research and development for SNF management would be
undertaken, including stabilization technology.
___________________________________________________________________________
Regionalization 4A is
the management of SNF based
on the specific fuel type. The
DOE has identified
Regionalization 4A as its
preferred alternative (see
Section 3.0). All SNF would
be transported to and stored at
either the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory or the
Savannah River Site,
depending upon the fuel type,
with the exception of defense
production fuel that would be
retained at the Hanford Site.
Regionalization 4A is similar
to the 1992/1993 Planning
Basis alternative but involves
more intersite transportation
of SNF to the sites, depending on the existing capabilities of the sites to manage the specific fuel types with
respect to cladding material, physical and chemical composition, fuel condition, and adequate facilities to
handle the increased quantity. Actions for this alternative would assign all but defense production SNF to
either the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory or the Savannah River Site, depending on the fuel type.
Figure 3-4 shows the movement of SNF from 1995 through 2035 under Regionalization 4A. Facility
upgrades, replacements, and additions would be undertaken to the extent required by this alternative.
Activities related to the management of SNF, including research and develop-
ment activities, would be
included.
Figure 3-4. Spent nuclear fuel distribution, location, and inventory for Regionalization 4A (by fuel type).______________________________________________________________________________
Regionalization 4B
Distribute existing and projected SNF between an Eastern Regional Site
(either Oak Ridge Reservation or Savannah River Site) and a Western
Regional Site (either Hanford Site, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory,
or Nevada Test Site).
The Eastern Regional Site would receive fuel from east of the
Mississippi River and the Western Regional Site would receive fuel
from west of the Mississippi River.
Naval fuel would be transported to, examined, and stored at either
the Western Regional Site or the Eastern Regional Site.
SNF processing might need to be conducted. Other forms of
stabilization might occur to provide for safe storage and/or
transport.
Facilities required to support SNF management would be upgraded
or built as necessary.
Research and development would be undertaken for SNF
management, including stabilization technology.
______________________________________________________________________________
Regionalization 4B is
the management of SNF based
on geography. In general,
SNF from eastern locations
(east of the Mississippi River)
would be consolidated at the
Eastern Regional Site (either
the Oak Ridge Reservation or
the Savannah River Site); SNF
from western locations (west
of the Mississippi River)
would be consolidated at the
Western Regional Site (either
the Hanford Site, the Idaho
National Engineering
Laboratory, or the Nevada
Test Site). All naval SNF
would be transported to,
examined, and stored at either
the Eastern or the Western
Regional Site. Regionalization 4B has 10 options, based on the combination of sites selected as the Eastern
and Western Regional Site and the placement of the expended core facility at either the Eastern or the
Western Regional Site. There are three potential Western and two potential Eastern Regional Sites that could
be paired, with either supporting the expended core facility. Neither of the two possible combinations that
include the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory as the Western Regional Site would consider constructing
another expended core facility at the Eastern Site because of the estimated $1 billion cost to construct the
expended core facility. Figure 3-5 shows the movement of SNF from 1995 through 2035 under
Regionalization 4B with the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory as the Western Regional Site and the
Savannah River Site as the Eastern Regional Site. Facility upgrades, replacements, and additions would be
undertaken to the extent required by Regionalization 4B. Activities related to the management of SNF,
including research and development, would be included.
3.1.4.1 Hanford Site.
Regionalization 4A-Under Regionalization 4A, activities at the Hanford Site would be
intermediate to those of the Decentralization and the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternatives. Hanford would
continue to store its defense production fuel. The Hanford Site would not receive any shipments of SNF and
would transport commercial remnants and stainless steel and nondefense production zircaloy-clad fuels to the
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. Facility upgrades,
Figure 3-5. Spent nuclear fuel distribution, location, and inventory for Regionalization 4B (by geography).replacements, and additions associated with defense production fuel would occur as for the Decentralization
and 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternatives. Minor facility additions required to consolidate and prepare
other onsite SNF for transport offsite would also occur.
Regionalization 4B-If the Hanford Site were selected as the Western Regional Site for
implementation of Regionalization 4B, DOE SNF located or generated in the western United States and
possibly naval SNF nationwide would be sent to the Hanford Site. This would require the completion of
upgrades, increases, and replacements of storage capacity identified for the existing inventory under the
Decentralization alternative, as well as additional capacity to accommodate DOE SNF and naval SNF within
the existing or new facilities. A new stabilization facility may be required to accomplish safe interim storage
of SNF.
New facilities would also be required to receive, handle, and store offsite fuel. In addition, a new
facility for research and development and pilot programs would be required to support ultimate disposition.
An expended core facility would be built on the Hanford Site, if the naval SNF were sent to the Hanford Site.
Implementation of Regionalization 4B at a site other than the Hanford Site would require the Hanford
Site to consolidate and prepare onsite SNF for transport to the Western Regional Site. Because of the
potential chemical reactivity of the defense production fuel at Hanford, it would require stabilization before
offsite transport, which would require a new facility similar to the one described in the Decentralization
alternative. Additional casks and associated handling equipment compatible with the receiving capabilities at
the regional site may also be required. After the SNF is transported, related facilities at the Hanford Site
would be closed.
3.1.4.2 Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.
Regionalization 4A-Under Regionalization A, stainless-steel- and zircaloy-clad, TRIGA,
and naval SNF would be transported to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. The Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory would transport aluminum-clad fuel to the Savannah River Site. Dry interim storage
capacity would be increased and facility upgrades similar to those described for the 1992/1993 Planning
Basis alternative would be undertaken, with replacements and additions as appropriate.
Regionalization 4B-If the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory were selected as the
Western Regional Site for implementation of Regionalization 4B, SNF from western locations would be
transported to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. The western facilities would characterize,
stabilize, and can the SNF in containers compatible with dry storage at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant
at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. Naval SNF removed from naval reactors would be transported
to the Expended Core Facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory for examination. Following
examination, the SNF would be transferred to the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant for interim storage.
DOE would complete an expanded Dry Fuels Storage Facility, which would include a new
characterization and canning facility similar to the one described for the 1992/1993 Planning Basis
alternative. In addition, the same new facility projects described for the 1992/1993 Planning Basis
alternative would be initiated.
DOE would conduct SNF research and development. Similar to the 1992/1993 Planning Basis
alternative, the Electrometallurgical Process Demonstration Project would continue at Argonne National
Laboratory-West.
If implementation of Regionalization 4B were to occur at a different site, DOE would construct a
characterization and canning facility at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant to assist in stabilizing the
different types of Idaho National Engineering Laboratory SNF before placement in various shipping casks
and storage containers before transport to the selected Western Regional Site.
