1. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is evaluating its options for two separate but related sets of
decisions pertinent to the management of the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) for which the DOE is responsible. As
a result, this Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is divided into two parts. Volume 1 involves
programmatic (DOE-wide) approaches to the management of DOE's SNF; Volume 2 discusses site-specific
approaches for environmental restoration and waste management activities at the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory, including SNF management. This EIS has been prepared in accordance with the National
Environmental Policy Act and its applicable implementing regulations (40 CFR Parts 1500-1508 and 10
CFR Part 1021).
The DOE's proposed action for Volume 1 is to safely, efficiently, and responsibly manage existing
and projected quantities of DOE's SNF through the year 2035, pending ultimate disposition. Volume 1 has
been developed to support DOE's decisionmaking on the most appropriate location for implementing national
strategies for managing DOE's SNF until its ultimate disposition is determined and implemented. For
planning purposes, it has been assumed that decisions regarding ultimate disposition strategies may require as
long as 40 years to implement. The general environmental consequences of managing SNF in a range of
configurations at various sites are summarized in this volume.
Volume 1 is supported by site-specific appendices (under separate cover) that provide detailed
information on the consequences of management activities under each alternative at the Hanford Site
(Appendix A); Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (Appendix B); Savannah River Site
(Appendix C); naval SNF management facilities, including management of naval SNF at DOE facilities
(Appendix D); other generator/storage sites (Appendix E); and the Oak Ridge Reservation and the Nevada
Test Site (Appendix F). This EIS does not select site-specific technical management options presented in
Appendices A through F. The management options are representative of potential activities at each of the
sites under consideration.
Volume 2 addresses the Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Programs at the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory. DOE objectives for the next 10 years are to mitigate the impacts of past
operations through environmental restoration and to treat, store, or dispose of waste at the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory in a way that minimizes future adverse impacts.
Volume 3 summarizes the comments that DOE received on the Draft EIS during the public comment
period and provides responses to those comments. Volume 3 also discusses the extent to which public
comments resulted in changes to this EIS and describes how to find specific comment summaries and
responses.
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a. The Department of Energy Programmatic Spent Nuclear Fuel Management and Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Programs Environmental Impact Statement (SNF and INEL
EIS)
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1.1 Overview of Spent Nuclear Fuel in the DOE Complex
This section is an introduction to the nature, types, and quantities of DOE SNF; the historic generation
and storage of SNF; and the current program structure as it existed in April 1995. This section also explains
what SNF is not included in this EIS as DOE SNF.
1.1.1 What is Spent Nuclear Fuel
Nuclear reactors use a process called fission to generate heat to produce electricity and to generate
power to propel Navy ships and submarines. Production reactors have been used to produce defense
materials at DOE facilities and radioisotopes for industrial and medical use. Some colleges and universities,
government facilities, and commercial establishments use nuclear reactors for research and educational
purposes, as well. Fuel that has been withdrawn from a nuclear reactor following irradiation, the constituent
elements of which have not been separated, is called spent nuclear fuel, or SNF. The EIS also evaluates
uranium/neptunium target materials, blanket subassemblies, pieces of fuel, and debris. Contact-handled
fuel/targets (that is, fuel/targets with radiation levels low enough to permit handling without shielding or
remote operations), even though slightly irradiated, are not included. This material will be managed by DOE
along with the other excess nuclear materials.
1.1.1.1 Configuration of Nuclear Fuel.
The fuel in a nuclear reactor consists of fuel assemblies
that may range in number from one to several hundred, depending upon the reactor size and the design of the
reactor and fuel assemblies. Fuel assemblies are constructed in many configurations, but they generally
consist of the fuel matrix, cladding, and structural hardware.
The fuel matrix contains the fissionable material (typically uranium oxide or uranium metal). The
matrix form is typically plates or cylindrical pellets. For gas-cooled reactors, the matrix may be small
particles. The cladding is the encapsulation (typically zirconium, aluminum, or stainless steel) that surrounds
the fuel, confining and protecting it. For gas-cooled reactors, this may be a ceramic coating over the fuel
particles.
The structural parts of a fuel assembly hold fuel in the proper configuration and direct coolant flow
(typically water) over the fuel. Structural hardware is generally nickel alloys, stainless steel, zirconium, or
aluminum, or, for gas-cooled reactors, graphite. The size of a fuel assembly ranges from a weight of 1
kilogram (2.2 pounds) and a length of less than 1 meter (3 feet) to a weight of more than 450 kilograms
(1,000 pounds) and a length of more than 3 meters (10 feet). Figure 1-1 illustrates a representative fuel
element.
Figure 1-1. Representative reactor fuel assembly and element.
1.1.1.2 Properties of Spent Nuclear Fuel.
When it is initially removed from a reactor, SNF is
highly radioactive. A fraction of the initial mass of fissionable material (uranium-235 or plutonium) has been
converted into fission products, some of which are radioactive with half-lives ranging from a few seconds to
thousands of years. At the time of withdrawal from the reactor, most of the radioactivity is associated with
fission products with very short half-lives. The radioactivity from SNF decreases very rapidly over time after
irradiation. After 1 year, the levels are about 1 percent of that at the time of removal. After 10 years, these
levels have decreased by another factor of 10.
The radiation of most concern from SNF is gamma rays. Although the radiation levels can be very
high, the gamma-ray intensities are readily reduced by shielding fuel elements with such materials as concrete,
lead, steel, and water. The thickness of the required shielding is dependent on the energy of the radiation
source, the desired protection level, and the density of the shielding material. Typically, shielding thicknesses
for concrete or lead are much smaller than for water.
The radioactivity produces heat, and the assemblies must be cooled for a period of months to years
following removal from the reactor to prevent excessive fuel temperatures from being reached. Typically, the
SNF removed from reactors has been stored in water pools for a period of 3 to 18 months for cooling before
transfer to other facilities for storage or processing. Storage systems are designed to prevent nuclear
criticality (nuclear chain reaction).
Many fuel elements that are now SNF, particularly production reactor fuel, were designed to be easily
dissolved in nitric acid for uranium-235 and plutonium recovery. Because the fuels were designed for only
short-term storage, prolonged storage sometimes presents problems. For example, some fuels, such as
aluminum-clad fuels, corrode during prolonged storage in water pools unless the water chemistry within the
pool is carefully controlled. Corrosion can result in cladding failures and the release of small quantities of
fission products, especially radioactive gases and readily soluble isotopes.
1.1.1.3 SNF Management Vulnerabilities.
Prolonged storage of some types of SNF has
resulted in deterioration of the cladding, degradation of the fuel matrix, or other storage problems leading to
significant environmental, safety, and health concerns. DOE reported its evaluation of these concerns in a
Spent Fuel Working Group Report on Inventory and Storage of the Department's Spent Nuclear Fuel and
Other Reactor Irradiated Nuclear Materials and their Environmental, Safety and Health Vulnerabilities in
November 1993 (DOE 1993a). This evaluation was followed by a Plan of Action to Resolve Spent Nuclear
Fuel Vulnerabilities in February 1994, which identified three phases to resolve those vulnerabilities (DOE
1994a). This Phase I Action Plan, which addresses the most urgent activities, was issued immediately. The
Phase II Action Plan was released April 1994 for public comment (DOE 1994b). The Phase III plan was
issued in October 1994 (DOE 1994c). Phases I, II, and III corrective actions include activities at the main
DOE SNF storage sites. Examples of corrective action projects include installing equipment to improve
storage pool water quality at the Savannah River Site; transferring fuel from an old, inadequate water pool to
a newer pool at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory; removal of all fuel and sludge from the
105-K basins at the Hanford Site.
Some of the SNF Action Plan activities could potentially result in emission and effluents. These
effects are not individually analyzed because their impacts are no greater than the impacts of normal SNF
management activities reported and analyzed for each site in Volume 1 and the respective site appendices.
Successful completion of the corrective actions would reduce the potential for health and safety problems to
the workers and public and minimize degradation to the environment.
In addition to the Spent Fuel Working Group report on vulnerabilities and the associated plans of
action to resolve the identified vulnerabilities, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board issued
Recommendation 94-1 (Conway 1994) calling for DOE to develop an expedited schedule for resolving
identified vulnerabilities across the DOE complex. Recommendation 94-1 was critical of DOE's lack of
urgency in correcting known SNF management deficiencies. Further, Recommendation 94-1 criticized DOE's
lack of prioritization of corrective actions and lack of an integrated systems approach to resolving previously
identified SNF management issues. DOE has developed a plan for implementing Recommendation 94-1
across the DOE complex. DOE's Implementation Plan (DOE 1995a) for Recommendation 94-1 was
submitted to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board on February 28, 1995. The plan includes a
prioritization of corrective actions to remedy known deficiencies utilizing a DOE complex-wide systems
approach and considering limited budgets. The plan focuses on fulfilling outstanding commitments to other
parties (for example, court-ordered milestones) and fully recognizes the urgency required to rectify long-
standing SNF management issues.
1.1.2 DOE Spent Nuclear Fuel Management
For the purposes of this document, SNF is separated into two categories: commercial SNF and DOE-
managed SNF. The management of commercial SNF (with a few special-case exceptions) is outside the
scope of this SNF and INEL EIS and is not discussed further herein.
Since 1943, DOE and its predecessor agencies have generated more than 100,000 metric tons of
heavy metal (MTHM) of SNF, of which about 2,700 metric tons remains. This SNF was generated in
various programs in different types of reactors, including DOE defense production reactors, United States
naval reactors, and DOE test and experimental reactors. In addition, DOE has accepted responsibility for
SNF from non-DOE sources, including United States university research reactors, special-case commercial
power reactors, and selected foreign research reactors.
In 1992, the Secretary of Energy directed the DOE to develop an integrated, long-term SNF
management program. This program is assessing DOE's SNF and fuel storage facilities, integrating DOE's
many existing SNF activities into one program, deciding the most appropriate and responsible means of
facility operation, and ensuring that issues associated with SNF are resolved safely and cost effectively.
Solutions to the storage questions may require changes in the management strategies for these fuels, including
such options as the construction of new facilities and stabilization of certain fuels. The program has also
established a programmatic objective to define a management path and proceed toward ultimate disposition
of DOE-managed SNF, as outlined in DOE (1994d). A number of activities are currently in process to meet
or address this objective. Appendix J, Spent Nuclear Fuel Management, provides an overview of
technologies for SNF management.
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a. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, gives DOE the responsibility and ultimate title for the Nation's
SNF. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended sets up the process for disposition of the Nation's
commercial nuclear power reator SNF in a mined geologic repository and makes provisions for cost recovery for
the ultimate disposition of that SNF. It also specifies the procedures for ultimate disposition of DOE's high-
level waste and SNF.
b. Quantities of fresh nuclear fuel, SNF, and targets are traditionally expressed in terms of metric tons of
heavy metal (typically uranium), without the inclusion of other materials, such as cladding, alloy materials,
and structural materials. A metric ton equals approximately 2,200 pounds.
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For various reasons, including the lack of characterization data on the interim storage behavior of
certain SNF types and the fact that the acceptance criteria for ultimate disposition have not yet been defined,
DOE cannot yet make all the decisions for the full 40-year period. Therefore, this EIS focuses on issues
relating to deciding the locations of future SNF management activities.
DOE faces a number of major programmatic and site-specific decisions regarding SNF management
over the next 40 years including
Where should DOE locate specific SNF management activities? Broadly, the alternatives
include managing the SNF where it is and minimizing shipments; consolidating the SNF at a
limited number of sites (the Decentralization, 1992/1993 Planning Basis, and Regionalization
4A and 4B alternatives); or consolidating the SNF at a central site.
What capabilities, facilities, and technologies are needed for SNF management? DOE has
identified the need for SNF interim storage sites and must select appropriate means at each site
for meeting these needs under each of the SNF siting alternatives.
What research and development activities should support the SNF management program?
1.1.2.1 Current and Projected Spent Nuclear Fuel Inventories.
Table 1-1 summarizes the
current inventories of SNF at DOE and other facilities and those projected to be generated through the year
2035. These estimates are based on assumptions regarding reasonably foreseeable future reactor operations
and the generation rates of SNF for which DOE is responsible. The principal SNF generators and storage
sites for SNF are described below and in Appendices A through F. Figure 1-2 illustrates those locations, as
well as representative points of entry for foreign fuels under consideration in this EIS.
1.1.2.2 DOE Facilities.
During the last four decades, DOE and its predecessor agencies have
transported, received, reprocessed, and stored SNF at various facilities in the nationwide DOE complex.
Three of the DOE facilities have primary responsibility for managing DOE SNF; several others have smaller
roles in SNF management.
Table 1-1. Spent nuclear fuel inventory.a
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Generator or storage siteb Existing Future increases Total
(1995) (through 2035) (2035)
________________________________________________________________________
Generator or storage siteb MTHMc Percent MTHMc Percent MTHMc Percent
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
DOE Sites
Hanford Site 2132.44 80.6 0.00 0.0 2132.44 77.8
Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory 261.23 9.9 12.92 13.5 274.14 10.0
Savannah River Site 206.27 7.8 0.00 0.0 206.27 7.5
Oak Ridge Reservation 0.65 <0.1 1.13 1.2 1.78 <0.1
Other DOE Sites 0.78 <0.1 1.50 1.6 2.28 <0.1
Naval Nuclear Propulsion 0.00d 0.0 55.00 57.6 55.0 2.0
Reactors
Foreign Research Reactor 0.00 0.0 21.70 22.7 21.70 0.8
Non-DOE Domestic
Domestic Research and 2.22 <0.1 3.28 3.4 5.50 0.2
Test Reactors e
Special-Case Commercial 42.69 1.6 0 0 42.69 1.6
SNF at non-DOE locationsf
Totalg,h 2646.27 95.53 2741.80
Percent of 2035 total 96.5 3.5 100.0
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a. Source: Wichmann (1995). Changes to the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) inventory contained in the Draft
Environmental Impact Statement were made to reflect updated inventories at domestic research and test reactors and
to remove materials that are contact-handled (i.e., materials unirradiated or slightly irradiated).
b. The Nevada Test Site does not currently store or generate SNF and is not expected to generate SNF through 2035.
c. MTHM = metric tons of heavy metal. One MTHM equals approximately 2,200 pounds.
d. Existing inventory of naval SNF (10.23 MTHM) is included in the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory totals.
e. Includes research reactors at commercial, university, and government facilities.
f. The total inventory of SNF from special-case commercial reactors is 186.41 MTHM. The 42.69 MTHM indicated
here is just that stored at the Babcock & Wilcox Research Center, Fort St. Vrain Reactor, and West Valley
Demonstration Project. The remaining special-case commercial SNF is stored at the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory, Oak Ridge Reservation, Hanford Site, and Savannah River Site and is included in the totals (in this
table) for those sites.
g. Changes to the fuel inventory occurred due to recalculation of the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
inventory at the Experimental Breeder Reactor-II and Hot Fuel Examination Facility and the removal of contact-
handled fuel.
h. Numbers may not sum due to rounding.