Similar to the No Action alternative, DOE would complete the transfer of the CPP-603 Underwater
Fuel Storage Facility pool inventory to existing dry storage facilities by the year 2000. DOE would not build
the Dry Fuels Storage Facility. DOE would then close all SNF-related facilities at the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory, except for operating reactor support facilities, such as the Advanced Test Reactor
canal or the Argonne National Laboratory-West Hot Fuel Examination Facility and Fuel Cycle Facility.
The SNF-related research and development activities would be phased out, although the
Electrometallurgical Process Demonstration Project would continue at Argonne National Laboratory-West
(but would only test processes for SNF currently on the site). Similar to the No Action alternative, shipments
of naval SNF to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory would cease, and the Expended Core Facility
would be phased out.
3.1.4.3 Savannah River Site.
Regionalization 4A-Under Regionalization 4A, DOE would transport aluminum-clad
fuels to the Savannah River Site. The same actions and options as the Decentralization alternative would be
required. The Savannah River Site would transport nonaluminum-clad fuels to the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory.
The stabilization activities and options would be similar to those described for the Decentralization
alternative. The principal differences are that, under this alternative, the Savannah River Site would can and
store more aluminum-clad fuel and would not manage nonaluminum-clad fuels. The amount of fuel
processed would remain the same. The storage options and new facility requirements would be similar to
those described for the Decentralization alternative, except that storage space for stainless-steel-clad and
zirconium-alloy-clad fuels would not be necessary. The Savannah River Site would undertake similar types
of research and development programs as those described for the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative. The
principal difference would be that nonaluminum-clad fuels would not be included under this alternative.
Regionalization 4B-If the Savannah River Site were selected as the Eastern Regional Site
for implementation of Regionalization 4B, eastern locations would transport aluminum-clad and
nonaluminum-clad fuels to the site. In addition, naval SNF might be transported to the Savannah River Site,
if the Eastern Regional Site were selected for naval fuels. The stabilization activities and options required
would be similar to those for the Decentralization alternative. The Savannah River Site would store the
nonaluminum fuels and either store or process the aluminum-clad fuels. The storage options and new facility
requirements would also be the same as those for the Decentralization alternative. The Savannah River Site
would undertake the same types of research and development programs as those described for the
Decentralization alternative. Current ongoing activities would continue. The Savannah River Site would also
conduct research and pilot-scale studies to determine the best technology for ultimate disposition of
aluminum-clad fuels.
If the Savannah River Site were not selected as the Eastern Regional Site, DOE would transport SNF
to the Oak Ridge Reservation. Some fuel would have to be stabilized before transport.
3.1.4.4 Oak Ridge Reservation.
Regionalization 4A-Under Regionalization 4A , the Oak Ridge Reservation would not
receive SNF and would transport its aluminum-clad SNF to the Savannah River Site. All other SNF would be
transported to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.
Regionalization 4B-If the Oak Ridge Reservation were selected as the Eastern Regional
Site for implementation of Regionalization 4B, the eastern locations would transport SNF to the Oak Ridge
Reservation for storage. In addition, naval SNF might be transported to the Oak Ridge Reservation if the
Eastern Regional Site were selected for naval fuel. SNF currently stored at other DOE facilities would arrive
at the Oak Ridge Reservation fully stabilized. New non-DOE domestic, foreign research reactor, and naval
SNF would arrive in a condition necessary for safe transportation but uncanned. This fuel would be
stabilized, prepared, and canned at the Oak Ridge Reservation to assure safe interim storage. Research and
development activities at the Oak Ridge Reservation would increase from current levels. A new SNF
management complex would be built, including (a) a SNF receiving and canning facility, (b) a technology
development facility, (c) an interim dry storage area, and (d) an expended core facility similar to the one at the
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.
The SNF receiving and canning facility would receive SNF cask shipments from offsite and prepare
the SNF for dry storage. A pool storage area would be included in this facility for cooling SNF before dry
storage. The technology development facility would be used to investigate the applicability of dry storage
technologies and pilot-scale technology development for disposition of the various types of SNF. The interim
dry storage area would consist of passive storage modules designed to safely store the SNF for 40 years.
Naval SNF would be examined at the new expended core facility at Oak Ridge before interim storage.
A small quantity of Molten Salt SNF is stored in tanks at the Oak Ridge Reservation. Currently,
technology to stabilize this SNF for transport does not exist. Under this alternative, if the Oak Ridge
Reservation were to transport SNF to the Savannah River Site, this Molten Salt SNF would continue to be
stored at the Oak Ridge Reservation until it could be stabilized for safe transport.
If the Oak Ridge Reservation were not selected as the Eastern Regional Site, almost all SNF at the
Oak Ridge Reservation would be transported to the Savannah River Site. Some SNF might not be
transported until a stabilization process is developed because of the current inability to stabilize some SNF
for transport. The option for acquiring dry storage facilities would support continued High Flux Isotope
Reactor operation during the transition period.
3.1.4.5 Nevada Test Site.
Regionalization 4A would not affect the Nevada Test Site because fuel
is not currently stored onsite and fuel would not be transported to the site.
If the Nevada Test Site were selected as the Western Regional Site for implementation of
Regionalization 4B, SNF from western locations would be transported to the Nevada Test Site for storage. In
addition, naval SNF might be transported to the Nevada Test Site if the Western Site were selected for naval
fuel. SNF currently stored at other DOE facilities would arrive at the Nevada Test Site fully stabilized. New
non-DOE domestic, foreign research reactor, and naval SNF would arrive in a state necessary for safe
transportation but uncanned. This fuel would be stabilized, prepared, and canned at the Nevada Test Site to
ensure safe interim storage. A new SNF management complex would be built including (a) an SNF receiving
and canning facility, (b) a technology development facility, (c) an interim dry storage area, and (d) an
expended core facility similar to the one at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (if Nevada Test Site
were selected for receipt of naval fuel).
The SNF receiving and canning facility would receive SNF cask shipments from offsite and prepare
the SNF for dry storage. A pool storage area would be included in this facility for cooling SNF, as necessary,
before dry storage. The technology development facility would be used to investigate the applicability of dry
storage technologies and pilot-scale technology development for disposal of the various types of SNF. The
interim dry storage area would consist of passive storage modules designed to safely store the SNF for 40
years. Naval fuel would be examined at the new expended core facility at the Nevada Test Site before interim
storage (if Nevada Test Site were selected for receipt of naval fuel).
If the Nevada Test Site were not selected as the Western Regional Site, then Regionalization 4B
would not be applicable to the Nevada Test Site because it does not generate or store SNF.
3.1.4.6 Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program.