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Figure 1-2. Locations of principal spent nuclear fuel generators and storage sites. Hanford Site-The Hanford Site was dedicated to producing plutonium for more than 40
years, until production was halted in 1989. Hanford's production reactors (including the
N Reactor and Single-Pass Reactor) have generated 2100 MTHM of the existing DOE SNF. The ongoing
actions at Hanford are focused on improving worker health and safety and protecting the environment. SNF
management activities include reducing water contamination levels, performing physical upgrades necessary
to assure facility safety for near-term storage, characterizing SNF condition, and stabilization or repackaging
for storage and/or ultimate disposition.
The SNF at facilities associated with the Hanford Site include N-Reactor SNF, Single-Pass Reactor
SNF, Shippingport Core II SNF, Fast Flux Test Facility SNF, and miscellaneous special-case commercial and
experimental SNF. As shown in Table 1-1, the Hanford Site currently stores over 80 percent (by MTHM) of
the current complex-wide SNF.
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory-The Idaho National Engineering Laboratory is
one of the principal centers in the DOE complex for nuclear research and development. Ongoing activities
include continued safe storage of SNF, continued reactor operations, and onsite fuel transfers to reduce
identified vulnerabilities.
As a result of its historic mission, the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory has been safely
managing SNF for over 40 years. This site is the home of the Expended Core Facility and the Naval Reactors
Facility, which are central to the Navy's nuclear propulsion program. Currently, the site stores approximately
261 MTHM (about 10 percent) of DOE's SNF from a variety of DOE programs and a limited number of
commercial and foreign sources.
Savannah River Site-The Savannah River Site was constructed in the early 1950s to
produce the basic materials used in nuclear weapons-primarily plutonium and tritium.
Savannah River's production reactors have generated about 150 MTHM of the existing DOE SNF.
Most of the SNF from Savannah River Site reactor operations is stored underwater in concrete, water-filled
reactor storage basins. These reactor disassembly basins were originally intended for only short-term storage
of production reactor SNF. Some of the SNF stored at Savannah River consists of uranium clad in stainless
steel or zirconium alloy, which Savannah River Site cannot process without facility modifications. Ongoing
activities include improving the use of existing storage facilities to provide for continued safe storage of the
less corrosion-resistant aluminum-clad SNF. DOE currently manages approximately 206 MTHM (about
8 percent) of its SNF at the Savannah River Site.
Oak Ridge Reservation-The Oak Ridge Reservation was originally developed as part of
the Manhattan Project-the effort to build the first nuclear weapons. The missions of Oak Ridge Reservation
facilities include weapons dismantlement, storage of enriched uranium, maintaining production capability,
technology research and development, and environmental management. Less than 1 MTHM (0.07 percent) of
DOE's SNF is either in storage or being generated at several facilities at the Oak Ridge Reservation.
Other Department of Energy Sites-A number of other DOE sites also store SNF,
principally from experimental and test reactors that have operated at many Department sites nationwide.
Four of these DOE sites storing SNF are as follows:
Argonne National Laboratory-East has one reactor that is being decontaminated and
decommissioned. This site currently manages 0.08 MTHM of SNF.
Brookhaven National Laboratory is generating and storing SNF at two facilities. The
Brookhaven High Flux Beam Reactor and the Brookhaven Medical Research Reactor are both
operating at the present time. This site currently manages 0.24 MTHM of the DOE's SNF.
Los Alamos National Laboratory has SNF at the Omega West Reactor, which has been shut
down since December 1992. There is 0.014 MTHM of SNF in storage at Los Alamos.
Sandia National Laboratories have reactors that operate as needed. These reactors will
generate small quantities (0.4 MTHM) of SNF when shut down and defueled.
1.1.2.3 Navy Nuclear Propulsion Program.
Naval SNF is removed from naval reactors at
shipyards and prototype sites and placed in shielded shipping containers. Since 1957, the SNF removed from
nuclear-powered naval vessels and prototypes has been transported from shipyards and prototype sites to the
Naval Reactors Facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. The SNF is then removed from the
shielded shipping containers and placed into a water pool at the Expended Core Facility. In the water pool,
each naval fuel assembly receives, as a minimum, an internal and external visual examination to confirm that
it performed as designed and to identify anomalies that would warrant more detailed examination. After
examination, the SNF is loaded into shielded containers and transferred to the Idaho Chemical Processing
Plant for storage.
Currently, four naval shipyards and one commercial shipyard (Norfolk, Puget Sound, Portsmouth,
Pearl Harbor, and Newport News) and the Kesselring Site support the refueling of nuclear-powered ships and
prototypes. Other naval shipyards that formerly supported defuelings and refuelings, such as Charleston and
Mare Island, are being closed because of military base closure decisions. An existing water pool facility,
constructed to support the refueling of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, is located within the industrial zone
of the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard. To date, the facility has been used for refueling equipment
demonstrations and testing. The facility contains a radiologically controlled, high bay structure and a
Personnel Support Building, which provides office and other nonradiological support functions. The high
bay structure contains the water pool and general work areas. At Newport News, SNF is removed from naval
vessels and temporarily stored near the removal site before transport.
1.1.2.4 Foreign Research Reactors.
In accordance with national nuclear nonproliferation
goals, DOE has accepted (and is considering the renewal of the policy to accept) SNF that contains enriched
uranium of United States origin that was used in foreign research reactors. In April 1994, DOE decided to
accept up to 409 additional SNF elements from eight foreign research reactors in seven European countries
for storage at the Savannah River Site. One hundred fifty-three of these elements were actually received
before an order by the court in the case of South Carolina v. O'Leary, No. 3:94-2419-0 (District of South
Carolina January 27, 1995) preventing the receipt of additional shipments. That order is currently on appeal
to the United States Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit. The United States Government is currently
considering the acceptance of SNF from approximately 40 nations. This foreign research reactor SNF is
estimated to amount to 21.7 MTHM and is the subject of the Environmental Impact Statement on a Proposed
Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel (see
Section 1.2.5), due to be published in 1995.
1.1.2.5 Non-DOE Domestic.
This category includes non-DOE domestic, licensed facilities,
including training, research, and test reactors at university, commercial establishments, and
government-owned installations for which DOE has contractual obligations to accept SNF. Appendix E
provides additional detail on these sites. These locations currently have less than
1 percent of the existing DOE SNF.
Domestic Research and Test Reactors-Fifty-seven domestic non-DOE facilities have
been licensed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 38 of which are expected to be small generators
of DOE SNF during the next 40 years. These facilities include colleges, universities, government, and
commercial establishments in the United States that use reactors for educational and research activities. The
reactors are of several different types and are used for training, experimentation, and teaching in nuclear
science and engineering. Some of these research sites have limited storage capacity compared with generation
rates. Table 1-2 provides a summary of these locations, the SNF currently at these locations, and the amount
of SNF they currently have stored plus projected generation through the year 2035.