Regionalization 4A-Under Regionalization 4A, the management of naval SNF would be
the same as for the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative. Naval SNF removed from naval reactors would
continue to be transported to the Expended Core Facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory for
examination. Following examination, the SNF would be transferred to the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant
for interim storage. Planned improvements for the Expended Core Facility, including additions to the Dry
Cell Facility, would be completed.
Regionalization 4B-Under Regionalization 4B, naval reactors would continue to be
defueled and refueled, and the SNF would be sent to either the Western or the Eastern Regional Site for
examination and storage.
If the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory were selected as the Western Regional Site, then naval
SNF would continue to be transported to the Expended Core Facility for examination. After examination, the
SNF would be transferred to the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant for storage. If another site were chosen for
storage, naval SNF would continue to be transported to the Expended Core Facility at the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory for examination until construction of a new nuclear fuel examination facility or
modification of an existing facility to perform the examinations at the selected site. The new facility would
provide capabilities equivalent to the Expended Core Facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.
3.1.4.7 Other Generator/Storage Locations.
Under Regionalization 4A, the activities
at the other generator and storage locations are the same as indicated for the 1992/1993 Planning Basis
alternative. The exact destination of SNF transported would vary depending on the fuel type under
Regionalization 4A and on the generation/storage location under Regionalization 4B.
3.1.5 Centralization
_________________________________________________________________________
Centralization Alternative
Manage all existing and projected SNF inventories at one site until
ultimate disposition.
Existing SNF would be transported to the centralized site.
Naval fuel would be transported to, examined, and stored at the
centralized site.
Projected SNF receipts would be transported to the centralized
site.
SNF processing might need to be conducted. Other forms of
stabilization might occur to provide for safe storage and/or
transport.
Facility upgrade/replacement and new storage capacity would be
provided at the centralized site; stabilization facilities would be
provided at the transporting sites.
Research and development would be undertaken for SNF
management, including stabilization technology.
_________________________________________________________________________
Under the
Centralization alternative, the
SNF that DOE is obligated to
manage would be transported
to a single location for
management. Potential sites
include the Hanford Site,
Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory, Savannah River
Site, Oak Ridge Reservation,
and Nevada Test Site. Table
3-5 summarizes the basic
actions at each site under this
alternative. Consequently, this
alternative has five options
(Options A through
E)-centralization at each of
the five potential sites. For
the five sites designated under
the Centralization alternative, the following discussion comprises two parts. The first part addresses the
implications for the site if it were selected as the receiving site (that is, the centralization site). The second
part presents the implications to the site if it were not selected as the centralization site, but currently
managed SNF would be transported to the centralized site.
Regardless of the option selected, new facilities would be built at the selected site to accommodate the
increased inventories. Some SNF would require stabilization, such as canning, before transport. SNF
facilities at the transporting sites would then be closed. Activities related to the processing of SNF, including
research and development and pilot programs, would also be centralized. Figure 3-6 shows the movement of
fuel from 1995 through 2035 under this alternative.
For consolidation at sites other than the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, a new expended core
facility with capabilities comparable to the one in Idaho would be constructed, and the Idaho facility would be
closed. Naval SNF would continue to be transported to the Expended Core Facility at the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory during a transition period, pending construction of storage and examination facilities
at the central site.
3.1.5.1 Hanford Site.
Under the Centralization alternative, Option A, DOE-controlled and naval
reactor SNF would be transported to the Hanford Site. This would require the completion of
Figure 3-6. Spent nuclear fuel distribution, location, and inventory for the Centralization alternative.the upgrades, increases, and replacements of storage capacity identified for the existing inventory under the
Decentralization alternative, as well as of the additional capacity within those facilities or new facilities to
accommodate the SNF from the other sites and possibly a stabilization facility.
New facilities would also be required to receive, handle, and store offsite fuel. In addition, a new
facility for research and development and pilot programs would be required to support ultimate disposition.
An expended core facility would also be built at the Hanford Site.
If the Hanford Site were not selected for storage, Hanford would have to consolidate and prepare
onsite SNF for transport to the central site. Some of the SNF would require stabilization before offsite
transport, which would require a new facility similar to the one described in the Decentralization alternative.
Additional casks and associated handling equipment compatible with the receiving capabilities at the central
site might also be required. After transport of the SNF, related facilities at the Hanford Site would be closed.
3.1.5.2 Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.
If Option B were selected under the
Centralization alternative, the Hanford Site, the Savannah River Site, and other DOE facilities would
characterize, stabilize, and can the SNF in containers compatible with dry storage at the Idaho Chemical
Processing Plant. Naval SNF removed from naval reactors would be transported to the Expended Core
Facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.
Projects and activities for storage of SNF would be similar to those described for the 1992/1993
Planning Basis alternative, except that accelerated schedules for the Increased Rack Capacity and Additional
Increased Rack Capacity projects would be necessary to accommodate the increased fuel receipts. In
addition, the schedule for the Dry Fuel Storage Facility project would have to be accelerated and its scope
expanded.
DOE would conduct maximum SNF research and development. Similar to the Regionalization
alternative, the Electrometallurgical Process Demonstration Project would continue at Argonne National
Laboratory-West.
If the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory were not selected as the storage site, a canning and
characterization facility would be constructed at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant to stabilize the different
types of Idaho National Engineering Laboratory SNF in various shipping casks and storage containers before
transport to the selected DOE facility.
Like the No Action alternative, the CPP-603 Underwater Fuel Storage Facility pool inventory would
be transferred to existing dry storage facilities until it is transported offsite. The dry fuels storage facility
would not be built. SNF-related facilities at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory would be closed,
except for facilities directly supporting operating reactors, such as the Advanced Test Reactor canal or the
Argonne National Laboratory-West Fuel Cycle Facility.
SNF-related research and development activities would be phased out, although the
Electrometallurgical Process Demonstration Project would continue at the Argonne National Laboratory-
West Fuel Cycle Facility (but would process only SNF currently on the site). Similar to the No Action
alternative, naval SNF would not be transported to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, and the
Expended Core Facility would be shut down.
3.1.5.3 Savannah River Site.
If Option C were selected under the Centralization alternative, the
Savannah River Site would receive all DOE and naval SNF. Major new facilities, including an expended core
facility for naval fuels, would have to be constructed. Near-term actions and options would be similar to
those described for the Decentralization alternative.
The activities and options for management of the aluminum-clad fuel would be similar to those
described for the Decentralization alternative. Fuels received from other sites would be stored.
The Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuels and reactor disassembly basins would be used to meet near-
term storage requirements for the current inventory of Savannah River Site SNF in the same manner as
described for the Decentralization alternative. The Savannah River Site would build large-capacity wet or dry
storage facilities for the SNF received. In addition, SNF receiving, characterization, and canning facilities
would be necessary, and an expended core facility would be built onsite for examination of naval SNF.