Special-Case Commercial Power Reactors-DOE also has taken possession of SNF
assemblies and complete or sectioned SNF rods from various commercial nuclear power reactors that were to
be used to support DOE-sponsored research and development programs. By way of a
Table 1-2. Summary of domestic research and test reactors.
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Type Number of locations MTHMa MTHMa
(RODb) (2035)
___________________________________________________________
Universitiesc 29 2.01 4.96
Government,
non-DOEc 5 0.11 0.42
Commericalc 4 0.10 0.12
Total 38 2.22 5.50
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a. MTHM = metric tons of heavy metal.
b. ROD = Record of Decision, June 1995.
c. See Appendix E of Volume 1 of this EIS for a discussion of these locations.
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three-party agreement among the Public Services Company of Colorado, General Atomics, and the Atomic
Energy Commission, the DOE has agreed to provide dry storage at the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory for eight segments of Fort St. Vrain SNF (approximately 1,920 SNF elements). Three segments
of this SNF have been transported to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory; the other five are currently
being stored at the Fort St. Vrain site. Other SNF in this category includes SNF from development reactors
(Shippingport and Peach Bottom Unit 1); SNF used for destructive and nondestructive examination and
testing; SNF remaining at the West Valley Demonstration Project; SNF from fuel performance testing at the
Babcock & Wilcox Research Center; and special-case SNF debris (Three-Mile Island Unit 2).
Table 1-3 summarizes the types and quantities of special-case commercial power reactor SNF in
storage. This SNF currently is in storage at either the West Valley Demonstration Project in West Valley,
New York, the Babcock & Wilcox Research Center in Lynchburg, Campbell County, Virginia, or the Fort St.
Vrain facility in Colorado. Additionally, special-case commercial SNF (such as from Three-Mile Island,
Peach Bottom, and Shippingport) is also stored at the Hanford Site, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory,
Savannah River Site, and Oak Ridge Reservation.
1.1.3 Technologies for the Management of Spent Nuclear Fuel
DOE must safely manage SNF until its ultimate disposition. Some SNF, such as naval reactor fuel,
was designed for long-term operation and to survive combat conditions; therefore, it is rugged
enough to retain its integrity during prolonged storage. Commercial reactor fuel is also inherently stable and
suitable for prolonged storage. The DOE will not select SNF technologies on the basis of Volume 1 of this
EIS. These technology-based decisions are most appropriately dealt with on a fuel type-specific or site-
specific basis.
Table 1-3. Special-case commercial power reactor spent nuclear fuel (SNF).
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Storage location Category SNF in storagea MTHMb
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
West Valley, NY Light-water reactor fuel 125 elements 27
Lynchburg, VA Light-water reactor partial fuel 3 full-length rods and 17 sectioned 0.044
elements rods
Fort St. Vrain, CO High-temperature gas-cooled reactor 1,464 elements 16
fuel
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a. No additions projected through 2035.
b. MTHM = metric tons of heavy metal. One MTHM equals approximately 2,200 pounds. (The approximate total
of SNF currently at these locations is 43 MTHM.)
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1.1.3.1 Storage.
Interim storage may be accomplished with either dry or wet storage technology.
Wet storage normally involves the use of belowgrade water-filled pools. Dry storage places the SNF in a
shielded container for aboveground storage. Dry storage technologies range from the use of casks, which
hold only a few fuel elements, to vaults that are capable of holding a large quantity of fuel. Casks are
normally constructed of steel or reinforced concrete, and vaults are normally constructed of concrete. For dry
storage, a number of similar concepts have been used for commercial power reactor-type fuels and may be
suitable for some of the DOE SNF. While both wet and dry storage are being evaluated for SNF
management, dry storage has several unique advantages when heat dissipation is not a major concern. These
advantages include lower emissions, simpler operation, lower cost, shorter times for design and construction,
and capability for licensing by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, if required.
1.1.3.2 Stabilization.
Stabilization may be necessary to provide safe interim storage of SNF.
Stabilization technologies can be placed in three broad categories: containerization, processing without
fissile material separation, and processing with fissile material separation. Containerization can involve
processes such as canning, coating, and passivation. Canning involves placing the fuel in a sealed canister of
durable construction (such as stainless steel). Coating involves depositing a protective film on the fuel to
inhibit corrosion. Passivation involves treating the SNF to place exposed surfaces in a less reactive form
when the SNF is stored in either water or air.
Processing without fissile material separation involves processes such as direct dissolving of the fuel
elements or oxidation of the fuel elements. Oxidation involves separation of the fuel matrix from the
cladding using oxygen at elevated temperatures [up to 800C (1,472F)]. The principal existing approach
for processing with fissile material separation is aqueous processing. Aqueous processing involves breaking
down the fuel through mechanical means (shearing, chopping, cutting) or chemical means (acid or electrolytic
dissolution, combustion, hydrolysis) and then chemically separating the fuel constituents by solvent
extraction. Aqueous processing would normally be followed by a vitrification process where the high-level
waste is processed into a glass or ceramic form. The Savannah River Site currently has the capability to
process aluminum-clad fuel.
Appendix J provides more details on fuel management technologies. Appendices A through F provide
details on the storage and stabilization technologies evaluated for each of the potential SNF management
sites. These technologies are representative of those discussed above. This EIS evaluates the environmental
impact of these technologies to illustrate, at a programmatic level, the characteristic impacts from
implementing each programmatic alternative.
The DOE will conduct additional National Environmental Policy Act reviews for research and
development and characterization activities that help select technologies for placing the SNF in a form
suitable for interim storage and ultimate disposition.
1.1.3.3 Transportation.
Depending on the SNF management options selected, some of the SNF
may be moved one or more times before being transported. SNF is transported in massive, lead and steel
shielded casks that can weigh above 100 tons. These casks must conform to both U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission and U.S. Department of Transportation regulations. Shipment by both rail cars and trucks is
common, with the chief advantage of rail being the ability to transport heavier, more massive casks and, thus,
transport more SNF per shipment.
The casks serve two functions: (a) providing gamma radiation shielding from the SNF so that the
radiation level outside the casks meets regulatory requirements, and (b) providing protection to and
containment of the SNF even in case of accidents. The casks are designed to withstand a wide range of very
severe accidents. Because the SNF is generally metallic in form, most of the radionuclides stay within the
metal fuel even in maximum foreseeable transportation accidents. The risks to both workers and the public
have been evaluated many times, most recently in Appendix I of this EIS, and have been shown to be low.
1.1.3.4 Ultimate Disposition.
In the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, as amended, Congress
established a national policy for disposal of high-level waste and commercial SNF in a geologic repository,
and directed DOE to characterize the Yucca Mountain site in Nevada for suitability as the site of a first
United States repository. That Act authorizes disposal of DOE SNF, as well as commercial spent fuel, in the
first repository, subject to a limit on repository capacity and the payment of appropriate fees. For planning
purposes, the DOE assumes that some or all of the SNF in its inventory that satisfies the repository's
acceptance criteria could be placed in the first geologic repository developed under the Nuclear Waste Policy
Act of 1982, as amended.