Projects would be initiated to design characterization, canning, and storage facilities for the fuel types
that the Savannah River Site would manage. Additional research would be conducted to develop
requirements for the ultimate disposition of the SNF.
If the Savannah River Site were not selected as the centralized storage site, it would have to transport
onsite SNF to the central site after stabilizing any fuel that is not safe for transport. No new storage facilities
would be necessary because the Savannah River Site would maintain the SNF in the existing pools (as
described for the Decentralization alternative) until moving it to the characterization facility before transport.
The Savannah River Site would construct new characterization and canning facilities to prepare the SNF for
transport. In addition, research would be conducted on stabilization and transport of aluminum-clad fuel that
is heavily corroded.
3.1.5.4 Oak Ridge Reservation.
If Option D were selected under the Centralization alternative,
the Oak Ridge Reservation would receive DOE SNF stabilized and canned to the extent necessary for safe
transportation. The SNF might need to be uncanned, stabilized, prepared, and recanned at the Oak Ridge
Reservation, however, to ensure safe interim storage. New non-DOE domestic, foreign research reactor, and
naval SNF would arrive in a form suitable for safe transportation. If necessary, this fuel would be stabilized,
prepared, and canned at the Oak Ridge Reservation to ensure safe interim storage. Research and
development activities would increase from current levels. A new SNF management complex would be built,
including (a) an SNF receiving and canning facility, (b) a technology development facility, (c) an interim dry
storage area, and (d) an expended core facility similar to the one currently at the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory.
The SNF receiving and canning facility would receive SNF cask shipments from offsite and prepare
the SNF for dry storage. A pool storage area would be included in this facility for cooling SNF before it is
placed into dry storage, as necessary. The applicability of dry storage technologies and pilot-scale technology
development for ultimate disposition of the various types of SNF would be investigated in the technology
development facility. The interim dry storage area would consist of passive storage modules designed to
safely store the SNF. Naval SNF would be examined at the expended core facility before storage.
A small quantity of Molten Salt SNF is stored in tanks at the Oak Ridge Reservation. Currently,
technology to stabilize this SNF for transport does not exist. Under this alternative, if the Oak Ridge
Reservation were to transport SNF to the Savannah River Site, this Molten Salt SNF would continue to be
stored at the Oak Ridge Reservation until it could be stabilized for safe transport.
If the Oak Ridge Reservation were not selected as the centralization site, then almost all SNF at the
Oak Ridge Reservation would be transported to the centralization site. The option for acquiring dry storage
facilities would support continued High Flux Isotope Reactor operation during the transition period.
3.1.5.5 Nevada Test Site.
If Option E were selected under the Centralization alternative, the
Nevada Test Site would receive DOE SNF stabilized and canned to the extent necessary for safe
transportation. (However, the SNF might need to be uncanned, stabilized, prepared, and recanned at the
Nevada Test Site to ensure safe interim storage.) New non-DOE domestic, foreign research reactor, and
naval SNF would arrive in a state necessary for safe transportation but uncanned. This fuel would be
stabilized, prepared, and canned at the Nevada Test Site to ensure safe interim storage. A new SNF
management complex would be built, including (a) an SNF receiving and canning facility, (b) a technology
development facility, (c) an interim dry storage area, and (d) an expended core facility similar to the one
currently at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.
The SNF receiving and canning facility would receive SNF cask shipments from offsite and prepare
the SNF for dry storage. A pool storage area would be included in this facility for cooling SNF before it is
placed into dry storage, as necessary. The applicability of dry storage technologies and pilot-scale technology
development for disposal of the various types of SNF would be investigated in the technology development
facility. The interim dry storage area would consist of passive storage modules designed to safely store the
SNF for 40 years. Naval SNF would be examined at the expended core facility before interim storage.
If the Nevada Test Site were not selected as the centralization site, then this alternative would not be
applicable to the Nevada Test Site because it neither generates nor stores SNF.
3.1.5.6 Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program.
Under the Centralization alternative, naval SNF
would be transported to the selected site for examination and storage. If a site other than the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory were selected, then a transition period would be required, during which naval SNF
would be transported to the Expended Core Facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory and a new
expended core facility at the central site would be constructed. No actions would be needed to prepare the
naval SNF for storage because of its corrosion resistance, high integrity, and strength.
3.1.5.7 Other Generator/Storage Locations.
Under the Centralization alternative, SNF would
be transferred from the other generator and storage loca-
tions to the central storage site. Although the
shipment destination may vary, the impacts from SNF operations at these locations would be the same as
those identified in the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative.
3.2 Alternatives Eliminated from Detailed Analysis
In the process of evaluating management alternatives available to the DOE, several other management
concepts and technologies have been considered for incorporation into the programmatic alternatives
described in Section 3.1. The following section describes the concepts and technologies considered and not
carried forward and identifies why they have been eliminated from detailed analysis.
3.2.1 Examine or Store Spent Nuclear Fuel in Foreign Facilities
The design and operating characteristics of the fuel for naval reactors and certain portions of other
SNF are classified. As such, they are not releasable to foreign interests without going through a complex
procedure prescribed in the Atomic Energy Act and strict U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing
requirements. Some of these classified design details and characteristics are obvious from the physical form
of the fuel, and others could be learned from detailed examination or analyses. The United States Nuclear
Weapons Nonproliferation Policy is summarized in the White House Fact Sheet on Nonproliferation and
Export Control Policy, dated September 27, 1993 (White House 1993). Under its nuclear nonproliferation
policy, the United States seeks to reduce or eliminate, where possible, the accumulation of stockpiles of
highly enriched uranium or plutonium. These factors, along with others such as the security required for
foreign transport and storage, make this alternative impractical. Based on these considerations, this
alternative was eliminated from detailed analysis.
3.2.2 Leave Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel in Nuclear-Powered Ships
It is physically possible to retain SNF in the reactors in nuclear-powered vessels and moor the ships at
shipyards until a decision on the ultimate disposition of the SNF is determined and implemented, and the fuel
could then be removed from the ships.
Implementing this alternative would require extensive modifications to facilities at shipyards,
including increasing the number of piers and the availability of waterfront utilities to support the ships at their
moorings. Other shipyard facilities also might have to be modified or replaced in order to moor the numbers
of ships involved during the 40-year period. The construction of piers and other needed facilities would cause
impacts on the waterfronts and harbors and could affect the local ecology. Shipyard facilities would become
overloaded with the requirement to moor vessels retaining their SNF onboard and skilled shipyard staff would
be unable to continue to work on the operational fleet.
In addition, the costs and impacts on national security resulting from such an approach would be
large; it would affect the ability of the U.S. Navy to carry out its mission. The costs of maintaining the ships
with SNF remaining installed under Navy operating procedures and of providing the additional piers,
waterfront services, and utilities would be large, both for ships that are to be decommissioned and for ships
that would normally be refueled and returned to duty. (Failure to remove the SNF from Navy ships that are
still needed for service would result in these ships being unavailable once their currently installed reactor fuel
reaches the end of useful life.)
3.2.3 Alternate Sites for the Management of Spent Nuclear Fuel
An alternative SNF site selection process was undertaken to identify alternatives to the three major
DOE sites-Hanford Site, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, and Savannah River Site. The candidate
sites evaluated, site selection screening process, and results are presented in the Alternate Site Selection
Decision Process Report (DOE-ID 1994). This study concluded that the uncertainties regarding Department
of Defense sites together with their lack of SNF facilities and expertise made these additional Department of
Defense sites less attractive as site alternatives. The alternative SNF site selection process resulted in the
addition of the Nevada Test Site and Oak Ridge Reservation as potential regionalization and centralization
sites for SNF management. The Oak Ridge Reservation represented a reasonable alternative site to the
Savannah River Site for regionalization of Eastern-based SNF and the Nevada Test Site represented a
reasonable alternative site to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory or Hanford sites for regionalization
of Western-based SNF. These two sites also represented options for centralization of all SNF management
activities. However, the DOE did not consider the Nevada Test Site to be a preferred site for the management
of SNF because of the State of Nevada's current role as the host site for the Yucca Mountain Site
Characterization Project and the Nevada Test Site's lack of SNF management facilities and high-level waste
infrastructure. For purposes of conducting a thorough National Environmental Policy Act analysis, the
Nevada Test Site provides a contrast to other potential sites because it represents a site that has no existing
SNF infrastructure. Non-DOE sites were eliminated from further analysis.
3.2.4 Chemical Separation/Processing of Spent Nuclear Fuel
Three potential technical management options were evaluated for chemical separation/processing of
DOE SNF. However, DOE will not select SNF technical management options on the basis of Volume 1 of
this EIS. These technology-based decisions are most appropriately made after detailed analysis on a fuel
type-specific or site-specific basis. The three options include (a) chemical separation/processing in DOE
facilities at the Hanford Site, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, and Savannah River Site; (b) chemical
separation/processing in foreign commercial facilities; and, (c) chemical separation/processing in domestic
commercial facilities.
Chemical separation/processing at DOE sites was evaluated under certain alternatives as a reasonably
foreseeable activity as a SNF stabilization technology. This activity is discussed in Section 3.1 of this EIS.
However, the evaluation was limited to certain alternatives and certain fuel types based largely on historical
technologies and capabilities. Future technology-based SNF management decisions would be made only after
further National Environmental Policy Act reviews were completed.
Several foreign commercial facilities exist that have the capability to process certain types of DOE
SNF. An analysis of processing DOE SNF at those facilities would have to consider United States nuclear
nonproliferation policy (with regard to highly enriched uranium and plutonium), national security concerns
(with regard to the classified nature of naval fuel), and other technical considerations (with regard to
transportation of wet fuel, processing capability in foreign facilities, possible fuel instability, etc.). There are
certain fuel types addressed in this EIS for which management by processing in a foreign facility may be
considered appropriate. In such instances, final decisions on technology-based options would be made based
on further analysis in other site-specific or fuel type-specific National Environmental Policy Act reviews
tiered from this EIS. For example, in a separate EIS on a Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy
Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel, DOE addresses foreign processing of the foreign
research reactor SNF included in this EIS as a potential management alternative.
In response to public comment, Appendix A, Volume 1 of this EIS includes an analysis of
transporting N-Reactor and Single-Pass Reactor SNF currently stored at the Hanford Site to a site in England
for processing. The impacts identified by this analysis are considered to be representative of the impacts of
transporting and handling any specific DOE SNF that might be considered for foreign processing, because N-
Reactor SNF is low-enriched SNF and is a large fraction (in MTHM) of the currently stored inventory. In
addition, the analysis included transportation routes that maximize foreign and domestic distances. A
summary of these transportation impacts is included in Appendix I, Volume 1 of this EIS.
Domestic commercial facilities are not available for SNF processing for interim storage and, therefore,
were eliminated from further consideration.
3.2.5 Preparations for Disposal
DOE has not yet decided whether the ultimate disposition for DOE SNF is disposal in a repository or
removal/recycle of the fissile material (primarily uranium). Disposal of SNF would require (a) development
of the repository waste acceptance criteria, and (b) completion of the characterization of the various types of
SNF that would allow a determination of the specific technology needed for SNF preparation (processing,
canning, etc.) for each fuel type. Because of the large number of uncertainties at this time, it is considered too
speculative to include in this EIS at this time. Therefore, preparation for disposal in a geologic repository
was eliminated from further evaluation in this EIS.
3.3 Comparison of Alternatives
As discussed in Chapter 5 and the site-specific appendices, the environmental consequences and,
therefore, differences among the five SNF management alternatives addressed in Section 3.1 would be small.
The comparison of alternatives in this section concentrates on (a) the areas in which the public has expressed
considerable interest, and (b) programmatic factors important to DOE decisionmaking. The following factors
were selected for comparison:
Number of SNF shipments among sites
Public health effects
SNF-related employment
Generation of radioactive waste
Impact on DOE or Navy missions
Cost of implementation.
The alternatives that would cause the smallest impacts in these areas maximize the use of existing facilities,
staff, and infrastructure.
3.3.1 Number of Shipments
Figure 3-7 shows the number of shipments that would occur under each alternative.
Figure 3-7 also quantifies shipments of test specimens under each alternative. Shipments of naval test
specimens are included here because of their contribution to cumulative impacts of naval SNF transportation.
Details concerning naval test specimens and methodologies for calculating impacts of specimen shipments
can be found in Appendix D. The No Action alternative would involve a limited number of naval spent fuel
shipments (200) and test specimen shipments (320). The Decentralization alternative, 1992/1993 Planning
Basis alternative, and Regionalization 4A alternative mostly involve shipments to DOE sites from the smaller
reactor and storage sites and from the naval sites to DOE sites. These shipments range in number from
approximately 2,300 shipments under Decentralization Options A or B to approximately 4,500 under the
Regionalization 4A alternative. Decentralization Option C and the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative
have approximately 3,200 and 3,700 shipments, respectively, over the 40-year period. For the
Regionalization 4B alternative and the Centralization options, SNF is transported to one or two sites. For
these alternatives and options, the number of shipments range from approximately 5,500 under the
Regionalization 4B alternative (Idaho National Engineering Laboratory and Savannah River Site) to a high of
about 9,200 under the Centralization Option E (centralization at the Nevada Test Site). The number of
shipments is
Figure 3-7. Number of spent nuclear fuel and test specimen shipments between the years 1995and 2035.
summarized in Table 3-6. A more detailed discussion can be found in Appendices D and I of Volume 1. The
public health effects from such shipments are discussed in the next section.