Although beyond the scope of this EIS, two broad strategies may at this point be envisioned for the
ultimate disposition of DOE SNF. The DOE could (a) work toward direct disposal of SNF in a geologic
repository, or (b) chemically dissolve the fuel and produce a waste form (such as vitrified glass) for
repository disposal. Variations on these broad strategies are also possible, and both remain under
consideration. It is possible that some of DOE's SNF could qualify for direct disposal. Aggressive
characterization and, if appropriate, preparation programs would be necessary, and would need to be
coordinated with plans to develop one or more repositories.
Sufficient quantity and quality of information is still not available to determine at this time whether
the Yucca Mountain site is a suitable candidate for geologic disposal of SNF and high-level radioactive
waste. The DOE, however, is in the early planning stages for a repository EIS, which will be prepared
pursuant to the directives of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended. The DOE plans to issue in
mid-1995 a formal notice of its intent to prepare this analysis. The repository EIS is being prepared to
evaluate potential environmental impacts, based on the best available information and data, that would be
associated with the repository's development and operation, and to support the Secretary of Energy's final
recommendation to the President, as required by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended. The
repository EIS will examine the site-specific environmental impacts from construction, operation, and
eventual closure of the repository, including potential post-closure radiological effects to the environment.
Until the repository EIS is complete, no final decision could be made concerning what DOE SNF would be
accepted in a geologic repository.
As part of its SNF management program, DOE would (a) stabilize the SNF as needed to ensure safe
interim storage, (b) characterize the existing SNF inventory to assess compliance with the repository
acceptance criteria as they are developed, and (c) determine what processing, if any, is required to meet the
criteria. Decisions regarding the actual disposition of DOE's SNF would follow appropriate review under the
National Environmental Policy Act, and would be subject to licensing by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission. This "path forward" would be implemented so as to minimize impacts on the first repository
schedule. The current planning assumption is that any DOE material (vitrified high-level waste and/or SNF)
qualified and selected for emplacement in the first repository would be disposed beginning in the year 2015.
Disposition of the remaining DOE SNF and vitrified high-level waste that is not emplaced in the first
repository would not be decided until the DOE recommendation on the need for a second repository (which
would consider such factors as the physical and statutory limits of the first repository). The Nuclear Waste
Policy Act of 1982, as amended, requires DOE to make that recommendation between January 1, 2007, and
January 1, 2010.
Except perhaps for a need to develop them further, the technologies described above for stabilization
and safe storage are available for the management of SNF and appear adequate to meet the needs of ultimate
disposition. Disposal in a repository, for example, may require canning, canisterization, encapsulation, or
processing the fuel to create a vitrified waste form. Resource recovery requires dissolving the fuel to separate
the fissile material from the waste and producing a stable waste form. These required technologies have
already been applied and are under continued development in several countries. Once the acceptance criteria
are established, the appropriate technologies can be identified and finalized to ensure that the SNF can be put
in an acceptable form for ultimate disposal.
1.2 Relationship to Other
National Environmental Policy Act Documents
DOE currently has a range of National Environmental Policy Act reviews planned or under way that
are interrelated with or tier from this SNF management review. Because the scope of SNF management
includes a wide variety of proposals, multiple National Environmental Policy Act reviews are, or will be,
necessary. Related reviews are identified in Table 1-4. Figure 1-3 graphically presents the interrelationships
of the various National Environmental Policy Act reviews. Discussion in the following subsections centers
primarily on reviews with an interrelationship with this SNF management review. The remaining documents
in Table 1-4 are site-specific reviews of SNF management, or individual project reviews that have a
relationship to SNF management.
Table 1-4. Major National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) reviews related to Volume 1 of this
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) as of March 1995.
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Type of NEPA
Site Subject Review Status
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
DOE Waste Management Programmatic EIS EIS In preparation
(Headquarters)
Programmatic EIS for Tritium Supply and Recyclinga EIS In preparation
Stockpile Stewardship and Management EIS EIS Future
EIS for a potential repository at Yucca Mountain for disposal of high-level EIS Future
radioactive waste
EIS on a Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign EIS In preparation
Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel
Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials EIS In preparation
Fabrication and Deployment of a Multi-Purpose Canister-Based System for the
Management of Civilian Spent Nuclear Fuel EIS In preparation
U.S. Navy Short-Term Storage of Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) EA/FONSIb Issued
West Valley Management of SNF in Storage at the West Valley Demonstration Project (interim EA In preparation
Demonstration onsite dry storage)
Project
West Valley Demonstration Project Completion and Site Closure EIS In preparation
Savannah River Urgent-Relief Acceptance of Foreign Research Reactor SNFc EA/FONSI Issued
Interim Management of Nuclear Materials at Savannah River Site EIS In preparation
Oak Ridge High Flux Isotope Reactor SNF storage reracking EA/FONSI Issued
Reservation
High Flux Isotope Reactor Dry Storage Pad EA Future
Idaho National Programmatic SNF and Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Environmental EIS In preparation
Engineering Restoration and Waste Management, Volume 2
Laboratory
Fort St. Vrain Fuel Shipments to the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant EA/FONSId Issued
Test Area North Pool Stabilization Project (also known as Dry Cask Storage
Project) EA In preparation
Nevada Test Nevada Test Site and Other Off-Site Test Locations Within the State of Nevada EIS In preparation
Site Site-Wide EIS
Hanford Site 105-KE and 105-KW Basins Fuel Encapsulation and Repackaging, 100-K Area EA/FONSI Issued
Transfer of Plutonium Uranium Extraction Plant and N-Reactor Irradiated Fuel for
Encapsulation and Storage at the K-Basins EA In preparation
Shutdown of the Fast Flux Test Facility
EA In preparation
Relocating TRIGAe Reactor Fuel from 308 Building (covers SNF, lightly irradiated
fuel, and unirradiated fuel) EA In preparation
Characterization of Stored Defense Production SNF and Associated Materials at
Hanford Site, Richland, Washington EA In preparation
Hanford SNF Management EIS
EIS Future
Preparation of an EIS for Management of SNF from the K-basins at the Hanford
Site, Richland, Washington EIS In preparation
______________
a. The Nuclear Weapons Complex Reconfiguration Study was replaced by two separate National Environmental Policy Act reviews: the
Programmatic EIS for Tritium Supply and Recycling and the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic EIS.
b. Environmental Assessment (EA): A concise public document provided by a Federal agency that presents evidence and analysis for
determining whether to prepare an EIS or a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI).
c. After the FONSI was issued, one shipment of foreign research reactor fuel was actually received in the U.S. A lawsuit by the
State of South Carolina resulted in an order preventing the receipt of additional shipments (South Carolina v. O'Leary, No. 3:94-
2419-0 (D.S.C. January 27, 1995). That order is currently on appeal to the United States Court of Appeal for the Fourth District.
d. The EA and FONSI were determined by the District Court to be inadequate. Volumes 1 and 2 of this EIS address shipments of Fort
St. Vrain fuel.
e. TRIGA: Training, research, and isotope reactors built by General Atomics.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Figure 1-3. Interrelationships of National Environmental Policy Act reviews related to SNF management. Volume 1 of this EIS provides the overall programmatic National Environmental Policy Act review of
the management of DOE SNF. This review and the Record of Decision will be summarized and incorporated
in the DOE Waste Management Programmatic EIS, currently in development. Programmatic reviews for
nuclear weapons disposition and weapons-usable fissile materials will also provide input to the DOE Waste
Management Programmatic EIS. This SNF EIS will provide input to the EIS for the management of SNF
from foreign research reactors. Except for special-case commercial reactors, commercial SNF is not
evaluated in this SNF EIS. DOE is also preparing an EIS for a multipurpose canister system. Additional
National Environmental Policy Act reviews for DOE and commercial SNF will be prepared as needed.