3.3.2 Public Health Effects
This section discusses the public health effects from radiation exposure and traffic accidents under
DOE's SNF Management Program (see Section 5.1.1.4 for basic information regarding assessment methods).
These effects are estimated to be small, as shown by Figures 3-8, 3-9, and 3-10. The three sources of
radiation exposure are (a) normal site operations, (b) transportation, and (c) accidents. Under all alternatives,
the estimated number of latent cancer fatalities from the operation of the entire DOE SNF management
system over a 40-year period would range from approximately zero to about two latent cancer fatalities.
3.3.2.1 Normal Operations.
In general, the greatest radiation exposure from normal SNF site
activities and incident-free transportation results when large quantities of SNF are transported among sites,
such as under the Regionalization 4B alternative or Centralization alternative. Under incident-free
transportation, as noted in Table 3-7, the estimated total fatalities are less than two for all alternatives, with
the highest estimates associated with the Centralization options. This reflects the higher number of
shipments associated with these options.
In summary, estimated radiation impacts on public health are small for all alternatives (which include
many different siting options), and it would, therefore, not be possible to materially reduce the impacts
through a site selection process.
3.3.2.2 Accidents.
Transportation accidents pose the lowest risk of cancer fatalities (although the
consequences of some accidents can be high). The accident risks are presented in
Table 3-8. The results indicated that the risks associated with traffic fatalities are greater than the risks
associated with cancer caused by radiation exposure. Both normal site operations and incident-free
transportation have greater risk than that expected from transportation accidents when the probability and the
consequences of potential accidents are considered. The latent cancer fatalities associated with onsite
accidents is small across alternatives. The transportation accident with the largest consequences would lead
to 55 latent cancer fatalities; the probability of occurrence is
1.1 10-7 per year (1 in 10 million years) (see Appendix I).
In summary, for radiation-induced latent cancer fatalities to the public over 40 years of SNF
management under all of the alternatives evaluated, the most likely outcome is as follows:
Essentially zero latent cancer fatalities from normal facility operations and facility accidents
Essentially zero latent cancer fatalities from transportation accidents
Table 3-6. Number of offsite spent nuclear fuel and test specimen shipments by alternative.
Maximum number of shipments
__________________________________________________
Alternative Test
Spent fuel shipments(a) specimen shipment(b)
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
No Action 200 320
Decentralization Option A 2,000 320
Option B 2,000 320
Option C 2,900 320
1992/1993 Planning Basis 2,900 760
Regionalization 4A 3,700 760
Regionalization 4B
Hanford Site/Savannah River Site 4,800 1,750
Idaho National Engineering 4,600 760
Laboratory/Savannah River Site
Nevada Test Site/Savannah River Site 6,600 1,750
Hanford Site/Oak Ridge Reservation 5,600 1,750
Idaho National Engineering 5,400 760
Laboratory/Oak Ridge Reservation
Nevada Test Site/Oak Ridge Reservation
7,300 1,750
Centralization
Hanford Site 5,700 1,750
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory 5,500 760
Savannah River Site 6,600 1,750
Oak Ridge Reservation 7,300 1,750
Nevada Test Site 7,400 1,750
_____________________
a. Assuming naval SNF shipments by rail and DOE SNF by truck.
b. Test specimens by truck.
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Figure 3-8. Maximum estimated number of latent cancer fatalities per year in the generalpopulation from normal spent nuclear fuel site operations and total fatalities from incident-free
transportation.
Figure 3-9. Estimate of risk of latent cancer fatalities in general population from facilityaccidents for spent nuclear fuel management activities.
Figure 3-10. Estimate of average annual riskb from transportation accidents for spent nuclearfuel management activities.
Table 3-7. Comparison of incident-free transportation total fatalities for alternatives over the 40-year period.
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Minimum(a,b) Maximum(b,c)
total total
fatalities fatalities
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
No Action 0.0089 0.0089
Decentralization 0.12 to 0.15 0.35 to 0.38
1992/1993 Planning Basis 0.14 0.45
Regionalization 4A (fuel type) 0.17 0.61
Regionalization 4B (geography)
Idaho National Engineering Labor- 0.15 to 0.17 0.51 to 0.53
atory and Savannah River Site
Idaho National Engineering Labor- 0.14 to 0.15 0.53 to 0.54
atory Ridge Reservation
Hanford Site and Savannah River Site 0.17 0.55 to 0.56
Hanford Site and Oak Ridge Reserva- 0.15 0.57
tion
Nevada Test Site and Savannah River 0.19 0.88
Site
Nevada Test Site and Oak Ridge Reser-0.17 0.90
vation
Centralization
Hanford Site 0.23 1.3
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory0.21 1.1
Savannah River Site 0.26 1.7
Oak Ridge Reservation 0.21 1.6
Nevada Test Site 0.26 1.6
_________________________
a. The minimum total fatalities are associated with transport of DOE fuel by rail; naval SNF shipments
are by both truck (onsite) and rail (offsite).
b. Total fatalities are for the 40-year period 1995 through 2035 and were the sum of the estimated
number of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities for workers and the general population and the
estimated number of nonradiological fatalities from vehicle emissions.
c. The maximum total fatalities are associated with transport of DOE fuel by truck; naval SNF
shipments are by both truck (onsite) and rail (offsite).
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Table 3-8. Comparison of estimated transportation accident risks for alternatives over the 40-year period.
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Truck accident risks(a) Rail accident risks(a)
__________________________________________________________________________
Alternative
Latent cancer Latent
fatalities Traffic fatalities cancer fatalities Traffic fatalities
No Action 4.1 X 10^-6 0.047 4.1 X 10^-6 0.047
Decentralization(b) 0.00085 to 0.20 to 1.01 0.00029 to 0.26 to 1.07
0.00090 0.00034
1992/1993 Planning Basis 0.0010 0.70 0.00035 0.73
Regionalization 4A (fuel type) 0.0011 0.77 0.00037 0.76
Regionalization 4B (geography)
Idaho National Engineering0.00090 0.72 0.00034 0.73
Laboratory and Savannah
River Site
Idaho National Engineering0.00095 0.73 0.00024 0.72
Laboratory and Oak Ridge
Reservation
Hanford Site and Savannah 0.0013 0.84 0.00075 0.82
River Site
Hanford Site and Oak Ridge0.0013 0.81 0.00050 0.78
Reservation
Nevada Test Site and 0.0012 0.99 0.00045 0.91
Savannah River Site
Nevada Test Site and Oak 0.0012 1.00 0.00035 0.91
Ridge Reservation
Centralization
Hanford Site 0.0050 1.10 0.0013 1.05
Idaho National Engineering0.0048 1.00 0.0013 0.95
Laboratory
Savannah River Site 0.0020 1.44 0.00080 1.09
Oak Ridge Reservation 0.0017 1.35 0.00055 1.00
Nevada Test Site 0.0050 1.33 0.0014 1.19
_______________________________
a. Assumes SNF shipments are 100 percent by truck or 100 percent by rail, except for naval SNF shipments that are by both truck
(onsite) and rail (offsite).
b. Range of values in each column for the Decentralization alternative reflects the different fuel examination options for naval
SNF.
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Up to about one latent cancer fatality from most incident-free transportation scenarios; up to
two latent cancer fatalities under the Centralization options
Up to about two fatalities from nonradiological traffic accidents.
A more detailed discussion of accidents is found in Chapter 5, Volume 1 of this EIS.
3.3.3 Employment Related to Spent Nuclear Fuel Management at DOE and Naval Sites
Under various alternatives, the total labor force involved in SNF management could decrease by 180
jobs or increase by more than 2,100 jobs averaged over the period 1995 to 2005, as compared to the 1995
baseline. This labor force is the sum of permanent employment in operating or maintaining new facilities and
shorter term construction jobs. Figures 3-11 and 3-12 characterize the range of SNF jobs under each
alternative. The number of jobs related to SNF management is small compared with the total number of jobs
(2 to 4.5 percent) at the sites that would be involved in SNF management. SNF management-related jobs
account for less than 4.5 percent of total employment at the sites and less than 8 percent of employment at
any one site.
It is important to note that the relocation of large amounts of SNF under the Regionalization 4B
alternative and the Centralization options would eventually result in closure of SNF management facilities at
major DOE sites and, therefore, long-term job loss at the closed facilities. However, some of the job losses at
closed facilities would be accompanied by job gains at the sites receiving the fuel shipments. In addition,
from 1995 to 2005 several management actions already initiated at various sites to maintain a safe storage
configuration for existing SNF will be completed, and much of the SNF would need to be stabilized before
transport. In the near term, the combination of building facilities at some sites and stabilizing SNF before
transport at other sites complicates estimating the near-term SNF employment situation.
Under the No Action alternative, employment would not increase substantially at any site, and the
closure of the Expended Core Facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory would result in a net loss
of just over 500 jobs involved in SNF management following closure. The maximum number of jobs
indicated in Figure 3-11 assumes processing for stabilization and reports the maximum number for options at
each site.
For any of the alternatives, no more than an average additional 2,100 jobs over the period 1995 to
2005 would be required for implementation. Some of the larger SNF employment requirements (particularly
those involving the Hanford Site) would be caused by the development and operation of processing facilities
needed to stabilize stored SNF. If processing were not undertaken, less employment would be generated at
those sites. In addition, the relocation of the Expended Core Facility to sites other than the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory would result in an increase of
Figure 3-11. Change in the number of jobs averaged over the years 1995 to 2005 for spentnuclear fuel management activities.
Figure 3-12. Change in site employment between the years 1995 and 2005 for spent nuclearfuel management activities as a percent of 1995 baseline.
about 500 jobs per year in the support of naval SNF examinations at those sites and would result in a
corresponding loss of approximately 500 jobs at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. However,
regionalization with the Nevada Test Site as the Western Regional Site and the Oak Ridge Reservation as the
Eastern Regional Site would result in the highest employment peak. The peak, estimated to be approximately
4,600 jobs in the year 2000, includes employment at sites preparing SNF for transport to the selected sites.
A more detailed discussion of socioeconomic impacts can be found in Chapter 5, Volume 1 of this
EIS.
3.3.4 Generation of Radioactive Wastes
When SNF is stored onsite, very little high-level, transuranic, or mixed waste is generated (see Figure
3-13). These small quantities of radioactive wastes would usually be generated during stabilization activities.
As a result, under the No Action alternative fewer than 20 cubic meters per year (26 cubic yards per year) of
transuranic wastes would be generated from SNF management nationwide because SNF would not be
stabilized. Under the other alternatives, where stabilization activities are assumed to occur, it is estimated
that between 20 and 190 cubic meters (26 and 250 cubic yards) of high-level waste and between 20 and 90
cubic meters (26 and 120 cubic yards) of transuranic waste would be generated each year (Figure 3-13). The
lower generation rates would occur in the Decentralization alternative, where small amounts of SNF would be
transported among major DOE sites (and stabilization for transport would not be necessary). For other
alternatives, greater amounts of SNF would be transported among sites; therefore, more SNF would require
stabilization before transport and more waste would be generated. The difference between the minimum and
maximum volume of waste generated results principally from the contribution attributable to processing for
stabilization.
Low-level waste is also generated as a result of SNF management. Figure 3-14 indicates the
estimated annual volume for each of the alternatives. As previously noted for high-level, transuranic, and
mixed waste, the higher values are principally the result of processing for stabilization.
A more detailed discussion of radioactive waste generation under each alternative can be found in
Chapter 5, Volume 1 of this EIS.
3.3.5 Impacts on DOE and Navy Missions
The concerns for the missions of DOE and the Navy relate to storing SNF safely, meeting obligations,
preparing SNF for ultimate disposal, and examining naval SNF.
3.3.5.1 Impacts on DOE.
The DOE mission regarding the safe storage of SNF is impacted in the
No Action alternative. Under this alternative, DOE will initially suffer from a loss of margin
Figure 3-13. Average volume of high-level, transuranic, and mixed waste generated per yearover the years 1995 to 2005 for spent nuclear fuel management activities.
Figure 3-14. Average volume of low-level wastes generated per year over the years 1995to 2005 for spent nuclear fuel management activities.
in storage capacity. In addition, DOE may be impacted by needing to make more frequent repairs to existing
facilities (potentially losing the use of a facility because it is beyond repair). In time, there would be little or
no flexibility for repairs under the No Action alternative.
Additionally, by limiting research and development to activities already approved, DOE's ability to
safely store SNF would be impacted by being unable to conduct new research and development. The No
Action alternative would not permit development of processing and other technologies except for those
underway as of June 1995.
Under the No Action alternative, DOE would not satisfy its obligations associated with SNF from
university reactors, other research reactors, and special-case commercial SNF. Also, under the No Action
alternative, DOE might not be able to fulfill agreements with states or other Federal agencies that involve
SNF, except those specific actions already in progress, unless the agreements are changed. Failure to meet
the terms of these agreements would expose DOE to adverse legal actions. In addition, DOE would not
proceed, as it has proposed, to establish a new policy for management of foreign research reactor fuel that
contains United States origin uranium (see Section 1.2.4). These mission impacts could be avoided under any
alternative but the No Action alternative.