Table 1-4 and Figure 1-3 also identify site- or project-specific National Environmental Policy Act
reviews currently planned or underway. This Volume 1 is a DOE-wide programmatic EIS covering a full
range of strategic alternatives for the management of SNF. As such, this document is an upper tier EIS,
intended to provide National Environmental Policy Act review of related and potential actions. By tiering
National Environmental Policy Act documentation, DOE is able to look at the overall potential impact of a
group of connected actions. Lower-tier reviews provide more specific and detailed analyses on specific sites
and projects that stem from the programmatic decisions. The tiering of National Environmental Policy Act
reviews as they relate to this SNF management review is shown schematically in Figure 1-3. This
programmatic EIS does not replace site-specific or project-specific National Environmental Policy Act
documentation, except where adequate coverage is provided in this EIS to evaluate reasonably foreseeable
impacts. For the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, the site-specific documentation is provided by
Volume 2 of this EIS.
1.2.1 Waste Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement
DOE is currently analyzing nationwide and site-specific alternative strategies to maximize efficiency
for DOE's waste management program. The nationwide analyses will be part of the DOE Waste
Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) (previously known as the Environmental
Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement). This PEIS evaluates proposed DOE actions
regarding the
Type, size, and number of waste storage, treatment, and disposal facilities needed and where to
build them, including the transportation network
Proposed action formulating and implementing an integrated Waste Management Program
Alternative configurations for each waste type (except hazardous waste) to provide a
framework for siting future facilities at specific locations.
The alternatives are structured to ensure analysis of the impacts of the mixed waste configuration that
will be defined in the site treatment plans developed pursuant to the Federal Facility Compliance Act.
The Draft Waste Management PEIS is scheduled to be available for public and agency review and
comment by mid-1995. Although the DOE Waste Management PEIS was originally intended to provide the
programmatic analyses of alternatives for SNF management, these analyses are also presented in this volume.
The Waste Management PEIS is expected to summarize and consider, as part of its analysis of cumulative
environmental consequences, the impacts of the SNF alternatives identified in this EIS.
1.2.2 Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Tritium Supply and Recycling
The Nuclear Weapons Complex Reconfiguration Program has evolved considerably since its original
Notice of Intent to prepare a Nuclear Weapons Complex Reconfiguration PEIS was issued in February 1991.
DOE has now separated the Nuclear Weapons Complex Reconfiguration EIS into two programmatic EISs:
(a) a PEIS for Tritium Supply and Recycling (expected completion in November 1995) and (b) a Stockpile
Stewardship and Management PEIS. In the original Notice of Intent, DOE proposed to reconfigure the
Nation's nuclear weapons complex to be smaller, less diverse, and less expensive to operate. This proposal
offered the advantage of enabling the closure and remediation of the Mound and Rocky Flats Plants. At that
time, no new plutonium or highly enriched uranium storage facilities were envisioned, and a new tritium
production facility was being planned as part of a separate New Production Reactor Program. Later, the New
Production Reactor Program was incorporated into the Reconfiguration PEIS. DOE's needs have evolved
since then for many reasons, but primary among them is the end of the Cold War. The tangible effects of this
include the significant reduction in the size of the Nation's stockpile of nuclear weapons and reduced
requirements for production of tritium.
Accordingly, the Tritium Supply and Recycling PEIS addresses alternatives associated with new
tritium production and the recycling of tritium recovered from weapons being retired from the stockpile.
Alternative technologies for producing tritium are planned to be analyzed at five candidate sites (Savannah
River Site, Oak Ridge Reservation, the Pantex Plant, the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, and the
Nevada Test Site). The PEIS was issued in draft form February 28, 1995.
1.2.3 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Environmental Impact Statement
The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Environmental Impact Statement was originally part of
the Nuclear Weapons Complex Reconfiguration Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (see Section
1.2.2). DOE expects to begin the scoping process for the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS in
1995. Stockpile stewardship includes activities required to maintain a high level of confidence in the safety,
reliability, and performance of nuclear weapons in the absence of underground testing, and to be prepared to
test weapons if directed by the President. Stockpile management activities include maintenance, evaluation,
repair, or replacement of weapons in the existing stockpile. The review will take into account the latest
information on current and projected future stockpile requirements.
1.2.4 Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Programmatic
Environmental Impact Statement
In response to the President's Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy issued on January 24, 1994,
the Department created a separate Department-wide project for developing recommendations and for
directing implementation of decisions concerning disposition of excess nuclear materials. Through this PEIS,
DOE proposes to develop a comprehensive national policy for the management and disposition of fissile
materials (primarily separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium, but also other excess nuclear materials
including neptunium, americium, and uranium-233) that are no longer required for military purposes.
1.2.5 Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research
Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Environmental Impact Statement
DOE proposes to adopt and implement a policy concerning management of SNF containing enriched
uranium that originated in the United States and was used by foreign research reactors. Under the proposed
policy, the United States may manage approximately 22,750 elements (19.2 MTHM) of high-enriched
uranium or low-enriched uranium SNF during a 10-year period from foreign research reactors in
approximately 40 nations. Alternative methods of implementing the proposed action and the No Action
alternative are being analyzed in an EIS. DOE will not make a final decision on the acceptance of SNF from
these foreign research reactors until after the EIS for the Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy
Concerning Foreign Research Reactor SNF and this programmatic SNF EIS are both completed. Both of
these EISs are scheduled to be completed in 1995.
The proposed action would support the nuclear nonproliferation policy of the United States by
removing the highly enriched uranium from these reactors from international commerce. The implementation
of this policy could result in the receipt of foreign research reactor SNF at one or more United States points of
entry and overland transport to one or more DOE sites for storage and/or processing.
1.2.6 Fabrication and Deployment of a Multipurpose Canister-Based System for the
Management of Civilian Spent Nuclear Fuel Environmental Impact Statement
This environmental impact statement is addressing the potential environmental impacts associated
with alternative systems for storage and transport of SNF assemblies for civilian and naval SNF. The review
will analyze the following: (a) manufacturing of multipurpose canister system components, (b) packaging
and handling of SNF as it is transferred to canisters or casks, (c) canister transfer and loading operations, (d)
storage of SNF in canisters and casks at the reactor sites, (e) SNF transport from the reactor sites to a
hypothetical monitored retrievable storage facility and/or repository, (f) handling and storage of SNF at a
hypothetical monitored retrievable storage facility, and (g) surface activities involving the handling and
disposal of SNF at a repository.
The multipurpose canister-based technology may have application for DOE and Navy SNF.
1.2.7 Environmental Impact Statement for a Potential Repository at Yucca Mountain for
Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Waste
Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, DOE is investigating the suitability of the
Yucca Mountain, Nevada, site as the nation's first licensed geologic repository for SNF and high-level
radioactive waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, requires that DOE's recommendation
of a repository site to the President must be accompanied by an EIS. DOE has tentatively scheduled the
Notice of Intent for the repository EIS for 1995 and the Record of Decision for 2000. Yucca Mountain is a
potential disposal site for DOE SNF.
1.3 Scope of this Volume
1.3.1 Scoping Process
On October 22, 1990, DOE published a Notice of Intent in the Federal Register announcing its intent
to prepare a PEIS addressing environmental restoration and waste management (including SNF management)
activities across the entire DOE complex. DOE then invited the public to submit written comments on the
scope of the PEIS, held 23 scoping meetings across the country, and issued a draft Implementation Plan in
January 1992 reflecting the comments provided. DOE held six regional public workshops on the draft
Implementation Plan and recorded public comments given at these workshops. The Implementation Plan for
the PEIS was issued in January 1994 and addressed the comments received from scoping and the regional
workshops.
On October 5, 1992, DOE published a Notice of Intent to prepare an EIS for Environmental
Restoration and Waste Management at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory in the Federal Register.
The notice invited Government agencies and the public to participate in five scoping meetings throughout
Idaho and to provide written comments. Oral testimony from the meetings was transcribed and made
available at DOE public reading rooms. The comment period lasted from October 5, 1992, to December 4,
1992.
On September 3, 1993, DOE published a Notice of Opportunity to Comment in the Federal Register
proposing to expand the scope of the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Environmental Restoration and
Waste Management EIS to include impacts related to transportation, receipt, processing, and storage of DOE
SNF at locations other than the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. This comment period started on
September 3, 1993, and ended on October 4, 1993. Government agencies and the public were invited to
provide comments on the DOE Programmatic SNF and the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Programs EIS. A toll-free telephone number was
provided for questions, requests for documents or other information, and for the public to provide oral
comments that were transcribed for DOE's consideration. The Implementation Plan (issued October 29,
1993, and amended on
May 9, 1994) for this EIS summarizes these comments and DOE's responses.
As existing large-scale SNF management operations, the Hanford Site at Richland, Washington; the
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory in southeastern Idaho; and the Savannah River Site near Aiken, South
Carolina, were logically identified as reasonable site alternatives for SNF management in the October 29,
1993, Implementation Plan. In addition, four Navy shipyards and the Kesselring Site (in West Milton, New
York) with years of SNF handling experience were identified for consideration in the EIS for activities limited
to naval SNF. The four Navy shipyards are the Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, Virginia; the
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Kittery, Maine; the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, Honolulu, Hawaii; and the
Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Bremerton, Washington.
In response to public scoping comments, DOE committed to consider other sites for SNF management
in an effort to broaden the range of reasonable alternatives for locations at which SNF management activities
could be conducted. DOE developed a screening process, which resulted in selection of the Oak Ridge
Reservation, near Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and Nevada Test Site, near Mercury, Nevada, as additional site
alternatives for regionalized or centralized SNF management (DOE-ID 1994). The EIS Implementation Plan
was amended on May 9, 1994, to reflect this addition.
1.3.2 Scope
1.3.2.1 Programmatic Spent Nuclear Fuel Disposition.
The DOE will not analyze the
ultimate disposition of SNF in this EIS. The focus of this Volume 1 of the EIS is the management of SNF in
a safe and environmentally sound manner until decisions regarding its ultimate disposition are made and
implemented. Decisions regarding the actual disposition of DOE's SNF will follow appropriate review under
separate National Environmental Policy Act documentation. Congress has mandated that the Federal
Government pursue the development of mined geologic repositories for the permanent disposal of SNF and
high-level waste, and has directed DOE to study the Yucca Mountain, Nevada, site to determine whether it is
a suitable site. Ultimate disposition of DOE SNF, however, is outside the scope of this programmatic SNF
EIS.
1.3.2.2 Programmatic Spent Nuclear Fuel Stabilization.
DOE is phasing out reprocessing
activities because of decreased demand for the recovery and reuse of certain nuclear materials. Fuel
stabilization activities potentially required for safe interim storage and management of SNF, such as canning
of some degraded fuels or processing as necessary, are relevant to the safe storage of SNF and within the
scope of this EIS. Worker safety, public health, and potential environmental impacts associated with SNF
stabilization, research and development of technologies, and pilot programs are topics of importance in
analyzing the appropriate alternatives for interim storage of SNF and are included in this EIS.
In April 1992, the Secretary of Energy directed that DOE phase out defense-related chemical
separations activities due to a reduction in the demand for new material for nuclear weapons (Claytor 1992).
DOE no longer produces plutonium-239 and highly enriched uranium, and, in December 1994, DOE
committed to prohibit the use of plutonium-239 and highly enriched uranium separated and/or stabilized
during the phaseout, shutdown, and cleanout of weapons complex facilities for nuclear explosives purposes
(Reis and Grumbly 1994). However, the use of chemical separations or other processing technologies is a
reasonable site-specific option to assure the safe interim management of some types of SNF (or its
constituents). Selection of chemical processing as a potential management option will be made after detailed
analyses in site-specific National Environmental Policy Act reviews tiered from this EIS. Specific
technologies for managing SNF are described in Volume 1, Appendix J. The potential impacts from a
representative processing technology have been evaluated to aid in the analysis of reasonable technology
options for interim storage of SNF and are included in this EIS. The DOE selected chemical separations for
stabilization of degrading SNF as the technology for evaluation. The DOE believes the impacts from this
activity are representative of the overall potential impacts of other similar technologies. This EIS assesses
the impacts of processing only at the Hanford Site, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, and Savannah
River Site because DOE determined it would require significant resources to consider undertaking such
processing activities at sites with no facilities or infrastructure to support these processes. Processing
operations that modify the SNF form to create new forms suitable for interim storage are much more complex
than the activities associated with either dry storage or wet storage of intact SNF. For example, processing
by chemical separation requires large-scale facilities for: SNF storage, SNF dissolution and chemical element
separation operations, liquid high-level waste storage, storage for special nuclear material, and facilities to
process the liquid high-level waste into a stable form, for example, vitrification, for storage. Additionally, all
these facilities must be supported by a complex infrastructure of services and utilities. The Hanford Site,
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, and Savannah River Site have some or all these facilities and all of
the infrastructure for these types of operations. The other sites (that is, Nevada Test Site and Oak Ridge
Reservation) lack this level of plant facilities or high-level waste infrastructure. The cost alone to create this
level of capability makes evaluating the other sites less than desirable. Construction of the necessary high-
level waste infrastructure is estimated to be several billion dollars.
1.3.2.3 Programmatic Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage.
Current and projected DOE SNF
inventories are considered in this EIS. Existing storage facilities are identified, and their status, capacities,
and accident histories are described. SNF container design, integrity, corrosion and corrosion byproducts,
storage technologies, and storage facility design life are factored into the EIS analysis for each alternative.
Storage options at the site of generation and other storage options are analyzed. The analysis of the storage
options for each alternative includes the estimated type and size of representative storage facilities potentially
needed at each site.
1.3.2.4 Programmatic Spent Nuclear Fuel Transportation.
The EIS includes an analysis of
the potential impacts of SNF transportation, including safety and emergency preparedness requirements. A
review of the safety record for past SNF transportation activity is included, along with an analysis of potential
transportation impacts from normal transport and from transportation accidents.
Transportation modes and routes deemed reasonable for SNF shipment have been analyzed to
estimate potential risks to worker safety, public health, and the environment. Federal and state regulations
that place restrictions on certain aspects of SNF shipment and limits on shipment size, types of containers,
and number of shipments have been accounted for in the analyses. Hazardous materials manifests, required
for each shipment of SNF, include information on the carrier, the materials involved and their characteristics,
and the containers.