The DOE recognizes a need, which is not yet well defined, to prepare SNF for its ultimate disposition.
At this point, the processing and other technology required for ultimate disposition are not precisely known.
Under the No Action alternative, no new facilities or new research and development would be allowed. The
No Action alternative would not permit development of processing and other technologies except for those
begun as of June 1995. Although the acceptance
criteria for DOE-managed SNF have not yet been defined and repository disposal may permit canned SNF,
alternative approaches for ultimate disposition must be developed. By not allowing this development under
this alternative, DOE would be unable to meet one of the major goals of the SNF
Management Program. For the No Action alternative, no facilities could be built for converting SNF to forms
acceptable for disposition. In addition, with facilities storing SNF throughout the country, more canning or
other processing facilities might be required than are currently planned. Building additional facilities at
multiple locations would impede efficient disposition of SNF produced at small reactor sites. Other
alternatives would allow research and development to proceed as deemed appropriate to support stabilization.
3.3.5.2 Impacts on the Navy.
The Navy would incur large storage costs under the No Action and
Decentralization alternatives. In addition, the Navy mission would be hindered if the full examination of
fuels at an expended core facility were not possible. Full examination would not happen under the No Action
alternative and Decentralization Options A and B. The examinations are a critical aspect of the Naval
Nuclear Propulsion Program's ongoing advanced fuel research and development program. They provide
engineering data on nuclear reactor environments, material
behavior, and design performance. These data support
The design of new reactors having extended lifetimes
Continued safety of naval reactors
Improvements in nuclear fuel performance and ship operational performance
The operation of existing naval reactors by providing confirmation of their proper design and
allowing maximum depletion of their fuel.
The verification of engineering methods and models to design naval nuclear fuel.
Although it is difficult to quantify the benefits of an outstanding safety record and improved
operational characteristics, increased core life yields an economic advantage-a reduction in the number of
reactor cores that must be procured and in the number of refuelings that must be performed. It also results in
less SNF being generated. Another advantage is the increased online availability of nuclear-powered ships
with life-of-ship fuel, which would reduce the number of ships required. About $5 billion would be saved if
life-of-ship fuels are developed, based on an assumed force structure of fewer than 100 nuclear-powered
ships by 2005. Additional details can be found in Appendix D, Volume 1 of this EIS.
3.3.6 Cost of Implementation
The DOE prepared and issued in March 1995 a cost evaluation report (DOE 1995b) that provides
insight for short- and long-term planning for DOE complex-wide SNF management. This report was also
used to provide costs relevant to this EIS. This section provides potential costs associated with the
management of DOE SNF for the 40-year period evaluated in this EIS.
3.3.6.1 Results.
Table 3-9 provides a range of costs for interim storage. Because of the very broad
scope associated with complex-wide SNF management and the uncertain nature of future actions, "best
estimate" costs cannot be developed at this time. The degree to which existing facilities factor into a given
alternative can vary. To account for this, each alternative was analyzed for two cost ranges to define the
possible spread of cost for each alternative. The upper and lower cost ranges were defined as follows:
Upper Cost Range - Assumed construction of new facilities, except for a limited number judged
adequate for 40 years.
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Table 3-9. Cost results for storage only (billions of dollars).
Alternatives
Upper Lower
range range
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
No Action (1) 17.4 10.6
Decentralization-no examination (2A) 17.9 8.6
Decentralization-limited examination (2B) 18.1 8.9
Decentralization-full examination (2C) 20.1 10.8
1992/1993 Planning Basis (3) 18.0 9.4
Regionalization by fuel type (4A) 17.6 9.1
Regionalization by geography (4B)a 16.0 9.6
Centralization at Hanford (5A) 15.4 13.5
Centralization at Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (5B) 13.8 11.9
Centralization at Savannah River Site (5C) 15.1 9.5
Centralization at Oak Ridge Reservation (5D) 17.1 15.1
Centralization at Nevada Test Site (5E) 17.5 15.3
___________________
a. All options were considered, however, only Idaho National Engineering Laboratory and Savannah River
Site costs are shown.
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Lower Cost Range - Assumed existing facilities used at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
and the Savannah River Site but no existing facilities used at Hanford. Facility upgrades were
limited to Phase III vulnerability costs (DOE 1994c).
3.3.6.2 Discussion and Conclusions.
Table 3-9 shows that Alternatives 1, 2A, 2B, 3, or 4A
are roughly equivalent. This is because most of the SNF would be located at the same sites (Hanford, Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory, and Savannah River Site) in each alternative. Alternative 4B costs less
than Alternative 3 because all SNF would be moved to two sites (Idaho National Engineering Laboratory and
Savannah River Site), which have existing infrastructures, and economies of scale (fewer sites cost less)
dictate that two sites would be less costly than three. The table also shows that if new facilities are required,
it would be least expensive to centralize SNF management at a site with existing SNF management
infrastructure (that is, Alternatives 5A, 5B, or 5C). Transportation costs, which are typically 1 percent of
total costs, would not be an overriding consideration in the selection of locations for SNF management.
In the lower cost range, if existing facilities can continue to be used, it would be least expensive to
manage fuel under alternatives that maximize the use of sites with existing capabilities (that is, Alternatives
2A, 2B, 4A, or 4B). The centralization alternatives, which would require the construction of storage
facilities, could cost up to $6.7 billion more that the least costly alternative (2A). Before drawing conclusions
based on the lower cost range results, however, the reader should recognize that the selection of an approach
using existing facilities, combined with a commitment to upgrade facilities [over and above correction of
vulnerabilities (DOE 1994c)] may significantly change the cost comparisons. In this situation, cost would
tend to increase toward the upper cost range.
Additional details can be found in DOE (1995b). This report is available in the DOE Public Reading
rooms listed in the EIS, or upon request from the Office of Communications, DOE Idaho Operations Office
at the address listed in the front of the EIS.
3.3.7 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Licensing Standards
DOE is proceeding with actions to implement safe, efficient, and cost-effective interim storage of its
SNF before final disposition. The need for interim storage has led DOE to evaluate storage technologies and
alternative management strategies to provide an optimum solution to storage challenges. Several commercial
storage technologies under evaluation for DOE SNF have been licensed and regulated by the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. In addition, DOE SNF could eventually come under the jurisdiction of the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission if it is to be disposed of in a geologic repository. Therefore, DOE is
considering having any new interim storage facilities reviewed to determine whether they could meet U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing standards. This approach, if implemented, would provide a testing
ground for the development of the technical and administrative protocols between the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission and DOE in the event that some type of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
regulatory oversight occurs in the future.