The potential impacts of transporting nuclear fuel for ultimate disposition will be included in the
appropriate National Environmental Policy Act documentation. Therefore, an alternative to transport SNF
directly to a repository is not considered in this EIS.
1.3.2.5 Special-Case Commercial Fuels.
This EIS addresses the management of certain small
quantities of special-case commercial SNF for which DOE has responsibility. Some of this SNF is currently
being managed at DOE facilities; some is being managed at non-DOE facilities.
1.3.2.6 Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel.
This EIS addresses the impacts of and alternatives to
transporting, receiving, and storing SNF from naval reactors (Navy warships and reactor prototypes) at a
number of sites across the country, including sites near the point of refueling or defueling. The analysis
includes alternative sites for naval fuel examination, as well as the possibility of phasing out this
examination. This EIS addresses existing naval SNF inventories and fuel to be generated from future
refuelings and defuelings.
1.4 Response to Public Comments
Volume 3, Response to Public Comments, was added to this EIS to fully address and respond to
public comments. In addition, DOE considered public comments, along with other factors such as
programmatic need, technical feasibility, and cost, in arriving at DOE's preferred alternatives. During the
public comment period for the Draft EIS, more than 1,430 individuals, agencies, and organizations provided
DOE with comments. A broad spectrum of private citizens; businesses; local, state, and Federal officials;
Native American tribes; and public interest groups are represented within this volume of comments.
Comments were received from all affected DOE and shipyard communities.
Volume 3 summarizes the comments on the EIS received by DOE during the public comment period
and provides responses to those comments. In addition, Volume 3 explains how public comments influenced
the selection of the preferred alternatives, discusses the extent to which public comments resulted in changes
to the EIS, and describes how to find specific comment summaries and responses in this volume.
Responses to comments consist of two parts. The first part summarizes the comment(s), and the
second part responds to the comment(s). Identical or similar comment(s) were frequently provided by more
than one commentor and, in such cases, DOE grouped the comments and prepared a single response for each
group. This summarization was also appropriate due to the large volume of comments received.
In compliance with National Environmental Policy Act and Council on Environmental Quality
regulations, public comments on the Draft EIS were assessed and considered both individually and
collectively by DOE and the Navy. Some comments resulted in modifications in the EIS or explanations of
why comments did not warrant further response. Most comments not requiring a change to the EIS resulted
in a response to correct factual misinterpretations, to explain or communicate government policy, to clarify
the scope of the EIS, to explain the relationship of the EIS to other related policy, to clarify the scope of the
EIS, to explain the relationship of the EIS to other related National Environmental Policy Act documentation,
to refer commentors to information in the EIS, to answer technical questions, or to further explain technical
issues. The Record of Decision will include the decision made by the Secretary of Energy, which will
consider public comments on the Draft EIS.
1.4.1 How DOE Considered Public Comments in the National Environmental Policy Act
Process
As required in the Council on Environmental Quality regulations [40 CFR 1502.14(e)], DOE's
preferred alternatives are identified in the Final EIS. The preferred alternatives for Volumes 1 and 2 were
identified based on the consideration of environmental impacts, regulatory compliance, DOE and SNF
programmatic missions, public issues and concerns, national security and defense, cost, and DOE policy.
Public input considered in the decisionmaking and preferred alternatives selection process included concerns,
desires, and opinions regarding the activities addressed in the EIS and expectations of DOE in making the
management decisions on complex-wide programmatic SNF management and environmental restoration and
waste management programs at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. Public input contributed to the
development of performance factors, defined as desirable attributes or characteristics that measure the
relative acceptability of alternatives, which were used to select candidate preferred alternatives. The
candidate preferred alternatives were then evaluated against a number of technical and nontechnical
sensitivities, including public perception of environmental impact, indicated stakeholder preferences,
implementation flexibility, regulatory risk, SNF processing potential, environmental justice, potential
resistance to implementation, and fairness. DOE's preferred alternative reflects DOE consensus that SNF
should be actively managed in preparation for ultimate disposition. In addition, DOE's preferred alternative
supports the implementation of a path forward for the ultimate disposition of SNF, a significant issue raised
by the public. The EIS, including its preferred alternatives, will be considered by the Secretary of Energy,
along with other factors, in arriving at a decision to be documented in a formal Record of Decision.
1.4.2 Changes to the Environmental Impact Statement Resulting from Public Comment
A major purpose of the National Environmental Policy Act is to promote efforts that will prevent or
eliminate damage to the environment by ensuring informed decisionmaking on major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. Consideration of public comments on the Draft
EIS helps to ensure that the EIS is an adequate decisionmaking tool; accordingly, this EIS has been enhanced,
as appropriate, in response to public comments. While a number of specific issues and concerns were raised
by commentors, none of the issues or concerns identified new reasonable alternatives requiring assessment or
resulted in significant change in the results of the analysis of the potential environmental consequences.
Based on review of public comments, coupled with the consultations held with commenting agencies
as well as State and tribal governments, the main EIS enhancements include the following:
Seismic and water resources discussions were reviewed, clarified, and enhanced for all
alternative sites, and current data and analyses were added to Volumes 1 and 2, as appropriate.
A discussion of potential accidents caused by a common initiator was added. The option of
stabilizing some of DOE's SNF (specifically from the N Reactor) by processing it at available
facilities located overseas was added, thus enhancing the processing options discussed in the
EIS. An analysis of barge transportation was added to the EIS, with respect to the option of
transporting N-Reactor fuel to a shipping point for overseas processing, as well as to support
the potential transport of Brookhaven National Laboratory SNF to another site, as appropriate.
In addition, an analysis of shipboard fires was added, primarily in response to comments
related to receiving SNF containing uranium of U.S. origin from foreign research reactors.
In Volume 2 of the EIS, the air quality analysis was revised to upgrade the existing baseline
conditions and impacts of alternatives in terms of the amount of Prevention of Significant
Deterioration (PSD) increment consumed, thus updating the baseline conditions presented for
the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. Additionally, the Waste Experimental Reduction
Facility project summary was enhanced and clarified. This EIS was also revised to reflect
current projections of employment, including the projected downsizing of the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory due to contractor consolidation.
In response to public comments, a brief summary of the results of a separate evaluation of the
costs of the various alternatives was added to the EIS, although the cost evaluation was
performed independently of the EIS for additional purposes. The discussion of the options
regarding the management of Fort St. Vrain SNF currently stored in Colorado has been
expanded. As committed to in the Draft EIS, the evaluation and discussion of environmental
justice has been expanded in both Volumes 1 and 2 of the EIS. This analysis was based on
interim DOE guidance in the absence of interagency policy in this regard and reflects limited
public comments received regarding environmental justice. Consultation with the commenting
Native American tribes is reflected in the environmental justice analysis, as well as in the
various sections of the EIS, as appropriate.
Other enhancements include a clarification that potential shipment of SNF containing uranium
of U.S. origin from foreign research reactors consists of a bounding estimate of 22 MTHM. In
addition, as a result of public comments, Volume 1 of the EIS was enhanced to clarify the
relationship between current DOE National Environmental Policy Act actions and this EIS.
Likewise, the relationship between the EIS and the Spent Fuel Vulnerability Action Plans was
clarified in this EIS. With respect to the naval SNF, Appendix D of Volume 1 was modified to
more fully explain the import of naval SNF and to discuss potential effects of terrorist attacks
at naval shipyards.